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**The Second International Seminar
on the Transformation of the World:
Economy and Society in the
Transformation of the World**

A Report of Proceedings

Madrid, Spain, September 1980

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THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY

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**THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORLD:
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN
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INTRODUCTION

The United Nations University's Project on Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World (SCA) — comprising two sub-projects, on Endogenous Intellectual Creativity (EIC) and on the Transformation of the World (TW), as well as a series of "convergence areas" — is proud to present this report on the second international seminar devoted to the implementation of the TW sub-project, "Economy and Society in the Transformation of the World," held jointly with the Faculty of Political Sciences and Sociology of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, under the chairmanship of Professor Salustiano del Campo Urbano, in Madrid, Spain, 15–19 September 1980.

The SCA project and its sub-projects are based on point 2 of Article 1, Purposes and Structure, of the Charter of the United Nations University: "The University shall devote its work to research into the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare . . . , with due attention to the social sciences and the humanities as well as natural sciences, pure and applied." It also aims to implement point 3 of the same article: "The research programmes . . . shall include, among other subjects, coexistence between peoples having different cultures, languages and social systems; peaceful relations between States and the maintenance of peace and security; human rights; economic and social change and development; the environment and the proper use of resources; basic scientific research and the application of the results of science and technology in the interests of development; and universal human values related to the improvement of the quality of life."

The quest of peoples, societies, nations, cultures, and civilizations, united in the United Nations system for peace and a new international order, can, through such seminars focus on the key area of differences and convergence: the transformation of the world in our time.

The SCA Project is proud and happy to be able to contribute to this major area of thought and action in our changing world.

Anouar Abdel-Malek
Project Co-ordinator

I. PRESENTATION AND GUIDELINES

Anouar Abdel-Malek

1. The UNU Project on Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World (SCA)

The main intent of the SCA project and its sub-projects is to evolve an international cultural and theoretical workshop towards the formulation of novel, creative positions of the problématique of human and social development during this time of world transformation.

The "novation," that is, the creative spirit of the SCA project, is to act jointly with seminal centres of scientific, intellectual, and cultural activity to develop converging sets of alternatives. We must bear constantly in mind two matters.

First, and above all, socio-cultural aspects of life are deeply rooted and genuinely representative of existing and prospective alternative potentials within different civilizations, cultures, and national specificities obtaining in our world. Through these formative moulds, the whole array of theoretical, philosophical, ideological, and methodological approaches will be invited to participate, so as to preserve the many-splendoured richness of mankind.

Secondly, but centrally too, we must seek always to ascertain the structural, continuous, dialectical links between concrete reality and ongoing and conflicting practices on the one hand, and the elaboration of concepts, theories, and systems on the other hand. This second consideration addresses itself essentially to practitioners of human and social development in all fields of socio-political activity proper.

The project is now organized in three major orientations:

- (a) the sub-project on Endogenous Intellectual Creativity;
- (b) the sub-project on the Transformation of the World;
- (c) a series of convergence areas.

A description of the first stage of the SCA project will be found in *The Project on Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World: Report on the Formative Stage (May 1978–December 1979)* (UN University, Tokyo, 1980).

1.1. The Sub-project on Endogenous Intellectual Creativity (EIC)

The original formulation of the sub-project on Endogenous Intellectual Creativity took the following two forms:

[1] Endogenous intellectual creativity: starting from the position that human and social development is, fundamentally, a process of self-reliance — at macro-level, by whole societies; at micro-level, by human groups and individuals — it will immediately appear that the key lies in endogenous (self-reliant) creativity as against the prevailing fashion of the transfer of knowledge, itself to be remodelled according to, precisely, alternative goals of development. And this creativity, contrary to exoticism and orientalism, lies at the very heart of the thought process itself, i.e., is essentially intellectual creativity, encompassing science, technology, philosophy, and social policy — jointly with culture and the arts. [Extracts from the Consultant's Report to Task Force Meeting, Tokyo, 6 — 10 June 1977]

[2] Endogenous intellectual creativity: understood as the contribution of the countries or cultures to human civilization; the study of how to give creativity precedence over transfer; and also the socio-economic framework in which creativity deploys. The absence of intellectual creativity should be considered as part of the framework. [Decisions of Task Force Meeting, Tokyo, 6 — 10 June 1977, p. 7]

A first dimension of the implementation of this sub-project has been a series of regional symposia in each of the major geo-cultural regions of the world (using Unesco's definition). Three regional symposia have been held to date: the First Asian Symposium on Intellectual Creativity in Endogenous Culture, held with the Institute of Humanistic Studies at Kyoto University, 13–17 November 1978; the Latin American Symposium on Cultura y Creación Intelectual en América Latina, held with the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 23–29 April 1979; and the Arab Symposium on Endogenous Intellectual Creativity in the Arab World, held with the University of Kuwait, 8–12 March 1980.

1.2. The Sub-project on the Transformation of the World (TW)

The central character of our times, of the real world in our times, resides in the transformation — not evolution, or transition (all historical periods are periods of transition) — of all dimensions of the life of human societies. To be sure, this transformation, acknowledged by all quarters and groups all over the world, is neither unilinear nor synchronic. At the first level, we are witnesses to major differences in the quality, quantity, and, more so, the tempo and impact, of processes of transformation in different sectors of social life and activity — economic production; patterns of power; societal cohesiveness; cultural identity; civilizational projects;

political ideologies; philosophies; ideologies; myths, etc. — in short, all sectors of what is usually termed the infrastructure and superstructure of society. At a second, more visible and forceful level, we do acknowledge distinctions between different types of societies, e.g., in the different types of socio-economic formations and the accompanying political ideologies (basically capitalism, liberal capitalism, and monopoly capitalism; and socialism, national progressive socialism, and communism). And even more so, in the hitherto neglected dimension of civilizational, cultural, and national specificity, we encounter major, more resilient, and protracted sets of differences.

This transformation of the world can be recognized in the following three sets of factors, which lend themselves to being reordered according to different conceptions of priorities.

(1) The resurgence of the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to contemporaneity, in both the socio-political and civilizational-cultural fields: The historical processes of national liberation and independence, coupled with national and social revolutions, have gathered momentum since their inception in modern times, during the early part of the nineteenth century, until they became the dominant factor of contemporary history from the years following 1917 and especially in the period 1945–1973. This vast transformation has been seen by Western specialists as a socio-political process, within the traditional conception of the world's history (as consisting of one centre — Europe, later Europe and North America: i.e., the Western world — and its periphery, the Orient, i.e., Asia, Africa, the Arab world, later joined by Latin America). The three continents were emerging, but what was/is emerging is seen in socio-political terms. On the other side of the river, especially in the Orient — Asia, Africa, and the Arab world — this process of emergence was seen essentially as a process of renaissance of either culture or civilization, as in the Arab and Islamic "Nadah" and in Meiji Japan, in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the upsurge of Africanism, while Latin America's quest for identity has brought to light the hitherto hidden Indian and Indian-African elements of the culture.

(2) A parallel, major set of formative factors in this transformation appears to have developed between 1848 and 1973, and especially from October 1917, the date of the first socialist revolution in history. The hitherto equanimous front of the bourgeoisies in power was suddenly faced with the eruption of the labouring people into power, coupled with a populist *Weltanschauung* geared towards a persistently more humane life for the have-nots. Sixty years later, nearly half of mankind lives under socialism, while two of the three main centres of influence in our times follow that path.

(3) More recently, a third set of factors has become more visible, centring upon the immense progress accomplished in the fields of science and technology. Here again, while certain advanced western countries opted for such denominations of description as the "scientific and technological revolution," or "post-industrial society," on the

other side of the river the vision remained paradoxically nearer to more realistic approaches, using the more traditional concepts of "revolution," "development," "social transformation," within the implacable parameters of geopolitics. Yet, none would deny the message and ever-growing influence of the application of modern technologies in our world, in the very fabric of our individual life through the complexity of societal processes. The transformation of the world: how can it be related to the social and human sciences, political and social theories, to the philosophical quest? And, proceeding from there, how can this lead to the path of the study of human and social development?

This general theme of the Transformation of the World is to be studied through a series of international seminars dealing with its major dimensions, as follows:

- (a) Science and Technology – with the University of Belgrade, 22-27 October 1979,
- (b) Economy and Society – with the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 15-19 September 1980,
- (c) Culture and Thought,
- (d) Religion and Philosophy,
- (e) History and International Relations,
- (f) Civilizational Prospectives – to be held at the University of Hiroshima, in symbolic homage.

1.3. The Convergence Areas

A series of convergence areas has been defined, with a view to help in the tasks of scientific and theoretical elaboration proper, thus:

(1) *Cultural identity and socio-political change.* This area will benefit from the uses of the concept of specificity, away from abstract essentialist typologies. And it will thus naturally lead to refine the different, and differing, positions of the problems of development itself, through the complex processes at work in the fields of social dialectics, of the perpetuation and novation, transformation, rise, and decline, and renaissance and crisis of human societies.

(2) *New and emerging perceptions of prospects for human civilization.* This is the field of the transformation of the world in our times, of the new international order (which is not only "economic"). It will have to assess the different perceptions of this global transformation – at geopolitical, political, economic, strategic levels certainly, but also at the levels of ideas and theories, of modes of societal maintenance and evolution – as conceived of, and felt by, major civilizational and national-cultural areas of our world, encompassing the various political and social philosophies, religions, and ideologies. A key area appears to be the notion of the civilizational project, often conceived of as a societal project (*le projet de société*), and its interrelation with the mainstream of socio-political systems and their accompanying ideologies.

(3) *Specificity and universality.* At work through all scientific problem areas of our project is the problem and concept of specificity. It would, therefore, be proper to develop a universally valid theory of specificity, from and bearing upon major civilizational and national-cultural areas of the world. A second, culminating step would then be to explore and consolidate the bridges between such specificities and our goal of universality in the forthcoming epoch of human history.

Throughout, this whole project will be approached in a spirit of non-antagonistic dialectical contradictions leading to complementarity.

2. Guidelines on Scientific Contents

2.1. General Orientations

The central preoccupation should be with the scientific field and tonality of the major theme. Sub-themes, and their divisions and labelling, should be considered as a way to arrange presentation of position papers under discussion, not a way for intellectual segregation between "disciplines." It should be clearly borne in mind by all concerned with the writing of position papers as well as by the discussants that:

- a global interactional, multi-disciplinary approach is always to inform reports and discussions; and
- this is to obtain, as indicated above, in presentations and discussions, linking organically and persistently social practice and theoretical elaboration.

Position papers, as well as presentations by discussants, are not to deal with "case studies." Our symposium is not one further agglomeration of more refined analyses of different situations, nor is it intended to provide another forum for detached theoretical and epistemological pronouncements. Position papers and presentations by discussants should remember the wording of the Charter of the United Nations University:

The University shall devote its work to research into the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations and its agencies, with due attention to the social sciences and the humanities as well as natural sciences, pure and applied. [Article 1, point 2]

The research programmes of the institutions of the University shall include, among other subjects, coexistence between peoples having different cultures, languages and social systems; peaceful relations between States and the maintenance of peace and security; human rights; economic and social change and development; the environment and the proper use of resources; basic scientific

research and the application of the results of science and technology in the interests of development; and universal human values related to the improvement of the quality of life. [Article 1, point 3]

This orientation will enable us to provide for the location of innovations, of creativity, on the one hand. And it will also help us towards an evaluation of the immediate, more direct impact of such innovations and creativity; an evaluation of its effects in the geo-cultural area concerned; and, finally, an evaluation of the potential uses of such innovations and creativity in the structuring of the new universalism, which is the overall concern of the international community of scholars and the United Nations University proper.

More detailed guidelines of a practical nature will be offered in section 3 below.

2.2. Orientations for Session 1 — Changing Patterns in World Economy

This is the introductory general session for this seminar devoted to Economy and Society in the Transformation of the World. It will address the following areas:

- (1) The problem of the world economy and the world market: its origins and structuration; its present differentiation. The analysis will be conducted in a comparative prospective manner with a view to locate and better understand the formative factors in the transformation of present patterns of world economy, cutting across oppositional distinctions, with their substantive core, between different socio-economic systems — the so-called first, second, and third worlds, the so-called North and South, the so-called centre and periphery.
- (2) The study of the interaction between the actual and potential developments of economic self-reliance — i.e., national and regional economic self-reliance — faced with the impact and parameters of major forces in world economy. This area seems crucial to better understand the dialectics between national-cum-international emerging patterns, their constraints, feasibility, and acceptability, challenges and negative aspects.
- (3) Particular care will be given to the hitherto marginal forces in world economy, mainly Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the problématique of oil, raw materials, and food to the interplay of forces making for the future of world economy.

2.3. Orientations for Session 2 — The Scientific and Technological Revolution: Its Impact on Urban and Rural Societies

This session will be devoted to a prospective of current debates on the revolutionary character of science and technology in our times: whether it is a revolution *per se*, or the second, albeit much higher, stage of the industrial revolution, etc.

The scientific and technological revolution will be principally considered as of its impact on urban and rural societies, in both the developing and the developed countries, as well as its relevance to their socio-economic, cultural, and political development. Among other problems to be considered are the following:

- (1) The interrelation between the technological and scientific revolution on one hand, and national and social revolutions on the other.
- (2) The menaces and constraints of the "Promethean" approach to the scientific and technological revolution: problems of nuclear energy; the finite character of raw materials available in the world, etc.
- (3) The conditions of mankind in the new environment created by the scientific and technological revolution: the constraints of the technological control of personal, communal, and social life; mass media and popular culture; the spiritual dimension of affluence and the quest for affluence, etc.
- (4) A study of technocracy and technocrats, i.e., the organic intellectuals of the scientific and technological systems.
- (5) Attitudes generated by the scientific and technological revolution in the countryside, especially among the peasantry of under-developed countries; paths to mobilize the hidden potentials of the peasantry; obstacles to the penetration of the scientific and technological revolution, and perceptions of this revolution by the marginalized sector of the peasantry.
- (6) A prospective of urban problems: the control of space and power; the quality of life in urban geo-areas.

2.4. Orientations for Session 3 – Social Power: The State, the Working People, the Hegemonic Classes

This session would appear to be the convergent part of the seminar, where promises and contradictions will reach their explicit manifestation and will be, therefore, more amenable to analysis, criticism, and reshaping.

- (1) The traditional problématique of the State, viewed especially as an analysis of the modern contents of social power, through the State; a study of its new functions, areas of relevance, in capacity of reshaping. Attention will be devoted to the problems of the "withering away of the State" as against the strengthening of State power and machine in contemporary societies.
- (2) The transformation and prospective functions and character of the urban working

class, the rural labourers, the white-collar workers, the technocratic and scientific group of specialist workers, and the intellectuals. A question might be that of the emergence of a wider category — the working people — encompassing, in most countries of the under-developed world in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, essentially the masses of the working peasantry, with a core area of lesser size in the urban working class and proletariat.

(3) The problem of alliances obtaining in different socio-political settings for the working people will here be addressed through and within the various scenarios now obtaining, and capable of obtaining.

(4) The hegemonic classes seen in a wider perspective than the socio-economic class and group per se; the accompanying diffusion of hegemony and influence within societies; social hegemony, rational power, influence, etc., as interlocking aspects of the hegemony problems in the internal sphere of social dialectics.

(5) The armed forces and social order; the transformation of societies within the parameters of the transformation of the world balance of power in our times and in the foreseeable future.

2.5. Orientations for Session 4 — Youth, Sex, Family: The Quest for New Life Units

This session will deal with the pivotal access of human continuity, i.e., the biological and psychological and affective dimension of inter-human intimate relations. It will devote particular attention to the emergence of youth as a powerful social actor in both advanced industrialized countries and under-developed societies, at the optimal point of convergence of bio-sexual and affective surge on the one hand, with political mobilization and activism on the other. It will address some important issues:

(1) A prospective of the changing forms of family, sex life, amorous relations, and more generally of the institutions in institutionalization of affective inter-human patterns.

(2) The interplay between the more immediate cell, i.e., the family or couple, and wider circles of societal cohesiveness, maintenance, and transformation: family, professional groups; social groups and classes; schools of thought and action; spiritual groups; political and national orientations; etc.

(3) A prospection of the subtle, yet fundamental, linkages between images of man, the spiritual-philosophic dimension of our human condition in an immensely variegated array of societal formations and types obtaining in our world and the deepest, most intimate core manifestation of this emotional dimension with the socio-economic-political and cultural constraints.

- (4) Particular attention will be paid to the emergence of youth as a major social actor in the transformation of the world, cutting across economic, political, sexual, and societal categories and typologies.

The central theme of the all-encompassing frame of the SCA project, i.e., the transformation of the world (the so-called "emerging new international order"), will obviously have a direct impact on the general theme and sub-themes of our seminar. We will remember at every step that we are not collecting archival data towards one more exercise in intellectual exchange. For what is at stake, verily, is serious, critical, and constructive progress towards a better comprehension of the urgent problems and issues confronting human societies in our times, towards evolving alternative, novel, paths of evolution.

No "recipes" — but a deeper understanding, a more genuine comprehension of forces deep at work, and, therefore, a higher capacity to take action and help take action.

3. Technical Guidelines

3.1. Nature of Position Papers

As repeatedly indicated above, position papers are essentially designed to lead towards a more refined, diversified, deepened *problématique* of the general theme and its sub-themes. This *problématique* will be developed on the basis of detailed research at national, regional/cultural, and comparative levels, the prospective being that of the state of the art. It would be useful for papers to lead towards what their authors feel to be interesting theoretical elaboration, deeply rooted in the critical/comparative analyses of socio-cultural processes at work in the general area and its constitutive societies.

3.2. Structure of Position Papers

It might be interesting to prepare position papers in the following manner:

- the first part would be devoted to *results* of detailed research;
- the second part would be devoted to *problématique* and *prospective*, as of the different major *realistic scenarios* towards both practical policy definition and theoretical elaboration.

It would be extremely useful for each position paper to be followed by a critical review of existing bibliography, inasmuch as the book of proceedings (position papers and discussions) will serve as a major textbook in our field for advanced students and research workers, as well as for policy-planners.

3.3. Sessions

It is hoped that sessions will concentrate on the thematic presentation of the main theses of each position paper — in lieu of the reading of papers — combined with extensive discussions of the theses presented.

Discussion itself will be led by discussants. It will also contain its equal share of direct participation from the floor of an interactional type, capable of creating intellectual momentum.

The roles of session chairmen and rapporteurs will be essential to maintain this style of interaction and intellectual momentum.

The levels of discussion and elaboration as "logic of consensus" — on the basis of our seminal experience in Kyoto, as implemented notably in the first international seminar of the TW sub-project in Belgrade (22-26 October 1979) — will follow a three-tier path:

(1) A first level, the level of preliminary general discussion, will obtain for each of the four sessions, immediately after the short presentation of position papers. All participants will thus be in a position to intervene and broadly assess the general orientations and problems of all papers for all the sessions of the seminar.

(2) The second level, the level of detailed systematic discussion, will take place during the day devoted to the four working groups, one for each of the sessions — each working group being made up of those participants who wish to enter into an in-depth discussion and elaboration of the theme of that particular session.

Each session will have one or two rapporteurs, who will follow closely the presentation and discussion in the plenary session and in the corresponding working group, and will summarize and interrelate them in a meaningful manner towards their convergence in the General Report.

(3) The concluding level of the discussion will take place during the final plenary session, devoted to the presentation, amendment, and adoption of the reports from the sessions and of the General Report of the seminar.

In short, every effort is to be undertaken to overcome the usual monotonous, repetitive, and over-formalized type of meeting. What is at stake is the launching, through intellectual creativity, of a major United Nations University project geared towards mobilizing the creative potential of the international intellectual, cultural, and scientific communities, hopefully bringing forth, and putting before policy-makers and the wider public alike, novel ideas, alternative models, and new thought about our evolving future.

II. OPENING ADDRESSES

1: Salustiano del Campo

Chairman of the Seminar

En 1969, el entonces Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, U Thant, propuso la creación de una Universidad cuyos objetivos fuesen el entendimiento de las causas y soluciones de los principales problemas globales y aumentar la repercusión práctica de la investigación y preparación avanzadas en todos los países, mediante la colaboración entre los científicos y estudiosos del mundo entero, prestando especial atención a los países subdesarrollados.

Fundada en 1973, de acuerdo con estas directrices, que formuló un Comité "ad hoc", la UNU tiene su sede central en Tokio y cuenta ya con una red de actividades de investigación y especialización en sesenta países. Su presupuesto se nutre de las rentas de su capital propio, que se espera alcance eventualmente los 500 millones de dólares, y de contribuciones de 26 Estados, que van desde Japón con 100 millones a la Santa Sede con 50.000 dólares. Se rige por un Consejo de 24 miembros, nombrado conjuntamente por el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas y el Director General de la UNESCO que designan también de entre ellos al Rector. Precisamente el día primero de este mes ha iniciado su mandato Soedjatmoko, segundo Rector de la Universidad. El mandato de los Consejeros dura seis años y su elección se hace a título individual, ya que la Universidad es una institución académica autónoma y no un organismo intergubernamental.

La Universidad organiza su trabajo en tres programas: "El hambre en el mundo", "Uso y gestión de los recursos naturales" y "Desarrollo humano y social". Todos ellos son interdisciplinarios e internacionales. El Programa sobre "El hambre en el mundo" se ocupa de las políticas bromatológicas de los Estados, de evitar las pérdidas de alimentos tras las cosechas y de obtener información acerca de las exigencias nutritivas en las zonas tropicales. El programa "Uso y gestión de los recursos naturales" se centra en problemas de ecología y energía. El de "Desarrollo humano y social" constituye un foro para el debate sobre la evaluación de las estrategias de desarrollo y abarca cuatro áreas: problemas del desarrollo, tecnología para el desarrollo, educación para el desarrollo y derechos humanos y desarrollo.

El Seminario Internacional que hoy comienza en Madrid sobre "Economía y Sociedad en la Transformación del Mundo", sigue al celebrado en Belgrado con el tema "Ciencia

y Sociedad en la Transformación del Mundo" y se encuadra en el Proyecto "Alternativas Socio-culturales de desarrollo en un mundo en transformación" que coordina el Profesor Anouar Abdel-Malek. Está estructurado en cuatro secciones: "Modalidades cambiantes de la economía mundial," "El impacto de la revolución científica y tecnológica en las sociedades urbana y rural," "Poder social: El Estado, los trabajadores y las clases hegemónicas," y "La búsqueda de nuevas unidades de vida: Juventud, sexo y familia."

Todo el Seminario está orientado a mostrar las interrelaciones entre economía y sociedad, pero con conciencia de que no pueden ser explicados de una manera demasiado simple. El proceso de transformación económico-social experimentado en España a partir de 1960, aproximadamente, es buena prueba de ello. En nuestro país las magnitudes macroeconómicas se dispararon en unos pocos años, es cierto, pero no lo es menos que ello fué posible por una serie de movilizaciones espontáneas de la población, que hicieron posible que el cambio social acontecido en España en tres lustros superase al registrado en tres siglos. La redistribución de la población, la emigración a otros países de Europa Occidental, el turismo, las transformaciones en la vida familiar, los cambios en la estructura ocupacional, la explosión educativa, la generalización de los modernos medios de comunicación de masas y las nuevas pautas de consumo son algunos casos ilustrativos en una evolución que hizo posible que España, tras la muerte del General Franco, pudiese afrontar su democratización, asentándola en una sociedad bastante moderna ya.

Pero esta posibilidad democrática que ha avanzado mucho en nuestro país desde 1975 se halla hoy encuadrada dentro de una crisis económica de grandes proporciones: crecimiento económico mínimo en 1980, tasa de paro del 12 por ciento, gran déficit presupuestario, etc. Y precisamente ahora as también cuando los economistas más perspicaces advierten contra el riesgo que esta crítica situación entraña para nuestro sistema democrático. Recientemente, el Profesor E. Fuentes Quintana, tal vez el más ilustre de nuestros economistas actuales, ha hecho notar que la falta de una respuesta suficiente al conjunto de problemas que plantea la crisis económica esta poniendo en peligro nada menos que la legitimidad de nuestra naciente democracia y su continuidad.

De estos asuntos vamos a ocuparnos estos días en Madrid, en una perspectiva universal, unos cuantos hombres que, llegados de los más diversos lugares del globo, nos sentimos parte de una Universidad cuyo campus no tiene límites. La Universidad de las Naciones Unidas es un nuevo tipo de Universidad para un nuevo tipo de mundo, que actúa a través de *instituciones asociadas*, que cooperan en sus programas. Hasta el momento la única institución asociada española es la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología de la Universidad Complutense, que copatrocina este segundo Seminario Internacional, aunque esperamos que él sea un comienzo firme, dada la calidad de los participantes y la atención que ha atraído. S.M. el Rey de España ha accedido a recibir a los miembros

del Seminario y este dato permite valorar en cuanto aprecio se tiene ya en España a la Universidad de las Naciones Unidas. Deseo, por ello, que todos Vds. obtengan mucho provecho científico de los trabajos de los próximos días y, asimismo, que se sientan felices entre nosotros. El Comité Organizador, a cuyos miembros agradezco desde aquí su colaboración, ha hecho todo lo humanamente posible para que así sea.

2. From Developmentalism to the Civilizational Quest: A Mission for the United Nations University

Anouar Abdel-Malek

Nobody, to be sure, chooses his time in history. Yet, the timing of this, our second international seminar devoted to the implementation of the sub-project on the Transformation of the World — itself part of the project on Socio-cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World within the United Nations University's Human and Social Development Programme — takes place, under the auspices of the Faculty of Political Science and Sociology of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, only a few days after the first salvos devoted to the inauguration of the United Nations third development decade and simultaneously with the important Second Meeting on European Security in the capital city of free and democratic Spain. It so happens that the dimension to be explored this year of the processes making for, and converging towards, the transformation of the world is, precisely, the dimension of economy and society. We are therefore meeting at a particularly propitious time and moment, directly summoned to face this converging, yet so very divergent, flow of analyses and recommendations which address themselves to the challenges and, much less so, to the promises of the historical period which began to take shape as of the turning-point earmarked by the years 1949 to 1973.

A mounting pile of disasters forecast would suggest a growing consensus — at least at first glance. Already, the interesting summing up and ordering of available data by the Brandt Commission and the Commission's harnessing of these data towards its call for a massive new transfer of resources from rich to poor, looking towards the North-South summit in 1981, had the great merit of presenting a well-argued, reasoned, and reasonable approach to the dangerous challenges now facing all sectors of our world. Then, in mid-summer, on 24 July 1980, the conclusions of a three-year US presidential report, "The Global 2000 Report," indicated: "Time is running out for international action to prevent the world from becoming a starving, overcrowded, polluted, resource-poor planet The potential for global problems of alarming proportions by the year 2000 — environmental, resource, and population stresses are intensifying and will increasingly determine the quality of human life on our planet If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more crowded, more polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to disruption than the world we live in now." A month later, on 17 August, the third annual World Development Report, by the World Bank, predicted five years of sluggish growth until 1985, and an

extremely painful situation for the poorest group of countries, where more than eight hundred million of our brethren survive in misery, hardship and pain. *Sotto voce*, there were hints that, perhaps, after all, the non-affluent societies ought not to aim at a duplication of the Western pattern of growth.

But then what?

Thirty-five years after Yalta and Hiroshima, the epoch of the great waves of national and social revolutions and transformations in our times, including the two development decades, we are led to believe that problems remain untackled, their roots and solutions, profusely discussed by major intellectual schools of thought and action, still obscure. A time for anxiety and despair — the very tonality of the negative mind deep at work in the very fabric of large sectors of hegemonic cultures and mass media: "Apocalypse now."

Against this context, firmly rooted in the achievements of different paths and modes of political and societal behaviour, in the capacity of human societies to better identify their endogenous potentials and resources, in the ethos, too, in the growing feeling that different human paths of social evolution are to be sought, in earnest, springs the principled attitude of large sectors, ever widening, of intellectuals as citizens of their countries, cultures, civilizations, and the world — at one and the same time — to seek the roots, the hidden causality, of mounting dangers, or, at best, of the stalemate.

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A careful analysis of the course of discussions of the great debate around the twin poles of liberation and development since 1945 gives us one first clue to the present ambiguity.

In the first post-war phase — from 1945 to around 1960, from Yalta to the break-up of the traditional imperial patterns of hegemony — the position of the problem, of the whole problématique of the dialectics of liberation and development, was definitely political. The fall of fascism under the combined onslaught of the world-wide front of democracies and socialism; the wave of national liberation movements, leading to the emergence of an array of new independent states around the nucleus of resurgent national independent states, the formation of a group of socialist countries in the West, and, more so, the organic imbrication of liberation and socialism in China, Korea, Viet Nam, Cuba, Algeria, side by side with the national progressive orientation in the Bandoeng Afro-Asian group around Nasserism; the still prevalent feeling of the boundless character of the Promethean vision of the world, comforted at that time by the tempo and sheer scope of material and infrastructural reconstruction after the great war of 1939-1945; such were the major converging formative factors which led,

objectively, to the "primacy of the political" in the complex dialectical problématique of liberation and development at that time. Such was the objective environment, at world level, the formative mould of the great theoretical interlude. The historicist-dialectical orientation centred on the interrelation between national movements and imperialism, dependence and independence, with the rising factor of national-cultural identity as a running stream throughout. But, more importantly, the structuralist-functional, neo-positivistic approach to these beginnings of the transformation of the world — "Le grand vent de l'histoire," in the words of Charles de Gaulle — centred on the concepts of "centre" and "periphery," of the semantics and theology of economism and productivism already heralding the new wave. Obviously, owing to the balance of forces at work, both in the political and intellectual spheres, this second orientation became the most prevalent in the fields of the human and social sciences after Yalta. Yet the very movement of history allowed for the clear formulation of central theses and positions, asserting the primacy of the political but at the same time insisting on the necessity of going beyond — to seek the hidden part of the iceberg — in the civilizational and cultural formative dimensions of social dialectics.

Yet, quite obviously, this political position of the problem, with its cultural undertones, could hardly fit the exuberant mood of the time. The crystallization of a new world imperium around the USA, the resurgence of China and its civilization, the amazing reconstruction of Germany and Western Europe, the rise of Japan from Hiroshima to the second leading position in industry and technology, the upsurge of the USSR and the socialist group of countries, the strengthening of national economies in states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America all seemed to point to the primacy of economics and even more, of technology. Such was the launching path of the ethos of the so-called "stages of development" as well as of what was perceived as the scientific and technological revolution, the post-industrial electronic age in advanced societies.

From the early 1960s onwards, the dialectics of liberation and development came to be seen in a growing way as the single path of development, in an economicistic-technicist powerful blend that constituted the mainland of developmentalism. More than ever, the imitation of advanced societies in the West, the sanctification of productivism, consumerism, and boundless hedonism appeared to express the many-sided felicities of Prometheus Rex, of man as demiurge. Thus started the Golden Age of experts, both the professional technocrats and the self-styled saviours of mankind; there was the so-called "third world" to prospect, edify and salvage, while, in turn, the élite of the three marginalized continents could seek polite admission solely by their co-optation in the élitist groups of developers towards "the modernization of poverty," as sketched by Galal A. Amin.¹

Then, in 1973, oil as a weapon came to deepen the impact of the loss of South-East Asia: all of a sudden, out of the blue, verily, the mirage of productivism, consumerism, hedonism, the very spirit of the rise of the Western world to hegemony from the fifteenth century came to be seen as severely limited by the unfolding, precisely, of

the concrete social dialectics of the real-concrete societies of mankind in our time. Disruption of the public equanimity in any one historical period cannot but have destabilizing effects: from productivism to populism, from consumerism to basic communities, from hedonism to . . . — but then hedonism was there to stay. A recent statement by an experienced Western observer succinctly sums up the itinerary from the first political-cultural stage to the second economicistic-technicist one, having the special merit of centring on the strategies developed by the United Nations system:

But by the end of the Sixties, it became obvious that this "trickle-down" theory would take centuries to wipe out poverty. Obscene inequalities had developed and in many countries the numbers of absolute poor had grown. Over the second development decade, new approaches were tested and have now gelled into a coherent strategy, focused on reducing inequalities.

The World Bank proclaimed that economic growth was not enough: it had to be accompanied with redistribution of investment and productive assets to the poor and the neglected rural areas.

The International Labour Office championed the view that growth of income alone was insufficient: the basic needs of the poor, from food, clothing and shelter to public services and paying jobs, should be met quickly through detailed planning.

UNICEF and the World Health Organization developed the basic services approach to meeting public needs, sanitation, water or housing. Instead of providing Western standards for the lucky few, a modest but adequate level of service could be provided to the many by using cheap materials, simple technology, brief training for grassroots workers, and popular participation. Thus, on the eve of the Third Development Decade, the Third World has at its disposal a new, alternative model of development.

The essence can be summed up in one phrase: self-help and increasing self-reliance. And it can work, as thousands of successful projects already demonstrate.²

As we consider these two main stages in the dialectics of independence of liberation and development between 1945 and 1980, we are bound to incline towards the differentiation here established. Yet a striking particularity seems to lie at their very roots. For, in truth, both approaches address themselves to the question of "how" instead of "why," to method — or rather "methodology" — as instrumentation rather than to "purposes," to "technique" instead of "aims," in short, to instrumentation in lieu of vision. The whole model, the matrix, the civilizational project of the West, from the fifteenth century to our times, never for one moment is called to question. It seems assumed — by both orientations — that nothing different can, or indeed could, be obtained. Even facing the dwindling resources of our world? Even so, so it seems.

This is an attitude which, inter alia, helps explain the emerging hints about the non-repetitive character of the Western processes of development, which now begin to surface in select sectors of the Western media — to the growing horror and despair of the thriving battalions of good Westernizers/modernizers at large.

Where, then, do we go from here?

II

Could we go back to where we started, i.e., to mid-summer 1980, amidst predictions of gloom and danger? Significantly, *The Times* published at that time a series of four articles by Peter Hazelhurst on "The Place of Japan in the World Today and the Triumph of Its Economy."

Japan has unwittingly just won the Second World War, by dint of hard work, superior managerial skill and an ability to adapt quickly to advanced technology. The Japanese have, in fact, exceeded the wildest dreams of their military masters four decades ago The vitality which has driven Japan to the top is demonstrated in the almost frightening fact that a people representing only 3 per cent of the world's population and inhabiting only 0.3 per cent of the entire area of the globe, account for 10 per cent of the world's total economic activities. Even more remarkable is the fact that Japan's success story has been achieved by an island people with no resources whatever

There can be little doubt that Japan's economic miracle is founded upon another great achievement: one of the most highly educated societies in the world.

So much for the economic achievement. What about societal processes?

The Japanese are not plagued by class antagonisms, the rate of violent crime is low and declining. Strikes are rare and there is little evidence of vandalism. Graffiti is almost non-existent Unlike in the West, the successful individual who stands out in a group is not admired in Japan — the collective will of one's immediate group, be it in a company work squad or a neighbourhood association, is much more important. The watch-words of the social order are agreement and harmony.³

A stupendous, or infuriating, miracle success story as it no doubt is, depending on the standpoint of the observers. Then, as the field is defined, accurately and with precision, the question remains in its entity. How to account for such an anomalous situation? Could massive industrialization, the most stupendous advances of the scientific and technological revolution, fail to distort the social fabric in the way to which we are witness everywhere in the world, as of the American model? Facing this panel of queries, epigones of the political orientation would heavily insist on the benefits which

accrued to Japan from its low posture in international politics and strategy since 1945, its dependence on the Western umbrella and immense capacity for international resilience.

They would also point to the very strong tradition of hierarchy and authority in Japanese society, which does account for an important part of the story. What else? Should we turn to the advocates of the economicistic-developmentalist orientation, we would find specialists even more baffled by this incomprehensible unique case, which alas cannot be dubbed "marginal." For here, as nowhere else, we reach the apex of incomprehension — as of pre-postulated concepts, categories, and "theories."

Therefore, the question remains: Where do we go from here?

Some time ago, and till very recently indeed, any attempt to interpret the Japanese miracle through the lenses of a historicist dialectical conception of history, reaching for the historical formation of its own national-cultural specificity within the wider mould of the civilizational vision of the Orient, of Asia, to which Japan belongs, would have been dubbed non-scientific or, to say the least, erratic. Yet the most respectable daily journal of the West, in its admirable editorial "Behind the Japanese Miracle," finds the courage to question "the supremacy of Western culture":

Behind the economic story there is the shared social creed that makes the warp and weft of Japanese society so much more secure than our own. This security is not simply the result of a discipline or conformism or hierarchy which Western democracy has long since outgrown. It is the legacy of the Confucian State system which dominated China's history and was imparted to her neighbours Korea and Vietnam. Although it did not take root in Japan during the era when Chinese culture was imported before A.D. 1000 it was virtually the official doctrine during the Tokugawa rule (1615–1867) which immediately preceded Japan's century of modernization on the Western model. Whatever the current political doctrines governing these four countries, the deep stream of Confucian thinking still runs in all of them.

This fact may have been disguised in the past thirty years by Japan's attachment to many aspects of Western culture from the best music, art and literature to the latest fad of youth culture. Yet running through Japan's postwar economic and political arrangements will be found the old instinct for consensus rather than adversary politics, the old respect for hierarchy, the natural acceptance of co-operation and compromise in all aspects of life.

What, then, is missing?

What the West often overlooks is that Japan and the three other countries sharing in East Asian civilization have at all times during the past century seen themselves in confrontation, and often in conflict, with the Western world. That

followed from each having been wrested out of its old enclosed world by Western power in the nineteenth century. Since then their modernization, their political manoeuvres, their constant self-analysis and internal debates have always in essence revolved round their relationship to the West. How, they have constantly asked themselves, can we equal them and regain our pride? How in doing so, can we ensure that our own distinctive civilization will not be undermined in the process?

Wherefore the conclusion:

The Western world has been slow to appreciate the constant swell of this long process of adjustment; slower still to realize that if East Asia must admit influences from the West then surely the West must arrive at its own assessment of this residual Confucianism.

Finally, the heart and kernel of the matter:

To reduce polarities to the simplest definition it could be said that the imperative of the East Asian outlook is human obligation. Japanese are born into families as the basic group and loyalties must work upwards from there or society cannot function. Against this is a Western view of being born as individuals and seeking thereafter a fulfilment to which first the family and later society should contribute. The East Asian emphasizes human obligations, the West human rights.

Thus far East Asia has found the concept of individualism repellent or difficult to digest. Thus far the West has found East Asia's conformism and consequent inhibition of original thought as no less undesirable. No good would be had by each pointing only to the faults of the other. Perhaps the West should now be more ready than in the past to take note of East Asian virtues.⁴

I have quoted at length so as to present what perhaps has been the most striking and authoritative analysis in recent times. The most revealing, too. This is neither the time nor the place to present anew to our distinguished audience our theses on the dialectics of time.⁵ Yet what *The Times* designates as "East Asian" is rather to be defined as "Oriental": East Asia has been visibly more fortunate than the other major civilizational circle of the Orient — the Islamic-Arab circle — in maintaining the continuity of its specificity, owing to its geo-political and strategic distance. For the vision of time does determine the accepted patterns of social and inter-human relations.

III

We are leaving the shores of methodology as instrumentation, to the core hinterland of

purposes, meaning, significance — the transition from "how" to "why" — thus only but echoing the in-depth movements at work in the whole range of human and social sciences and thought, at the heart of the transformation of the world in our times, as of the crucial period of 1949-1973.

As we join hands with the variegated panoply of national, regional, international, and transnational institutions engaged in the prospection of the avenues to the future, essentially around the promotion of the indispensable New International Economic Order, we are bound to define the specificity of the United Nations University's quest and endeavours: in short, of a mission for the United Nations University, springing from its very Charter.

We are therefore called upon to formulate the broad orientations for prospective research and thought dealing with the dimension of economy and society at the times of the transformation of the world which our SCA Project would like to stress, at the converging point of and within the broader mould of the United Nations University's programmes and projects concerned with this field.

1. Quite naturally, the starting point of such a thrust — concerned, precisely, with the *transformation* of the world — can only be towards that which is changing, as against the restatement of acquired knowledge and accepted ideas. In this quest, a clear distinction ought to obtain between that which is new and that which is innovative, between novelty as the formative influence in fashion and innovation, between the avant-garde and creativity. A tenuous divide, no doubt. The usual criterion of social efficacy, itself geared to the ethos of productivism and consumerism and more generally to the rationale of scientism and the primacy of technology, can be but a starting point. It is of importance to go beyond, to seek the reasons wherefore the hidden potentials of a given society, or cultural ensemble, lie dormant, or have been made to be so or look so. From that point, our critical quest could proceed to select such patterns of societal — or, better, socio-cultural — maintenance through transformation, which alone seem to strengthen national-cultural identity, now rightly seen as a vital requirement of an acceptable humane new world pattern.

The distinction between "modernism" and "modernity" could be of a genuine help in this realm: modernism, as the apex of hegemonic reductionism, of the centre and periphery approach internalized and accepted by docile peripheries; while modernity would seek, precisely, to ensure the maintenance of specificity through transformation, and even more so the identification and harnessing of the potentials specific to this very transformation.

Such an attitude would require us to focus on select instances where modernity has obtained — combining national-cultural specificity and radical transformation — with a view to better comprehending the common factors at work in totally different

historically defined societies and yet capable of parallel if not identical degrees of efficacy, of efficient actualization. And this comparative study could then be reversed to better eliminate the barriers to such a process, helping all concerned to define policies capable of overcoming the hidden breaks that distort and nullify.

2. As we bear in mind the immense differences between geo-cultural areas, as well as the very differing socio-economic and political-ideological systems of each area, including the *tempi* of acceleration and resistance, further scrutiny of "new" processes and trends could be engaged in, in non-Manichaean terms. Thus, ecologism and the grass-roots approach, the greening of advanced Western industrialized societies, can be viewed both as a generous attempt to overcome the stultification of over-industrialization and as a shrewd and refined life-style deeply entrenched in the objective hegemonic position of these societies in the international market and geo-strategic situation.

Yet, when all is said and done, could we fail to link several positive aspects of this new attitude to historical surplus value with the powerful upsurge of the civilizational quest, often combining fundamentalism and radicalism, through the hitherto uncharted paths of revolutionary social dialectics in non-Western so-called under-developed societies, essentially in the Orient, but more globally all over the hitherto marginalized tri-continental area?

On the other side of the river, the same critical approach should obtain in the investigation, precisely, of this spiritual revival in non-Western societies and cultures. Could it not perhaps signalize the reluctance of certain sectors to confront the harsh realities of realpolitik, to back down from realism to essentialism?

In a word, how could modernity escape the deadlock of escapism? How could it face the iron pressures and implacable challenges of the balance of power, of the control of space via the scientific and technological revolution?

3. This is precisely the locus of our quest for a renewed vision of the state as the instrument and focus of social power. Attention in this regard ought to be paid to the following: the growing functions of the state as compared with the more optimistic and restrictive visions of classical political thought and social philosophy, the weakening of several centrally managed functions vis-à-vis self-management and self-reliance coupled with an immense strengthening of the central coercive power of the state, *inter alia*. The now classical exploration of the interrelations between modes of production and the state, between the socio-economic dimension and social power ought to be largely and vigorously completed by the exploration of the role of the models of the contemporary state in the unification of our planet ("la mondialisation du monde"), the putting to the fore, the ever-growing importance, of geo-strategy and politics.

4. As we go through such a prospection, one vital area appears to be the analysis of the interrelation, to our mind central and organic, between the problems of power on the one hand and contents and forms of democracy on the other hand. How, if not by a deepened and more efficient democratic organization, could we bring to bear rationality and the visions of the heart on the implacable realities of the balance-of-power approach? Democracy, therefore, not only as an antidote to autocracy but as the only powerful influence to the implacable parameters of the transformation of power in the world — both at local and at regional and international levels — as we now know it. If anarchy and demagogy do not appear to be the consensus of the widest strata of populations and informed opinion, how are we to seek ways and means to strengthen the definition by the wide masses of the people of their destinies and the control, by the people, of decision-makers and the implementation of the desired visions?

5. How can we visualize the future of liberty as the understanding of necessity? Could we, somehow, at certain given points and conditions, break the implacable overwhelming influences of necessity? Perhaps through the implementation of the New International Economic Order, using the tools, precisely, of the scientific and technological revolution?

Here lies the difficulty, the area of confrontations, the rising dangers: the challenge and promise of meaningful mediation, of the dedicated quest for patterns for a non-antagonistic dialectical treatment of contradictions towards complementarity.

A few days ago, the French essayist Bertrand de Jouvenel, on the basis of the major UN demographic studies *The Future Prospectives of World Population as Evaluated in 1968*, underlined the critical stage of the very position of the problem of economy and society in the transformation of the world:

While meat represents 1,300 calories per day for North Americans, 1,100 for the populations of Western Europe, and 1,000 in Eastern Europe and USSR, the average becomes 167 for Africa; it falls down to less than 100 in many other countries.

It will appear abnormal that our "developed" populations, which will then represent only one-fifth of the world's population, continue to appropriate regions defined as "developed," for they now occupy 42 per cent of the lands of our globe, 42 per cent of its permanent pasture lands, 45 per cent of its forests, and 47 per cent of its harvestable lands. Such a wide "tray" for a relatively much lighter weight will soon appear unacceptable. Could we not then see part of the human weight coming from the other over-loaded tray, displace itself as it were to the developed tray? For where disequilibrium obtains, flux obtains, too: It would be reasonable for us to expect it.⁶

Could we not prepare our minds and souls for the now visible and unavoidable restructuring of patterns of human interaction and survival?

IV

This series of problematic areas links up directly with the basic need now felt for a restructuring of the main body of social and political theory, based on genuinely meaningful comparatism of real-concrete societal comparable units, taken in the course of the dialectical path. To be sure, there is no dearth of pre-postulations under theoretical garb. It is important, in this respect, to identify our real needs: not only for meaningful social theory, now perceived as an urgent and relevant need by different formative schools of thought and action in the world, but perhaps even more for the identification of problematic areas little tackled till now.

These could comprise the following:

- a. The conception of progress seen as a succession of "stages";
- b. The historicity of progress, as compared with the universal dimension of social evolution;
- c. the differentiation of societal groups, in classes, categories, professional groups, trends, plus the regional and local diversification;
- d. the formation of social ethos as compared with social philosophies and ideologies;
- e. the biological factors in societal processes, essentially gender, age, especially seen in the relations to social power and visions of the world, etc.;
- f. the requisites of a realistic, real-concrete, philosophical approach to the problems of economy and society as the fabric of the endogenous, inner, circle of the transformation of the world;
- g. the transition from the contemplative, ethically oriented scientist to the new type of scientist and intellectual as responsible citizen: his required training in economy, geo-strategy, social and political planning, philosophy;
- h. the question of how, if "man does not live by bread alone," a more perceptive planning of the economic and social cadres responsible for the future could take into account the non-economicistic dimension of human life, generally regrouped under the label of "superstructure," but genuinely made of philosophy, religion, ideology, spirituality, in general;
- i. the question, after the failures now clearly perceived of the economicistic-technicist approach, of what could be the prospects of culture and spirituality in the reshaping of the socio-economic fabric of human societies at the times of the transformation of the world;
- j. the question what can be the place and role of vision, artistic imagination, dream, mysticism — as related to our real-concrete approaches.

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From the much needed technocrat to the philosopher in the city, from stages of development to *The Republic*, from the technocratic bureaucrat or the bureaucrat-as-technocrat to the philosopher-king: how could we tackle this most difficult of the difficult equations between reality and vision?

More than ever before perhaps, we are now summoned to advance on paths untrodden. May our United Nations University – hand in hand with the wide networks of advanced centres of academic teaching and research, of thought and action in our times – lucidly and fearlessly fulfil its mission towards its civilizational quest, to which purposes this new stage of our modest endeavours starting this day will hope to contribute its responsible and humane share!

Notes

1. Galal A. Amin, *The Modernization of Poverty: A Study in the Political Economy of Growth in Nine Arab Countries, 1945–1970* (E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1974).
2. Paul Harrison, "How the Third World Is Now Beginning to Help Itself," *The Sunday Times*, 24 Aug. 1980.
3. Peter Hazelhurst, "The Place of Japan in the World Today and the Triumph of Its Economy," *The Times*, 21–24 July 1980.
4. "Behind the Japanese Miracle," *The Times*, 24 July 1980.
5. See A. Abdel-Malek, "On the Dialectics of Time – Position," Teheran Symposium, 1979, in *L'Impact de la Pensée occidentale rend-il possible un Dialogue réel entre les Civilisations?* (Berg Intern., Paris, 1979), pp. 197–215.
6. Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Les Repas du Monde," *Le Monde*, 4 Sept. 1980. Cf. also the recent discussions at the UN Funds for Population Activities (UNFPA), in Rome, in Michèle Champenois, "Quand le Monde pauvre entrera dans la Ville . . . , " *Le Monde*, 9 Sept. 1980.

III. KEYNOTE ADDRESS

De la Ideología del Progreso a la Ideología del Desarrollo

Celso Furtado

Durante el fecundo proceso de invención cultural que fue la revolución burguesa, se produjo el refinamiento de dos poderosos instrumentos de la mente humana: el racionalismo y el empirismo. Por un lado, someterlo todo al entendimiento crítico a partir de un conjunto de conceptos y, por el otro, tomar como punto de referencia la experiencia para comprobar la veracidad de una proposición — la correspondencia de las ideas con los hechos — era lanzar las bases de una sociedad fundamentalmente secularizada, en la que no cabían ni el autoritarismo ni el misticismo como bases del conocimiento. En esta sociedad todo podía ser puesto en duda y la cohesión social pasaba a depender más de la visión del futuro que de la memoria del pasado. Esta visión del futuro encontró su expresión definitiva en la idea de *progreso*. Si la humanidad es perfectible *ad infinitum*, como creía Condorcet, la idea de progreso podrá unir a los hombres de manera aún más sólida que la antigua fe religiosa.

Puesto que la revolución burguesa no era otra cosa que el ascenso de fuerzas sociales que tenían en la acumulación la fuente del prestigio propio, y la acumulación en los medios de producción conducía a la diversificación del consumo (mediante el intercambio externo o la invención interna), los cambios en los patrones culturales surgidos a partir de ahí — el concepto de modernidad — pasaron a ser considerados un indicador de ascenso social, de mejoría, de progreso. Todo lo que llevaba al progreso, a la “riqueza de las naciones”, según la feliz síntesis del título de la obra clásica de Adam Smith, ganaba legitimidad. El sistema de dominación social ya no buscaba legitimidad en sus orígenes — en un pasado en el que los hombres habrían recibido un mandato de sus dioses — sino en el futuro, considerado como promesa de abundancia para todos o por lo menos para quienes comprendiesen el espíritu de la nueva época. Muchos fueron los elementos de las clases dominantes tradicionales que captaron en seguida el mensaje, lo que explica que la revolución burguesa haya sido en gran parte librada por miembros de la nobleza, que pusieron su competencia y también su influencia al servicio de los nuevos tiempos.

En una sociedad en la que grupos y clases sociales, con intereses antagónicos, adquieren progresivamente una percepción de las posiciones respectivas y una visión del todo social — proceso inevitable en una sociedad secularizada —, las estructuras de privilegios pasan a ser transparentes y, por consiguiente, permanentemente amenazadas,

y tienden a surgir fuerzas centrífugas con la torma de conciencia de antagonismos que se agravan. Las luchas de clases, que en sociedades sometidas a formas tradicionales de dominación se manifiestan bajo la forma de explosiones ocasionales y la opresión, surgirán ahora como un proceso intermitente, exigiendo un marco institucional que las discipline. En estas sociedades estructuralmente inestables, con contradicciones internas que parecen condenarlas a un fin catastrófico, la idea de progreso ha de constituir la célula madre de un tejido ideológico que servirá de vínculo entre grupos sociales antagónicos.

Destruídas las bases ideológicas del autoritarismo y del misticismo ¿cómo legitimar el poder sin referirlo directamente a los intereses permanentes de la colectividad? El problema político fundamental, por lo tanto, pasaba a ser el de la representatividad. Todos los recursos serán utilizados para "educar" a los miembros de la colectividad, de forma que comprendan sus "verdaderos" intereses. Es necesario llevarlos a preferir la estabilidad al caos, razón por la cual el sufragio censatario privilegiará por mucho tiempo a los que más tienen que perder con la inestabilidad. La escolarización universal será una de las técnicas sociales de las que se echará mano para uniformar el pensamiento y preparar el hombre común para que acepte la "superioridad de los criterios racionales", con base en los cuales ejercen poder efectivo quienes controlan la información. Ahora bien, la idea de progreso permitiría traducir la nueva visión del mundo en términos de solidaridad social, para contrabalancear los efectos de las fuerzas desestabilizadoras. ¿Cómo no comprender que sólo podría encontrarse una solución permanente a los problemas de la gran masa de la población en la acumulación? Todo intento de satisfacer las reivindicaciones de las masas sin pasar por una intensa acumulación estaría necesariamente condenado al fracaso: implicaría desarticular el sistema económico, baja productividad y desempleo. Evidentemente, acumular interesaba a los grupos que dirigían la estructura de poder, pero ni por eso dejaba de ser fundamental para todos los grupos sociales que aspiraban a los frutos del progreso.

El choque de la ideología del progreso-acumulación fue tan profundo y abarcó tanto que impregnó incluso el pensamiento revolucionario surgido de la lucha de clases y orientado a la destrucción del orden capitalista. Su incorporación al pensamiento revolucionario es uno de los ingredientes del paso del "socialismo utópico" al "socialismo científico", del pensamiento de un Fourier con su mundo sencillo de "pasiones armónicas" al de las contradicciones siempre superadas que abren la puerta de un mundo mejor en Marx.

En su forma más elaborada, el pensamiento revolucionario surgido en el marco de la civilización industrial atribuye a la clase trabajadora el papel histórico semejante al que desempeñará la clase burguesa o sea la función de provocar transformaciones culturales que habrían de abrir un nuevo ciclo de civilización. Pero, mientras que la revolución burguesa se desplegó durante siglos, el nuevo cambio histórico se hizo en un período relativamente corto, gracias a la formidable intensificación del proceso

acumulativo. El rápido desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas que se manifestará en el siglo XIX, al aumentar la inestabilidad característica del sistema, habría de agravar las contradicciones entre la base material de la sociedad (y su potencial acumulativo) y el complejo institucional (y el sistema de decisiones) que la controla al servicio de la clase burguesa. Pero el verdadero progreso — la transformación cualitativa de la sociedad —, lejos de ser lineal habría de presentarse como una ruptura, un salto, después del cual saldría a la luz un nuevo horizonte de posibilidades para el hombre.

La idea de superación de las contradicciones de la sociedad capitalista (eliminación de los antagonismos de clase) mediante la ruptura y reconstrucción de la superestructura (marco institucional) es, evidentemente, otra versión de la visión del futuro como promesa de un mundo mejor. Aun manifestándose bajo la forma de un salto, el progreso no dejaría de ser una consecuencia del previo desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas, es decir de la acumulación. La explicación última de esta ruptura estaría precisamente en el hecho de que el conjunto de relaciones sociales, particularmente las relaciones de producción que corresponden a los intereses de la clase dominante, pasa a ser un freno al pleno desarrollo de esas fuerzas productivas. La “agravación de las contradicciones” no era más que la manifestación fáctica de que la clase burguesa, cumplido su papel histórico de acicate del proceso acumulativo, se desgastara. Convertida en parásita del sistema, tendía a actuar como freno de la acumulación. En síntesis: las leyes de la acumulación — con su teoría implícita de clase portadora de un proyecto de sociedad en el que se superan las contradicciones del presente — dirigen la evolución de las formas sociales.

Apoyada en una teoría de la historia que tuvo gran repercusión al llenar una evidente laguna de las ciencias sociales — y que era suficientemente vaga para adaptarse a una multiplicidad de situaciones sin que nunca pudiera ser sometida a prueba —, la ideología del “socialismo científico” desempeñó un papel de gran importancia en la difusión de la civilización industrial en zonas en las que fue débil o nulo el proceso de la revolución burguesa: zonas de gran atraso relativo en la acumulación y también en la lucha contra la dependencia externa en los países sometidos al yugo colonial, o sea, allí donde la dependencia fue un obstáculo efectivo a la difusión de la civilización industrial.

Ahora bien, difícilmente habría de lograrse establecer una relación de causalidad entre un desarrollo previo de las fuerzas productivas y la revolución burguesa. Los especialistas están de acuerdo en afirmar que este desarrollo fue lento, o insignificante, durante los dos o tres siglos que precedieron a la eclosión de la civilización industrial: el consumo de energía por trabajador se mantuvo prácticamente estable y las principales transformaciones de la agricultura estuvieron ligadas al sistema de explotación y a la introducción de nuevos cultivos, como el de la papa y el del maíz, importados de América. La relación de causalidad parecería ser inversa: los cambios ocurridos en el sistema de dominación social abrieron la puerta a la reorientación del proceso acumulativo, reorientación que habría de conducir a la aceleración de éste.

Así se explica que todo un sistema de cultura se haya contrapuesto al que prevalecía. Tampoco cabría hablar de revolución cultural, ya que el sistema de cultura preexistente, incluso desplazado, desempeñaría un papel decisivo en la formación del nuevo marco institucional y en la elaboración de la nueva visión del mundo.

Cierto que el ascenso de los nuevos grupos dominantes está ligado a las transformaciones llevadas al proceso acumulativo por la expansión comercial que se acelera en el siglo XVI, por el flujo de oro y plata originarios de América y por el pillaje de África, de donde habría de extraerse una decena de millones de esclavos. Pero nada autoriza a confundir esta ampliación del excedente con el desarrollo de las fuerzas productivas. Los nuevos recursos permitieron financiar guerras y reforzar las estructuras monárquicas que están en la base de los estados nacionales modernos. Y también proporcionaron a la clase mercantil los medios para ampliar el radio de acción de sus actividades, sustituyendo en el control de la producción agrícola y manufacturera a las viejas estructuras de dominación. Es la subsiguiente imposición de los criterios mercantiles a la organización de la producción — transformación de la tierra y de la fuerza de trabajo del hombre en “elementos de la producción” sometidos a las leyes del mercado — la que conducirá al prevalecimiento de la racionalidad instrumental y abrirá la puerta al desarrollo explosivo de las fuerzas productivas. La civilización industrial, fruto de este cambio histórico, crecerá dentro del espacio cultural salido de la revolución burguesa pero está lejos de confundirse con ésta.

La difusión planetaria de la civilización industrial vino a demostrar que el conjunto de técnicas (y de formas de comportamiento requeridas por la aplicación de estas técnicas) que la constituyen son compatibles con formas de organización social distintas de las surgidas de la revolución burguesa. Además, la experiencia histórica ha demostrado que son las sociedades de corte menos igualitario las que más rápidamente asimilan — o lo hacen con menos desplazamientos en sus estructuras sociales — los valores de la civilización industrial. Por otro lado, liquidar las relaciones sociales propias del capitalismo significa necesariamente encaminarse hacia una sociedad igualitaria, si se mantiene la lógica de la acumulación específica de la civilización industrial. En efecto: el centro motor de ésta sigue estando en los países capitalistas de más alto nivel de acumulación; de ahí que su vanguardia innovadora siga impregnada con los valores culturales originarios de la revolución burguesa. Lo que explica que las ideologías anticapitalistas, fundadas en la idea matriz de acumulación-progreso, hayan actuado como línea auxiliar en la difusión planetaria de estos valores.

De la misma manera que la idea de progreso se transformó en palanca ideológica para fomentar la conciencia de interdependencia en grupos y clases con intereses antagónicos, en las sociedades en las que la revolución burguesa destruía las bases tradicionales de legitimación del poder, la idea de desarrollo sirvió para afianzar la conciencia de solidaridad internacional en el proceso de difusión de la civilización industrial en el marco de la dependencia. Durante la fase de acceso indirecto (mediante la exportación de productos primarios) a los valores materiales de esta civilización — fase durante la

cual se fijaron las raíces de la dependencia — prevalecería la doctrina de que el camino más corto hacia el enriquecimiento de una región o país era la especialización interregional o internacional. Insertarse en el sistema de división internacional del trabajo había de ser la forma más “racional” de eliminar el atraso en la diversificación del consumo, de avanzar hacia la línea frontal de las naciones *civilizadas*.

Ahora bien, el camino de la especialización internacional no requería modificaciones de mayor monta en las estructuras sociales: era un pacto que se establecía entre intereses externos y grupos dominantes internos. Lo que importaba era que éstos estuvieran en condiciones de proveer a los mercados internacionales con determinados productos y no la forma en que se obtenían los productos destinados a la exportación. El dinamismo del sistema provenía del exterior y no de transformaciones sociales internas. El mercado interno era función de la parte del excedente retenido localmente y, por lo tanto, una prolongación de las actividades internacionales. La industrialización en el marco de la dependencia introducirá modificaciones importantes a este pacto. El interlocutor de los intereses externos (y en ocasiones el competidor) será un elemento surgido de la diversificación de la economía, impuesta por las vicisitudes de la dependencia. En los países en los que el control colonial llegó al siglo actual, la transformación de las estructuras internas de dominación social fue lenta, lo que había de favorecer el surgimiento ulterior de un fuerte estamento burocrático. En los países latinoamericanos, donde el estado nacional se constituyó a partir de la primera mitad del siglo XIX, los repetidos cambios ocasionados por la inestabilidad del sector primario-exportador propiciaron la diversificación y la ampliación de los grupos dominantes, habilitándolos para la fase de industrialización.

El nuevo pacto entre intereses externos y dirigentes internos, en el que se funda la industrialización dependiente, vendría a sustituir el mito de las ventajas de la especialización internacional por la idea más movilizadora de *desarrollo*. Privados progresivamente de memoria histórica y sentido de identidad, referidos a un sistema de medidas concebido para los fines de la acumulación, los pueblos atraídos por la vía indirecta hacia la civilización industrial pasaron a ser clasificados, ordenados, etiquetados, transfigurados en entidades abstractas cuyo comportamiento se explica exhaustivamente a partir de un número limitado de datos. Puesto que se concibe el “desarrollo” como un logro internacional — ignorándose el costo de la acumulación en términos de valores culturales propios — la historia de los pueblos pasa a ser considerada como una competencia por parecerse a las naciones que jefaturan el proceso acumulativo. Los medios sugeridos para alcanzar este objetivo, siempre huidizo, no han sido muchos: todos pasan por la idea del aumento de la tasa de ahorro interno y la creación de condiciones capaces de atraer recursos externos. Esta doctrina serviría de cobertura a las inversiones directas extranjeras, mediante las cuales las actividades productivas de los países dependientes habrían de ser controladas desde el exterior. Si el objetivo estratégico es acelerar la acumulación, toda aportación de recursos extranjeros es *positiva*. Por el mismo camino se justifica la concentración del ingreso: son los ricos los que tienen capacidad de ahorro. La idea de progreso que

adoptan las minorías privilegiadas y la racionalidad de las empresas transnacionales convergen para acelerar la diversificación y sofisticación de las pautas de consumo, en detrimento de la satisfacción de las necesidades esenciales del conjunto de la población.

De esta manera, la ideología del desarrollo se distingue de la ideología del progreso por un economicismo más estrecho, insertado en el marco de la dependencia externa. La idea de progreso fue principalmente usada con vistas a favorecer un pacto social entre grupos y clases que se sabían con intereses antagónicos. No se puede aislarla de la difusión en todas las capas sociales del racionalismo y del empirismo que emergieron de la revolución burguesa como formas dominantes de pensamiento. Una sociedad de clases que piensa sobre sí misma produce necesariamente un pluralismo ideológico. La idea de progreso fue el cimiento de una superideología que inyectó un hilo de solidaridad entre grupos sociales entre los cuales se suscitaban conflictos por factores económicos objetivos de no poca monta. En el marco de los antagonismos y de los problemas que surgían por ello en cuanto al sistema de dominación social, la ideología del progreso tomó cuerpo y creó y renovó su discurso. El diálogo entre conservadores y liberales por el hecho de realizarse dentro de la clase que ejercía el poder, no dejaba de captar las olas de mayor envergadura que irradiaban de las tensiones sociales. La pluralidad ideológica ampliaba necesariamente el área cubierta por el debate político: las iniciativas se ejercían en múltiples direcciones, con el fin de abrir opciones en los momentos en que las tensiones se volviesen agudas. La visión optimista del futuro, instilada por la ideología del progreso, preparaba a los grupos que se sentían amenazados en sus privilegios a asimilar iniciativas anticipadoras e incitaba a los que carecían de privilegios con el espejismo del ascenso social.

La idea de desarrollo como logro internacional se presenta disociada de las estructuras sociales, como simple expresión que es de un pacto entre grupos internos y externos interesados en acelerar la acumulación, por lo que tiene un contenido estrictamente economicista. Ignorando las aspiraciones — conflictivas o no — de los grupos constitutivos de la sociedad, apunta hacia el simple trasplante de la civilización industrial, concebida ésta como un estilo material de vida originado fuera del contexto histórico del país en cuestión. Las condiciones ideales para este trasplante pueden confundirse con el inmovilismo social: la población es vista por los agentes del proceso de industrialización como una masa de “recursos productivos” enmarcados en las leyes de los mercados. Los conflictos sociales, lejos de ser una fuente alimentadora de la creatividad política, son percibidos como formas de desperdicio de energías de la sociedad. Importante prolongación de esta ideología es la doctrina del autoritarismo como sistema político más adecuado para las sociedades de industrialización tardía. Sólo en el marco del autoritarismo sería posible crear las condiciones requeridas para un rápido trasplante de las técnicas industriales y, simultáneamente, intensificar la acumulación. La actividad política pasa a ser considerada como un esfuerzo orientado a reducir las resistencias de las estructuras sociales a la penetración de las técnicas propias de la civilización industrial. El autoritarismo, instrumento para alcanzar etapas superiores de acumulación, tendería a perder su razón de ser en una fase posterior del

desarrollo. También en este caso la evolución de las fuerzas productivas se presenta como catapulta para alcanzar formas sociales consideradas superiores. Como en el caso de la doctrina del "socialismo científico", esta visión optimista del futuro, subproducto de la acumulación, no tiene más fundamento que una lectura superficial de la historia social de Europa.

Una comparación, incluso superficial, entre los dos procesos históricos deja en claro que, en el primero, los conflictos sociales y la actividad política a ellos ligada constituyen el elemento propulsor de las transformaciones estructurales que son la sustancia de lo que vino a llamarse "desarrollo". Sin estas transformaciones el proceso de acumulación en las fuerzas productivas no habría proseguido más allá de ciertos límites. La civilización material engendrada por la industrialización no es otra cosa que el conjunto de manifestaciones externas de un proceso de creatividad cultural que abarca otras esferas de la vida social. Así, la orientación de la tecnología no es ajena a este proceso de enfrentamiento de fuerzas sociales. En síntesis: la muestra de bienes que tiene a su disposición el miembro de la moderna sociedad de consumo constituye la resultante momentánea de largo proceso histórico, en el que la reproducción de estructuras sociales, siempre puestas en jaque, sucede en un marco altamente dinámico. En el segundo de los procesos históricos mencionados — el de la industrialización en condiciones de dependencia — las transformaciones estructurales son un esfuerzo de adaptación frente al trasplante en firme de técnicas generadas en sociedades que se encuentran en una fase mucho más avanzada de acumulación.

Al contrario de lo que ocurrió en el primer proceso, no hay evidencia alguna de que la industrialización dependiente conduzca a formas sociales estables. La creciente heterogeneidad social, que tiene en la "marginalidad urbana" uno de sus síntomas más alarmantes, parece apuntar en dirección contraria. Ahora bien, los signos de una inestabilidad intrínseca en gestación sirven de justificación al refuerzo de un autoritarismo preventivo. De esta manera, más que instrumento destinado a propiciar una rápida acumulación, el autoritarismo es un arma represora de las fuerzas sociales que la industrialización dependiente no consigue canalizar en forma constructiva. Siendo el desarrollo la expresión de la capacidad para crear soluciones originales a los problemas específicos de una sociedad, el autoritarismo, al bloquear los procesos sociales en los que se alimenta el poder creador, frustra el verdadero desarrollo.

IV. REPORTS ON THE SESSIONS

Session 1. Changing Patterns in World Economy

Chairperson: Janusz Gołębowski
Co-chairperson: Amilcar O. Herrera
Rapporteur: José Agustín Silva-Michelena

Ponencias Presentadas

Se presentaron cuatro ponencias. Aquí solo resumiremos lo esencial de su contenido, pues ellas fueron distribuidas a todos los participantes.

1. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Patterns and Prospectives of the Capitalist World Economy"

En una primera sección se define la naturaleza de la economía-mundo. Dicho concepto supone que existe una "economía" donde quiera (y si, y únicamente si) hay una división social del trabajo operando extensivamente y en forma relativamente completa, con un conjunto integrado de procesos productivos, que se relacionan entre sí a través de un "mercado," el cual ha sido instituido o crecido de alguna manera compleja.

Se trata de una unidad de análisis más amplia que cualquier unidad política, de carácter histórico, que abarca un complejo de culturas y cuyas principales instituciones son los Estados, las clases, los "pueblos" y los hogares. En el aparte relativo a los "Patrones de la Economía-mundo" se precisa que ésta tiene un modo capitalista de producción, el cual ha operado por la vía de la relación social capital/trabajo que determina la apropiación de la plusvalía por parte de los que controlan el capital. Este excedente es luego redistribuido en forma desigual tanto nacional como internacionalmente, generándose relaciones centro-periferia.

De ese modo se crea un patrón jerarquizado de relaciones, el cual parece ser constante, aun cuando las naciones que ocupen un determinado nivel cambien.

La forma particular como opera el sistema genera ciclos de acumulación, con sus fases de expansión y de receso, las cuales parecen darse en lapsos de 40 a 55 años.

Las posiciones hegemónicas han sido las siguientes: Las Provincias Unidas, 1620-50; El Reino Unido, 1815-73 y Los Estados Unidos, 1945-67.

- Los Estados centrales, en particular los hegemónicos, imponen su dominio económico y cultural sobre el mundo.

Se examinan luego las tendencias seculares de la economía-mundo y su impacto en sus principales instituciones: las clases, los hogares, el Estado y los "pueblos."

El desarrollo de las estructuras institucionales mencionadas se refleja en el mosaico cultural del sistema-mundo, cuyo patrón es cada vez más el de la tensión entre "imperium" y resistencia. Su operación ha conducido a: (i) una ideología organizadora que es el racismo; (ii) concepto de una cultura "universal" neutra: progreso, modernización, ciencia y tecnología; y (iii) oposición en la semi-periferia y periferia, organizada alrededor del nacionalismo.

Luego se define cuando el sistema está en crisis. Así, se descartan los ciclos como crisis, puesto que éstos son parte del funcionamiento normal del sistema. Se dice que hay crisis cuando dejan de operar los mecanismos que restituyen el sistema y por tanto éste debe transformarse o decaer. Se examinan luego la situación actual del sistema y se señalan las principales contradicciones del mismo. Pero se señala al mismo tiempo que si bien la crisis actual no tiene una solución inminente, es probable que la recuperación se dé en un futuro próximo.

Finalmente, al examinar prospectivamente el sistema, se señalan tres lógicas diferentes:

- (a) la del socialismo,
- (b) la de la dominación,
- (c) la del proyecto civilizatorio.

2. Tamás Szentes, "Changing Patterns of World Economy"

El enfoque se sitúa dentro del contexto de la transformación del mundo, el cual es un proceso mucho más complejo que el de la economía mundial. Se trata de una transformación social, cuyo análisis exige una visión totalizadora.

La substancia de la transformación es *por qué* y cómo será reemplazado el sistema capitalista dominante por un sistema mundial *mejor*.

Como el sistema capitalista se ha desarrollado tanto dentro de marcos nacionales como internacionales, en forma desigual, "la *contradicción dialéctica*" entre el par antagónico "nacional-internacional," es el concomitante natural y la ley de movimiento del desarrollo del capitalismo a escala mundial. Y, asimismo, se manifiesta en otros procesos económicos sociales y políticos.

Se critica la idea del sistema capitalista mundial concebido como una unidad en existencia y se propone una interpretación del concepto como la expresión de una tendencia hacia la internacionalización, la cual nunca se materializará bajo el capitalismo. Esto implica la existencia de una multitud de capitalismos nacionales y de relaciones centro-periferia, las cuales constituyen un punto de inflexión decisivo en la historia del desarrollo capitalista.

Lo anterior implica que el "subdesarrollo" de los países en desarrollo no puede explicarse por las anteriores relaciones de las sociedades tradicionales, sin hacer referencia al sistema capitalista internacional. Este problema se examina exhaustivamente en el trabajo y se concluye que la internacionalización probablemente no elimine los Estados nacionales.

Luego, el autor se refiere a las contradicciones del desarrollo socialista, como posible alternativa para países subdesarrollados; al desarrollo desigual y la cambiante jerarquía de naciones y a la "brecha del desarrollo" que parece expandirse continuamente, la cual no puede reducirse con simples cambios dentro del sistema capitalista.

En una segunda parte del trabajo, el autor se refiere a la actual crisis económica mundial, la cual define como estructural e institucional; señala también tres factores principales causales de la misma: (i) cambios en la estructura internacional del poder; (ii) el redespliegue industrial; y (iii) en los procesos reguladores de la intervención estatal.

Señala luego los cambios fundamentales que están teniendo lugar en los antiguos patrones "coloniales" de la división internacional del trabajo y a la vez el surgimiento de nuevos patrones basados en el monopolio de la tecnología por parte de las empresas transnacionales. Esta nueva división del trabajo de corte neo-colonialista refuerza las relaciones asimétricas entre centro y periferia y por tanto no es posible hablar de una real internacionalización.

Para concluir, se señala que el análisis hecho sugiere que la transformación del mundo hacia un orden más justo, presupone cambios fundamentales en todas y cada una de las principales esferas de las relaciones económicas internacionales y, al mismo tiempo, cambios estructurales e institucionales en las economías nacionales. Esto es, cambios en las partes y en el todo.

3. José Luis García Delgado, "Crecimiento y cambio industrial en España, 1960-1980: viejos y nuevos problemas"

En esta ponencia se analiza el desarrollo económico-industrial de España en los dos últimos decenios.

En una primera parte se examina el crecimiento industrial entre 1960 y 1973. Allí se muestra el papel decisivo de la política económica diseñada para acelerar la inserción de España en el desarrollo capitalista mundial.

Se trata, en primer término, de poner fin a la autarquía nacionalista y de aprovechar las ventajas que ofrecía la situación mundial y, en particular, la europea: el aprovechamiento de una mano de obra barata; la posibilidad de exportar el excedente de mano de obra al resto de Europa; reorientar el uso del excedente generado por el turismo; utilizar las posibilidades abiertas del crédito exterior y otras condiciones favorables del sistema mundial.

En segundo término, se hizo un fuerte esfuerzo para modernizar el parque industrial mediante una renovación del mismo que implicó fuertes inversiones de capital y aumentos en la productividad.

En tercer lugar, se estimuló la concentración y centralización del capital en grandes empresas monopolistas, lo que, a su vez, se basó en un esquema de desarrollo que terminó por incrementar la dependencia energética y tecnológica.

En una segunda sección se examinan los principales problemas del segundo quinquenio. En particular, se muestra la diferencia entre el impacto de la crisis de los años de 1930 y la actual. Si bien es verdad que ambas crisis coinciden con importantes cambios políticos internos, en la crisis actual, lo importante es la gran dependencia de España con respecto a Europa. Ante esta situación es notable la indefinición de una política económica para hacer frente a la crisis, sobre todo ante una serie de debilidades de la estructura productiva que son consecuencias de su modo de crecimiento:

- (a) la urgente magnitud del paro,
- (b) la creciente dependencia externa,
- (c) los problemas de financiamiento,
- (d) las deficiencias de la empresa pública,
- (e) el flanco abierto de las relaciones laborales.

La ponencia concluye examinando el desafío de los '80:

En primer lugar está el reto que significa para la estructura productiva y en particular para la industria la alteración de las bases del desarrollo anterior: la energía barata y la exportación del excedente de mano de obra.

En segundo lugar está el desafío que plantea el ingreso a la Comunidad Económica Europea y, finalmente, están las complicaciones que se derivan del nuevo esquema de organización territorial del Estado español consagrado en la Constitución de 1978: la formación de las Comunidades Autónomas.

4. Issam El-Zaïm, "Changing Patterns in World Economy and the Transition to a New International Economic Order with Special Reference to the Arab World"

El objetivo de esta ponencia era el de precisar la posición de los países árabes en el Nuevo Orden Económico Internacional. Para comprender dicha posición, se parte de la hipótesis que, a nivel internacional, en el sector minero se constata la contradicción que las relaciones económicas son de naturaleza colonial, contrastando así con las formas jurídicas y políticas que son de otra naturaleza. En cambio, en otras actividades productivas se dan relaciones neo-coloniales.

En el caso de los países árabes se propone como objetivo eliminar las relaciones coloniales, atravesando por un período de transición de relaciones neo-coloniales.

Así, el significado de la nacionalización del petróleo es la de permitir una transición de actividades extractivas hacia actividades en un primer nivel de procesamiento. Sin embargo, éstas se han caracterizado por ser fragmentadas (actividades de ensamblaje o creadoras de productos de consumo final) a nivel nacional, e integradas a nivel internacional con actividades creadas en otras partes por las empresas multinacionales.

Al examinar este problema, es necesario tomar en cuenta las diferencias que se presentan al nivel sectorial. Por ejemplo, es diferente el tratamiento que se le da a los sectores según éstos sean o no altos consumidores de energía.

En síntesis, se señala que el mundo árabe se moverá en contra de las relaciones coloniales y hacia nuevas relaciones neo-coloniales. Para lograr ello, es previsible que se estimulen las relaciones tipo Sur-Sur y con las empresas estatales mas bien que con las multinacionales.

Temas de la Discusión

La variedad y riqueza de las ideas presentadas en las ponencias sobrepasaron el tiempo disponible para discutirlas. Sin embargo, las intervenciones se refirieron a los aspectos más importantes del tema central del Seminario: la transformación del mundo. Dichas intervenciones podrán agruparse alrededor de tres grandes temas: transformación en los patrones económicos internacionales; transformación en las relaciones políticas y culturales; y cuestiones metodológicas en relación a los dos puntos anteriores. Por conveniencia para la exposición se intentará resumir primero los puntos principales de orden metodológico.

1. Cuestiones Metodológicas

(1) Se planteó la necesidad de precisar la cuestión de la unidad de análisis y la unidad

de acción. Algunos consideraron que la unidad de análisis de la transformación del mundo debería ser la economía-mundo, sin que ello implique que esa sea la unidad de acción, la cual probablemente continúe siendo por mucho tiempo los estados nacionales. Otros, en cambio, señalaron la conveniencia de diferenciar entre ambas unidades ya que ello tiende a esconder la relación dialéctica entre las partes y el todo, es decir, entre los estados nacionales como unidades de acción a partir de cuyas transformaciones se transforma también el sistema mundial y, a la vez, la forma en que las transformaciones mundiales estimulan o frenan los cambios a nivel nacional.

En fin, el problema del *locus* de la transformación debe ser clarificado ya que ello tiene importancia para la selección de unos u otros procesos sustantivos.

(2) *El horizonte temporal.* Se hace necesario precisar el horizonte de tiempo en el cual se piensa sobre la transformación del mundo. Son bien conocidas las diferentes definiciones que en cada disciplina (y aún en los diversos enfoques dentro de cada disciplina) se le da a términos como corto y largo plazo. Esto tiene que ver tanto con las predicciones que se hacen como los medios de política que ellas sugieren.

2. Transformación en los Patrones Económicos

(1) En relación a los posibles cambios en el estilo actual de desarrollo se mencionó la posible presión que se derivará de las limitaciones ecológicas y en particular de los recursos naturales.

Se señaló que el tipo de crecimiento económico actual no puede mantenerse al largo plazo (50 años) debido a que es altamente insumidor de recursos físicos. Por tanto, se incrementarán las presiones para cambiar hacia un estilo de desarrollo que insuma cada vez más recursos no físicos. Sin embargo, no se observa que el sistema capitalista se esté preparando para ello.

Sin embargo, se apuntó que el problema de los límites ecológicos ha sido frecuentemente exagerado y que su solución tiene que ver con la adopción de un aspecto de la lógica del socialismo, es decir, de la planificación.

(2) Un problema relacionado con lo tratado en el punto anterior es el de la desigualdad internacional. Económicamente hablando, la cuestión se examinó en los niveles. En un primer nivel se observó que el estilo de desarrollo prevaleciente inevitablemente conduce a una expansión de la brecha entre los países centrales y los periféricos y, por tanto, que podría esperarse un incremento en la inestabilidad mundial.

En otro nivel, se señaló el incremento de la brecha en los procesos científicos y tecnológicos, aun cuando aplicables a la transformación de la estructura productiva, y en el intercambio desigual, — ambos factores de la creciente desigualdad entre el centro y la periferia. En relación a la brecha tecnológica se precisaron dos aspectos:

(a) la estrategia de los países centrales y de las empresas transnacionales de transferir tecnología obsoleta a los países subdesarrollados, tanto en sectores tradicionales como en los sectores así llamados de punta y (b) el refuerzo que a dicho proceso le presta la forma como se orienta la actividad científica y tecnológica en los países subdesarrollados, la cual tiene muy poco que ver con los procesos productivos.

En cuanto al intercambio desigual se señaló las implicaciones teóricas y políticas de dicho proceso. Por una parte, lo que ello significa para el concepto de justo precio y, por la otra, lo que ello puede significar en términos de estímulo para los movimientos nacionalistas. Finalmente, se precisó que el intercambio desigual se refiere específicamente a la forma como se redistribuye lo que ya ha sido apropiado.

En relación a la desocupación se precisó su nuevo carácter, en el sentido de que se trata cada vez más de un resultado de la aplicación de procesos tecnológicos automatizadores, lo que hace que la desocupación crezca a pesar del incremento de la capacidad productiva. Por tanto, se concluye que la solución de ese problema es más bien una cuestión de organización social que, estrictamente hablando, de política económica.

3. Transformaciones políticas y culturales

Se insistió en la necesidad de plantear la transformación del mundo desde la perspectiva de la transformación de una determinada estructura de poder, sin que ello implique el desconocimiento de la necesaria y limitante interrelación con la base económica. Dentro de este contexto general se precisaron varios aspectos:

(1) La necesidad de una voluntad política que conduzca a un reordenamiento de los recursos primarios de poder en el mundo; por ejemplo, (a) importancia de la población, un recurso abundante en el tercer mundo; (b) los mercados; (c) recursos naturales no renovables (i.e. OPEP); (d) creación y utilización de la tecnología. En suma, en el Tercer Mundo deberían crearse nuevas agrupaciones políticas que, como la OPEP, representen nuevas fuerzas mundiales.

A este respecto se observó que ello no era suficiente, pues como lo demuestra el mismo caso de los países de la OPEP, estas nuevas fuerzas pueden orientarse hacia su inserción en las tendencias dominantes, como por ejemplo, asociarse a los capitales financieros internacionales con el fin de incrementar sus ganancias y por tanto, expandir las desigualdades mundiales.

Así, pues, la formación de nuevas fuerzas mundiales, deben orientarse hacia los objetivos prioritarios, como por ejemplo, el hambre; el desarrollo de nuevas tecnologías y otros objetivos semejantes.

También se señaló la necesidad de considerar los cambios que son indispensables

efectuar a nivel de los estados-naciones, con el fin de facilitar los cambios internacionales. Así, se señaló que una reorientación de las prioridades en la acción internacional implican, por ejemplo, un cambio en los mecanismos de distribución del ingreso en favor de las grandes mayorías nacionales, lo que implica un cambio en el orden político y económico nacional. En este sentido se hace necesario insistir en la necesidad de los cambios políticos a nivel nacional.

(2) Lo propuesto anteriormente, puede verse también en función de la necesaria revolución cultural que facilitaría dichos cambios. En relación a ello se discutió ampliamente los temas que se habían planteado en varias ponencias: (a) la ideología del desarrollo o de la modernización y sus varias versiones y, (b) las lógicas del socialismo; de la dominación y del proyecto civilizatorio.

En este sentido se señaló que la estrategia de "reducir la brecha" pertenece a la lógica de la dominación. Se mencionó también que la lógica del socialismo ha inducido cambios importantes en el escenario y en la dinámica política mundial, aunque sin embargo no ha logrado aún cambiar la ley del valor y, finalmente, que la lógica de los proyectos civilizatorios no parecen estar cristalizando aún en perspectivas reales de cambio. Obviamente, las tres lógicas no actúan separadas entre ellas, y que, por tanto, lo que probablemente resultará es alguna combinación de las tres lógicas. Como dentro de cada lógica hay diferentes modelos, se comprende entonces la complejidad del problema y la variedad de las posibles modalidades concretas que pueden resultar.

Intervention

(A propos du pouvoir détenu par les économies capitalistes)

M'hamed Boukhobza

Il est certain que l'inégal accès à l'industrialisation a donné lieu à une répartition du pouvoir économique, politique et culturel, au profit des sociétés occidentales — le modèle de l'économie mondiale ne peut de ce fait être réaménagée sans une remise en cause de ce monopole du pouvoir.

Ce qu'il ne faut pas perdre de vue, c'est le caractère nécessaire et non suffisant d'une telle situation.

En effet il y a lieu de remarquer que les pays non-industrialisés n'ont qu'une très faible chance de participer au remodelage du mécanisme de décision, si persistent au sein de leur propre société, des situations propres à reproduire le sous-développement. Cela veut dire qu'il est tout aussi nécessaire de s'interroger sur la nature des relations économiques, politiques et socio-culturelles à l'intérieur même des pays non-industrialisés.

Si le développement peut être conçu comme un processus cumulatif de création de valeur d'échange (valeur à la fois matérielle, culturelle et symbolique), on est forcés de se poser la question central : développer pour qui?

Si seulement une minorité doit tirer profit des transformations projetées (la minorité au pouvoir notamment), il y a de très grands risques de voir le marché interne réduit à sa plus simple expression et de voir se renforcer la domination que le développement devrait en principe éliminer.

Si les transformations projetées impliquent positivement les fractions les plus larges de la société, cela suppose un accroissement général du pouvoir d'achat, donc une politique fondée sur une redistribution *interne* des facteurs de production et sur une transformation qualitative profonde des structures socio-politiques en place.

Dès lors, il nous paraît difficile de mettre en cause le pouvoir dominant actuel des sociétés industrialisées, sans créer au plan interne les conditions nécessaires à sa contestation effective.

Session 2. The Scientific and Technological Revolution: Its Impact on Urban and Rural Societies

Chairperson: Anne Legaré
Co-chairperson: José Ramón Torregrosa
Rapporteur: Barun De

Summary of Position Papers

The papers presented in the second section may be divided into two groups: the first two papers are concerned with broad aspects of human values, and the next three are related to specific problems, either cultural or economic.

1. Yves Barel, "Peut-on encore penser la modernité ?"

Prof. Barel investigated the operationality of concepts such as "modernity," "crisis," and "transcendence." He suggested ways to overcome possibility of rupture in the steady process of modernity among industrialized nations. Modernity had value, he said, if there was urgency in needs to change which were supported by realities, prior to the act of modernization. Changes depended on relations between human beings and ideology. Particular situations of modernity could be identified by reference to elective choices, paradigmatically lasting over generations of establishment as innovations from their own past. The choices had to be elective since in fixed paradigms no modernity was possible. Specificity of such situations had to be found in their practice, to be defined in terms of some "territory" or "locus" which was bounded, in the abstract sense, by the parameters of some collective memory or history, more universal than the paradigm, which was its dialectical product. "Crisis" had to be seen in such a dialectic of the abstract and the concrete. "Transcendence" of modern forms had to be considered in terms of distinctions within religious, philosophical, and mystical aspects of the use of this term, and economic, social, or political aspects as its praxis. Praxiological transcendence meant a meta-reproductive social objective which not only produced an identical prototype but went beyond the scope of the genetic form.

Prof. Barel believed that a barrier was being erected regarding the social aspects of

technological progress, leading to the emergence of intellectual meditation about the prospects of the latter, and to the beginning of distinction by concerned people regarding the institutions of society, and other elements of it. They were considering two formulae: (i) demarcating technological limits, restricting the mechanical reproduction of affluence, and injecting into the social use of technology less "modernity," more warmth, and more self-production by smaller and more limited units of production; and (ii) the possibilities of instituting, for particular situations in particular countries, a "double economy" of the sort that a report of the Commissariat of the French Plan had recently discussed with reference to Japanese ideas, but also in the specific terms of French circumstances, in which days or rather the week could be divided into a period of work and a greater period of leisure, with greater possibilities for human beings to create their own comfort for themselves, a creativity leading to self-reliance away from institutional facilities.

Prof. Barel felt that work was not autonomous of new modes of social discipline, and that reduction of worktime was necessary to give human authenticity back to the social roots of humanity. These "transcendental formats" should not be treated as "ends in themselves" blocking further developments. They were necessary to lead people to interiorize the production of their own ideas, instead of perverting other people's choice.

2. Janusz Gofębiowski, "Social Values and the Development of Technology"

By contrast, Prof. Gofębiowski pleaded for not treating technology as a surrogate for the whole of which it formed only a part. Technology was the sum total of available resources for the mechanical development of social endeavour. The broader ills of particular types of society each of which was developed by human work should not be assessed merely by the social perversions of its choice of technology. The culprit, if any, was not technology but those who made the choice of its particular format or apparatus. The problem of technological assessment lay partly in its possibilities of leading to new modes of domination of the general public, whom technological development was expected to benefit. Ideas like "small is beautiful," "appropriate technology," "cultural identity," "self-reliance," "quality of life," and "basic needs" were not necessarily a part of the traditional view of the general public. They were only products of intelligentsia and political élites, who concerned themselves with technological assessment. The selective use of ideas, such as the ones mentioned above, were developed within Western societies. They might be dangerous when applied to policies in non-Western countries. New words could have dynamic uses only when their purpose was not to shift the emphasis of social endeavour from the basic job of improving the conditions of the general public in any country. What was necessary, Prof. Gofębiowski continued, was to explore exactly what differentiation of interests existed, to find out who was differentiated against, and then to assess technology in that context.

He enquired why there had recently been a change of attitude towards Utopia. Fears of doom felt by some people were leading to apocalyptic visions of machines controlling men. In his opinion, humanism should replace egoism or altruism. Both the latter attitudes bespoke belief in one's own superiority, and thus led to domination over other people. Only authentic social partnership was the alternative to such moodiness. It was necessary to humanize social and political controls and manipulative practices. Consequently, the use of the production of force, and in particular of monopoly, had to be restricted so that technology could be changed to permit *everyone concerned* to participate in the debate on technological assessment.

3. Jean Casimir, "L'Encadrement du développement scientifique et technologique dans la Caraïbe"

Dr. Casimir discussed the specificities of Caribbean circumstances, where peasant societies had migrated, often forced in entire tribal groups, to particular locales. Intra-Caribbean migration had spread as plantations either became decadent over time or came into prominence in other islands or areas. There had been a movement of predominance from the smaller British- and French-settled islands to the larger and later-developing Spanish ones. These peasant societies in flux had finally been caught up in contradiction created by the diaspora of Caribbean labour in the form of cheap labour to metropolitan countries themselves. Due to limitations of wage levels, remittances back to native islands by this cheap labour were uneven and restricted. Hence hardly any capital was generated for any scientific and technological impact on individual islands. The slowness of technological transformation in the Caribbean had to be recognized as well as the fact that their insular societies lived in such colonially fragile conditions that they could be occupied by a few marines in a few hours. New forms of social integration were therefore necessary and, indeed, were greater priorities than formations of "new nations" (under the conditions of state power such as that which was prevalent in Haiti). In the large cities of the world, now socially closer to the Caribbean, its workers were in closer relationship with the workers of the world than of the islands of their birth. They had gained greater experience of democratization and of the capacity to "negotiate" problems of circulation of ideas than had their rural brethren in island groups.

Dr. Casimir desired national policy in such continually migrating societies to take immigrant flows into account in their changing local policy. New types of politicians and civil servants who could negotiate changes rather than merely remain bureaucratically stable were necessary. New social structures were necessary and they had to be established by popular planning which would make it possible for populations to react flexibly in the face of emergencies and crises. The Caribbean region was unfortunately still conceived of in a manner conducive to passivity. It remained outside the paradigm commonly called "new nations." Its migrants were exposed to needs and demands which were not compatible with their own rural locality. To survive, state power in the Caribbean area had to develop an international policy for

coping with technological retardation and labour displacement, a policy which could make use of these very weaknesses and forms of oppression to give themselves a greater capacity for negotiation with their metropolitan exploiters.

4. Osama A. El-Kholy, "Investigation of Scientific and Technological Potentialities in Tradition and Culture of Communities for the Satisfaction of Basic Needs (Egyptian Case)"

Prof. El-Kholy, speaking on a more general plane on the theme of foreign, dominant, and repressive style, based on asymmetric economic relations between urban and rural sectors, presented his UNU research project preliminary theses on the identification of three traditionally local communities in Egypt — Nubia, Siwa, and el-Arish — as case units for investigating the interaction between traditional cultures and indigenous technological innovation and adaptation, at the micro level of the village/small town. Like Prof. Gołębowski, he believed that it has been the fashion in certain quarters to blame, admittedly rather glibly in most cases, science and technology alone, in this case for the disruption of the harmonious co-existence of town and country which was supposed to have existed in the past. Listing as premises six elements as prerequisites for proper relations in building a healthy balance between technology utilization in rural and urban environments, he dwelt on the social history of the development of the city in the third world, always parasitic to production processes, and related to rural areas by mechanisms of absorption, control, and exploitation (unlike in the West on which it now models itself).

Thus, according to Prof. El-Kholy, the new ruling élite could be distinguished from the thrifty and hard-working leaders of economic development in the West by their consumerism and middleman mentality rather than entrepreneurship. They had failed in their industrial efforts to turn urban communities into centres of scientific discovery, technological innovation, and productive capacity on a scale which could contribute to developing the productivity of the whole of society. The rural areas had remained the main centres of production and the generators of national wealth. In these cases, the city merely lives on absorbing the economic surplus of rural communities.

5. M'hamed Boukhobza, "Impacts de la révolution scientifique et technique sur les ressources et besoins dans la société agricole"

Mr. Boukhobza deepened this understanding of asymmetry in Third-World economy and in its absorption and creativity regarding the use of modern technology and science. The latter, as he too said, was not a neutral phenomenon; but one which presented many valuable benefits while creating new forms of social stratification. He elaborated on differences which were created by its after-effects in modern Algeria. Developed countries generally had a correspondence between technology and the resources available for its productive uses. On the other hand, in developing

countries, imperative technological choices were created by pre-existing consumption needs and traditions as much as by the processes of reproduction.

In Algeria, the traditionally relative equilibrium between resources and needs had already become distorted in the colonial period as a result of many factors. These included: only partial proletarianization; the continuance of migration flows from the rural to the urban sector and chronic unemployment; the impoverishment of many small farmers as a result of the progress, principally in the advanced sectors, of technological and scientific change; the diminished value of family farms; and constantly increasing consumption demands, which led to the increasing desires of people to spend more without the commensurate capacity to earn or to save, etc. The end-product of all this was the creation of an involuntary satellitism by the poorer classes on the rich, the result of unevenness in the mode of production. This tendency could not be blamed on the mere processes of technological change.

Discussion

In the ensuing debate, Prof. Gołębowski's general propositions were taken up by Dr. Durán. While agreeing that who could control technology was a proposition that should be discussed, she felt that this should lead directly to a discussion of the character of the power deployed for such control as well as to questions of what values are at stake, what resources were available to maintain social order, and also questions relating to the size of the sectors of population who were beneficiaries. Dr. Durán also felt that in any contemporary discussion of technology, matters of the portending future, such as those of electronics, energy, and potential use of the sea floor, had not been taken up. There were questions regarding bio-technology as, for instance, expressed in the *problématique* of the pharmaceutical industry. Also, the idea of man dominating technology was too strong in countries which exercised world domination. If we dared to think of what technology could do as applied to women as well as to men, then people might have to rethink and remake themselves in terms of their relationship to technology as free persons. Dr. Durán took up Prof. Barel's proposition that the matter of transcendence, as discussed in the gathering, was cultural and intellectual. She desired it to be considered as a metaphor of biological reproduction. Transcendence related to feelings; in this context it was difficult for men alone or metaphors concerning men to appreciate women's experiences of issues relating to reproduction of children.

Dr. Ribes disagreed with the proposition that there was any stagnation in bio-scientific technology. A fantastic revolution was going on in bio-technology, which in 25 years would surely lead to new problems of training people to deal with new techniques, such as apparatus for handling the brain. He felt that tremendous possibilities existed for dealing with the revolution in genetics or bacteriology. While it was impossible to predict what would happen in the next 20 years, the human mind would have to

prepare itself by rethinking the concept of human nature in the light of foreseeable possibilities.

Prof. Furtado, in a sophisticated analysis of the total problems of Western technology in relation to its impact on people of all parts of the world, addressed himself particularly to Prof. Barel's propositions. He believed that the socially desirable image of humanity was generally Cartesian and rational. Only in moments of self-forgetfulness was it paradigmatic of *carnaval* or Mardi Gras. To build carnavalesque humanity into workaday life was not desirable. In today's circumstances, social transformation must have cultural revolution as its goal rather than merely social reorganization. Society should decide first on what its demands were going to be, before thinking of how to organize its leisure.

Dr. Botchwey emphasized that there should be no confusion in concepts used about social aspects of technology. He enquired whether control was in reality based on the desires of men of goodwill or on the facts of political power, Did technology mean only social relations, or choices relating to processes of production?

On the second day of discussion on the total content of the seminar, Prof. Barel clarified that "dual economy" in his view was to be seen in the context of the relation of the individual with his work culture. It did take many conflicts into account, such as the contradictions imposed on the conditions of immigrant labour by greater privileges afforded to the labour of the metropolitan nationalities. Such conflicts were the *territoire* or loci within which positive modern transformation had to be worked out. Dr. Legaré felt that "dual economy" or "dual society" was an over-simplified and purely binary relation of man to his own work, if the many contradictions between men and women, which cut across the lines of other connections and contradictions, were not accounted for. Also, culture should be considered in terms of social behaviour and not only intellectually and individualistically.

Dr. Casimir wondered why people were so concerned with matters of subjection, or of difficulties of liberation from the domination of technology. Technology often helped not only economic but also cultural developments. For instance, the innovation of the electric guitar had given much happiness to the working class in the Caribbean Islands, and had developed old traditions, endogenous within their culture, leading them to be happy about their work and not tense about it.

Prof. Abdel-Malek turned the discussion to broader aspects of endogenous custom as well as its uses for social ordering in societies in which the state did not have a heavy influence over communal relationships. He cited cases of how social obligations were fulfilled in Japan; how social responsibility was easily taken up in parts of Egyptian cities by the entire neighbourhood for newcomers to the area, who were made to feel happy and honoured; and of old people coming forward to run civil society and government in Viet Nam during its war. Prof. Abdel-Malek felt that the transformation

of the new international social order should give more attention to the integrating forces of duty and obligation than was at present available, and that options of indigenous creativity independent of Western technology should not be foreclosed.

Reverting to the topic of inequality in technology development, Prof. El-Zaïm pointed out a sort of law of unequal technological development which sustains dynamic but constant *déphasage* between advanced capitalist countries and the developing countries. It would be a mere illusion for developed countries to copy and catch up technologically with the former, which with their multinational corporations, and more particularly their State-owned corporations, do follow definite and long-range strategies which result for the developed countries, among other things, in renewed dependence and exploitation. In practice, Western corporations and states often export either running-but-obsolete technologies or new technologies, the frank objective of which is to experiment with them at the expense of the developing countries. He gave some examples from some industrial sectors and developed countries. He also criticised the well-known anticipation of the forthcoming destruction of resources within capitalist technology and its production pattern but suggested that, since developing countries can never catch up technologically with the Western countries and since consumption and technological production of these less-developed countries are what they are, it is necessary for both types of countries to define an alternative pattern of social values. An adequate pattern of consumption could be derived from such an alternative pattern, which would lead to alternatives in production and of technology. Prof. El-Zaïm stated that technological issues impose the abandoning of the objective of technological catch-up in favour of new patterns of consumption and production technology. Meanwhile, developing countries would need to revise strategies and policies while paying close attention to technological changes in the developed countries. Finally, he insisted that, when considering the technological relation between the developing and developed countries, it must be realized that State control leads the small and the non-multinational corporations of the developed capitalist countries to play an initiating role in technological transfer, and to use this transfer to drain value from the developing countries. Multinational corporations generally follow the example given by such corporations, thereby generalizing the transfer phenomenon and the technology-gained valuedraining exploitation and domination.

Prof. Gołębiowski repeated that technology was, of itself, an element of progress, though in certain contexts it could become an element of domination in structures where it was incorrectly used or planned, and that therefore technology should be modified according to national necessities and specificities.

In the context of earlier statements by Dr. Legaré and Prof. Furtado about the relationship between men and women in the context of domination, Dr. Ribes suggested that the problématique was one of the human maintenance of integration and collective memory. Since women retained much of the collective memory of their

social group, the subordination of women negated much of what maintained individuality of values.

Barun De pointed out that the problématique of technological transfer from developed to developing countries was in fact made more complex by the introduction of capitalist integration of technology on a world scale, over situations where local forms of endogeneity have their own standards, distinct from what world capitalism was interested in selling. For instance, endogenous formations of the communal use of music as social ritual during religious festivals or other occasions in India were deteriorating due to the diffusion of hardware by transnational electronic technology — by means of the domination of the “disco sound” (whose heavy, brassy notes made necessary an orgiastic and repetitive singing that could rise above those notes), amplifiers, cassettes, videotapes, and consequent propagation of messages of a highly homogenized kind, connected with what were essentially capitalist “good things of life.” This was where the acceptance of Westernized technology inevitably led to the domination of world capitalism. He felt that socialist principles of endogenous specificity and self-discipline as well as abstinence, free of the grip of excessive bourgeois consumerism, had to be given political content to combat world capitalist integration.

Professor Tsurumi agreed with both Dr. Ribes and Prof. Gołębowski as regards the need to see the problem as one of power and one in which modifications had to be made in terms of national and regional needs. Professor Abdel-Malek summed up by repositioning the problématique as one not of the adaptation of technology but of the mobilization of technology for the genuine growth of endogenous development in the oriental world. More creativity was necessary rather than mere adaptation.

Intervention

(A propos des catégories “moderne”/“traditionnelle”)

M'hamed Boukhobza

Il y aurait un danger à utiliser ces catégories pour caractériser la situation particulière des sociétés sous-développées. Il est vrai que modernisme doit être différencié de modernité, et qu'il n'y a modernité que s'il y a possibilité de plusieurs choix — que s'il y a alternative. Cette alternative a un sens totalement différent selon que l'on est dans une économie industrialisée que de parcourir en tant qu'actrice — une longue histoire de transformations, et les sociétés non-industrialisées qui n'ont connu de la modernité que ses manifestations externes.

Dès que la modernité cesse d'être un acte de création et de remise en cause par les acteurs d'une société donnée, elle risque de devenir une catégorie idéologique suscep-

tible de fausser le débat sur le sens social et politique du développement. C'est ainsi que dans le secteur agricole par exemple (cas de l'Algérie), si le secteur dit traditionnel a perdu toute traditionnalité (eu égard à la logique fondamentalement sociale l'économie précoloniale), le secteur dit moderne est un consommateur partiel et très sélectif de la modernité.

Ne participant pas à la *création* des alternatives à l'existant, ce secteur constitue dans le fait, un frein au développement. Il se particularise notamment par l'inexistence d'une rationalité économique dans tout ce qu'il exploite ou utilise. De ce fait, ce n'est pas le renforcement de ce secteur et la destruction du secteur dit traditionnel qui est susceptible d'entraîner un développement optimum des forces productives.

C'est en ce sens, que seule la production endogène des alternatives susceptibles d'améliorer le niveau de vie général doit être au centre de nos investigations. Ceci suppose bien évidemment les possibilités de contester le modernisme tel qu'il résulte des économies dominantes; c'est pourquoi, cette catégorie intellectuelle est extrêmement ambiguë dans sa portée explicative et de ses vertus analytiques.

Session 3. Social Power: The State, the Working People, the Hegemonic Classes

Chairperson: Bruno Ribes

Co-chairperson: Zinat Tofiq

Rapporteur: Immanuel Wallerstein

We all began with a common premise: There has been, and still is, in the modern world a radical maldistribution of social power – within the world as a whole (core/periphery, Occident/other civilizational areas, etc.) and within each State (bourgeoisie/proletariat, men/women, etc.).

This unequal distribution of power is of course based on economic and political realities: access to the levers of the production process, control of the means of violence. But it involved a strong ideological component as well. The triumphant world bourgeoisie (Western in origin) proclaimed and spread an ideology of progress, then “development,” defined primarily in quantitative and economic terms which facilitated the process of endless accumulation and justified uneven “development” as transitory, to be overcome by the cultural assimilation of a modernizing “catching-up” philosophy.

Movements which grow up to challenge this maldistribution of social power among classes and peoples mobilized political strength, seeking State power as a primary mechanism of reallocating power. They sought also, in many cases, to reject the dominant ideology of progress via accumulation through cultural renaissance of other sets of values.

The twentieth century has seen many processes of such movements, which have effectively begun to shift the world balance of forces. But it has also seen many disappointments in the limited degree of these successes. In some places, colonial economic structures have simply been replaced by more subtle neo-colonial economic structures. In other places, where workers’ movements have taken power, the working classes have nonetheless found themselves in conflict with administrations.

There was not full agreement as to the explanations for this limited success. Some

suggested that the acquisition of State power was the key to a new world order and that simply not enough of it had yet been achieved. Others wondered if achieving state power was the optimal route to equality of social power. Some suggested that concentration in smaller substate regions (closer to popular control, more sensitive to ecological concerns) might not be a better tactic.

For all, the central questions to resolve in designing the appropriate strategy of change were:

- (a) Who are the most likely and effective agents of change?
- (b) What kinds of change do we want that will break with the developmentalist ideology?
- (c) How can we avoid co-option by the forces resistant to fundamental change?

We are seeking the ways in which we can ally the logic of socialism to the logic of the civilizational project in forms that will not simply reproduce the inequalities of social power under new outer shells. We do this at a point in history, where for the first time all the civilizational zones are in direct ongoing contact with each other, precisely because of the economic and technological advances of the very world system which is in crisis.

Summaries of Position Papers

1. Kazuko Tsurumi, "Endogenous Intellectual Creativity and the Emerging New International Order, with Special Reference to East Asia"

An empirical study, made by Miyamoto, reveals that the centralized developmental strategy based upon the industrial complex, promoted by the Japanese government during the period of high economic growth, failed to create local employment or to increase local governments' tax revenues. Instead, it caused negative consequences such as pollution, environmental disruption, and an increase in the income distribution gap between the centre and the periphery within the nation.

As an alternative to such developmental policy, Tamanoi advocates "regionalism," characterized by stress on local administrative autonomy and self-reliant development of local industries, compatible with the eco-system of the specific region. Such experiments are exemplified by rejuvenation movements in the largely deserted villages in Okinawa.

As a tool of analysis of ecologically sound development, economic theory, according to Tamanoi, has to be reconstructed by incorporating ecological theories, especially the theory of entropy recently developed by a Japanese physicist.

Two scenarios of development are identified by Nishikawa, within the context of the New International Economic Order: (a) development of a country by means of outside capital; and (b) self-reliant development. However, self-reliant development is not possible in the long run without co-operation with other countries on a co-equal basis.

The first scenario of development defeats the purpose of the NIEO, while only the second scenario is compatible with the promotion of the original aims of the NIEO. In order to promote the second scenario, the transformation of the world order from hierarchical to co-equal relations among developing countries and between developed and developing countries is a prerequisite. This transformation consists of de-linking and re-linking processes among countries.

Kamishima presented involution as a characteristically Japanese principle of political control, which should be distinguished from the principle of domination by the use of power.

The principle of involution is the way for leaders to win people's respect, using superior knowledge instead of power. This method of political control evolved from the geo-political position of Japan as an isolated island and through her historical experiences.

Now that the globe itself is shrinking and approaching the situation of an isolated island, this principle of involution may be useful for the transformation of the international order from a dominance-dependence relationship to a co-equal interdependence.

2. Anne Legaré, "Eléments pour l'analyse du Québec: aujourd'hui et demain"

La communication qui condense les principales thèses d'une recherche plus large, pose d'abord une question d'ordre méthodologique. De ce point de vue, l'analyse des transformations socio-politiques ayant cours au Québec ne peut être réduite à celle des partis politiques ou à celle des syndicats. Ceci est posé comme parti pris méthodique afin de mettre à jour les procès qui se situent à l'extérieur du champ politique institutionnel et qui sont dans un mouvement de rupture avec les voies de la reproduction sociale. En même temps, les contradictions qui travaillent ces lieux de rupture permettent de mieux comprendre les causes de l'impasse qui connaît la situation politique actuelle du Québec.

Pour fonder cette approche méthodologique, il faut d'abord situer le projet de souveraineté-association dans son contexte. Le projet du Parti Québécois évolue à l'intérieur d'au moins trois conditions d'ordre structurel: (a) le fait que le palier

fédéral du pouvoir est celui qui remplit pour l'Etat capitaliste les grandes fonctions de la reproduction du capital monopoliste ; (b) la domination politique et l'hégémonie qui fondent l'alliance des bourgeois régionales et du grand capital dans le bloc au pouvoir s'exerce par rapport au palier fédéral de l'Etat ; (c) l'Etat canadien est caractérisé par une tendance structurelle à l'éclatement.

S'étant défini à l'intérieur de ces coordonnées de l'Etat canadien, le PQ a effectué un important recul social depuis sa prise du pouvoir en 1976. La scène politique québécoise ne recèle pas à l'heure actuelle les indices les plus significatifs d'une fusion entre le social et la question nationale. Le champ culturel et en particulier la création sont les lieux révélateurs de ce processus. Ainsi, une définition historique du mouvement extra-institutionnel conduit à voir que la recherche d'identité culturelle constitue un lieu de rupture avec la reproduction.

In short: the search for cultural identity through non-institutional projects and activities must be taken into account besides parties and unions, as an important relevant element of transformation in the world. (The Quebec case was said to be most significant in this respect.)

3. Kwesi Botchwey, "Transforming the 'Periphery': A Study of the Struggle of the Social Forces for Democracy and National Sovereignty in Contemporary Ghana"

The political history of contemporary Ghana may be broken into four periods for purposes of analysis: (1) the colonial period — roughly from the last decade of the last century to 1957; (2) the period of the first republic from 1957 to 1966; (3) the period of military dictatorship from 1966 to 1979 (with a short spell of constitutional rule from 1969 to 1977); and (4) the present.

During the first period, the working classes, urban petitbourgeois farmers, and young people, with the grudging co-operation of feudal and conservative intellectual elements, co-operated in the anticolonial struggle. In the first republic, the first five years or so saw the establishment of a liberal democratic régime, followed by a period of increased state investment in industry and a militant nationalist programme. Although this policy failed in the end to radically transform the existing capitalist relations, as a result of the ruling party's misconception of the essence of these relations coupled with lapses in the organization of the party itself, it nevertheless represented an intensification of the national struggle for the consolidation of independence and national sovereignty.

The military junta which ousted the nationalist government of the first republic led to a succession of governments which from about 1966 to 1978 practically destroyed the advances made towards the consolidation of national sovereignty and further deepened the integration of the nation's economy into the world capitalist system

under the direction of the International Monetary Fund and its allied institutions.

This policy reversal and the further entrenchment of imperialism was spearheaded by the comprador forces in society and thereby brought the nation to the brink of total disintegration. The ensuing crisis engulfed all democratic forces — workers, poor farmers, youth, church groups, and even elements of the national bourgeoisie — in a bitter resistance movement which, in the end, brought down the military dictatorship and restored the constitution, thus creating more auspicious conditions for a resumption of the struggle to consummate national independence and sovereignty.

These experiences lend credibility to the view that, in the oppressed and dominated nations of the third world, the entrenchment of capitalist relations tends to militate against the development of an integrated national economy and, rather, leads to the ascendancy of the most backward, parasitic social forces. Additionally, they show that, in the absence of a revolutionary mass organization of the working classes themselves, the most explosive revolutionary situations tend to fizzle out or give rise to brutal military dictatorship.

4. Barun De, "The State, Hegemonic Classes, and Working-Class Power: An Overview"

There have been two differentiable processes of material, organizational, and ideological changes: the crystallization of capitalism and its coincidentals related to colonialization of large parts of the less developing world (on the development of whose contradictions stress has to placed, more than is being placed by those who talk of "the world economy of capitalism") which lead to different patterns of economic and technological growth and marked disparities within nations and classes; and its crisis in the twentieth century, accompanied by the rise of three political alternatives. These are the rise of socialist state power or authoritarian collectivism (I am indebted to Professor Celso Furtado for suggesting this term to me), counter-dependent injections into national social orders of militarism, leading to fascism, to be transcended from the 1950s on by authoritarian conservatism in the bourgeois democracies; and freedom struggles and national liberation wars leading to the making in unevenness of the third world (divided between capitalism and socialism) south of the Tropic of Cancer.

Values, ideals, and, more often, myths, occasionally obscurantist in character, have developed about progress and the maintenance of its speedy trajectory, nourished by different national or international specificities and generalities of varying processes of growth, or constrained endeavour (the latter more common in the third world, as we have found in the papers by Dr. El-Kholy, Dr. Casimir, Dr. Boukhobza, and Dr. Botchwey). Sets of these ideologies, shared by various segments of the ruling class in

nation-states, have become rules for political systems, such as limited monarchy, parliamentarism, presidential government, plebiscitary dictatorship, or socialist party authority in representation of its statements of "working-class" objectives: they have spread from capitalism to its dependant bourgeoisies in the third world and from the USSR and China to socialist movements in other countries. It is only in the last half century that new state apparatuses have developed in China or in Yugoslavia, in Africa or in West Asia, presenting strictly endogenous political alternatives, such as exemplified in the development of praxis by Mao-Zedong.

Capitalism's failures to establish harmony of interests and an all-pervasive humanism on a truly world scale is wellknown. Communist ideology has also fallen back, partly forced by bourgeois solidarity (as expressed in reaction and Fascism or bourgeois authoritarianism), on apparatuses of defence. The authoritarian governance of cadre intermediary leadership, the bureaucratic gloom and flat evenness, and the manipulative aspects of the national and international state apparatus in the USSR, for instance, has not made it too attractive today, either for Marxists or for the toiling poor, even when both or either remain loyal to the ideology of their own communist parties. Nor has the dominant-nation foreign policy been able to steer clear of the world practices of manipulation and counter-dependence in defence of particularist "national interests." The harmony of world working-class interests, talked of by the Communist International, has not yet been established. Even on an abstract plane, the cadre-masses relationship is fraught with contradictions, consequent on problems of work relationships, new creations of demand, and the attendant economic structure and social order posited by state authority.

On the contemporary scene, a binary relationship has developed between militaristic establishments committed only to thermonuclear "theatre war" options and popular culture in which a quietist disenchantment is growing against traditional forms of organized, partisan behaviour. This is to be found in mass support for charismatic forms of leadership, but more welcome trends are to be found in a statement by Mr. Stanislaw Kania in Poland: "I am not so sure that our party needs what is usually termed a leader . . . My obligation should above all consist in ensuring that the collective wisdom of people functions."

Also it is clear that while national specificities are important as units of analysis they should not be always translated into units of social action. The international interests of the toiling poor and sub-regional interests have to be cared for in the same matrices of utility and beneficentiality. This has not always happened when ideology has been treated by obsolete hegemonic state power as dogma.

Finally, while the simplistic uses of hegemony as force or domination are demonstrated, attention is drawn to the fact that every state apparatus regulates and disciplines work to its own goals. Bourgeois goals of capital formation have led to gross social and economic inequities. But they have to be replaced not only by

breaking bourgeois discipline but by the simultaneous establishment of socialist goals of a productive work ethic and a collective spirit of labour and enterprise.

Discussion

Prof. Herrera raised the question of the specificity of cultures. "What," he asked, "is it that human cultures have in common?" He suggested that today, for the first time in human history, there is a significant convergence of cultures, a tendency toward synthesis.

Mr. Boukhobza wondered if the so-called "modern sector" of the economy could truly be called modern. Had it in fact achieved a mastery of technology?

Dr. Botchwey analysed the problem of the oppression of women, pointing out that the degree of social mobilization of women varied widely among the states, and that consequently national political struggles had different impacts on the degree to which the oppression of women has declined.

Dr. Furtado reminded us once again of the ideological framework within which the modern world was constructed. He saw the idea of progress as a trans-class concept, a perception of human beings. For Hegel, history is the realization of reason and man is someone who can perfect himself. The concept of economic development follows from this. The third world has undergone its own evolution within this ideological framework, but today the third world must construct its own idea of man.

Dr. Torregrosa posed a number of questions for reflection: Who are the agents of change? (This is the key question.) What kinds of change are possible? And what are our priorities?

Dr. Abdel-Malek noted that the Western civilizational project in the modern world has been a non-transcendental, immanent project, based on the acquisition of historical surplus-value via the destruction of the Americas and continental Africa and the semi-destruction of large parts of Asia. The question is not why but how this led to Hiroshima and Auschwitz. The need today is neither progress nor development (desired not by the popular masses but by the compradores, both of the left and of the right), but rather renaissance. He spoke of the incoherence of our present world-system and cited Malraux's view that the twenty-first century will be spiritual or it will not be.

Dr. Gołębowski spoke of the contradiction between the growing role of the working class in society and the fact that this working class often faces administrators who remain paternalist toward them.

Dr. Silva-Michelena insisted we look at the transnationalization of power and thought thought it important to analyse what political form the new neo-colonial relations are taking.

Intervention

Anouar Abdel-Malek

The problem of power ought to be posited within the general dialectical process of the evolution of ideas about social evolution.

- (1) From the European Renaissance, with its historical legacy of surplus value and its accumulation in the then-expanding Europe at the time of the rising bourgeoisies, to the initiation of the third development decade, two major stages ought to be distinguished:
 - (a) The age of the ideology of progress, which was the kernel of the whole philosophy of the Enlightenment, of the Renaissance, of Encyclopaedism, and on down to Marxism. It conceived of social evolution as an extrapolation of the specific process of the evolution which had obtained in European societies, from primitive societies to modern capitalism, via stages of slavery and serfdom. Man, the owner and master of the world, was seen as Prometheus unbound, as the centre and end of all processes of social evolution.
 - (b) The stage of development, which started at the time when Western societies had to take stock of their "periphery," i.e., Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Wherefore the emergence of different patterns of reductionism, under the label of "development"; how? instead of why?, the very nature of operational logic — at a time when the Faustian conception of progress, growth, and domination appeared doomed around the major turning point of 1973.
- (2) The transition was, therefore, beginning: from "progress" and "development" to a quest for purpose, the prospection of models, aims, in a word, at the emergence of transcendence, of a "beyondness" of objective societal reality, of the civilizational quest, giving pre-eminence to philosophy, religion, and values over economism.
- (3) The problem of power, at this juncture, appears more closely integrated than ever before with this very transition — from progress and developmentalism to transcendence and the civilizational quest. More than a mere centre of socio-political hegemony, power now appears as the centre to give rationality and cohesiveness, continuity too, to the major civilizational and cultural projects and visions. Briefly, the locus and instrument most concerned at the times of the transition from the "how" to the "why."

In "Specimens of Table Talk," on 2 July 1830, Samuel Taylor Coleridge wrote this:

"Every man is born an Aristotelian, or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that anyone born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure no born Platonist can change into an Aristotelian. They are the two classes of men, besides which it is next to impossible to conceive a third." A great deal has been written on this dichotomy, between formal analysis and the path of the heart, between the mind and intuition — Wagner, Henri Corbin, Joseph Needham — and I would conclude with the central thesis so rightly expressed by André Malraux: "Le XXI^e siècle sera spirituel ou ne sera pas."

Session 4. Youth, Sex, Family: The Quest for New Life Units

Chairperson: Tamás Szentes
Co-chairperson: María Angeles Durán
Rapporteur: Jean Casimir

Summary of Position Papers

1. Zinat Tofiq, "Youth and New Ways of Life in Iran"

To sum up the main thrust of this paper: The high fertility of the Iranian population as measured by CBR, GFR, TF, and GRR leads to a high proportion of youth in the population: 28 to 56 per cent of those of working age (ten years old and over) according to various definitions. With the succession of generations, within a period of not more than a decade, the traits and characteristics of youth today may spill over the whole population. The avalanche of coming generations prevents the formation of "collective memory" and thus leaves society open to revolutionary cultural upheavals.

No doubt, in a rapidly changing and poorly integrated society like Iran, youth is not a monolithic block. It is composed of different strata, such as students, workers, and the jobless, who are all to be cross-classified according to male-female, rural-urban, etc. However, as we argued previously, they have all been attracted to three ideological poles, except for those who have remained politically uncommitted. These poles are militant orthodox Islamic ideological formations, non-orthodox Islamic formations, and Marxist formations. The three tendencies give a preview of the future cultural scenery, with the fourth as a potentially important element. Except for the orthodox group, all these groups are going through their period of gestation. So far, none of them has been able to give a detailed and explicit account of their preferred way of life. Nonetheless, in the study of emerging life styles, the frameworks broadly defined by these groups are the only elements at anyone's disposal.

2. Bruno Ribes, "Système économique et crise des générations"

(1) En France, sous l'emprise du système économique, on assiste à un regroupement

massif et arbitraire des individus en trois cohortes d'âges: jeunes, adultes, personnes âgées, qui engendre de graves perturbations d'ordre physique et psychique ou mental. La traditionnelle échelle des âges est brisée. Les pères n'ont plus d'ascendants, leurs enfants ne sont plus leurs successeurs . . . Une telle société ne se dépasse plus. A côté de la dimension sociale (travail) et de la dimension privée (familiale) de l'existence, qui l'une et l'autre sont caractérisées par un certain comportement spécifique, on voit se développer une nouvelle dimension "agéelle" de la vie, au sein de bandes, clubs ou associations où chaque cohorte d'âge s'isole et se retrouve. Il se développe un corporatisme agéel.

(2) Une société au temps linéaire, telle que la société occidentale, a besoin qu'il "se passe" quelque chose, pour échapper à la monotonie; elle postule une appropriation du temps, une succession de générations sociales ayant leur mentalité collective propre. Or, de nos jours, nous assistons à un phénomène de "dégénération", par impossibilité pour les diverses cohortes de s'approprier leur temps:

- les événements sont abrasés
- il y a une dé-mission historique dans la poursuite du seul bien-être
- il y a perte de la mémoire collective (les savoirs et l'expérience sont rapidement dévalorisés, le passé désolidarisé); de la conscience ou connaissance collective du consensus (diversité des rationalités, "encombrement" des esprits); de l'imaginaire collectif et de l'espérance (on ne voit pas d'alternative, le futur est planifié, extrapolé, paraît déterminé).

Faute de cette possibilité de s'approprier leur temps, les cohortes d'âges s'enferment dans "l'agéel". Il y a perte de sens. Il s'ensuit une dévitalisation de l'élan social.

3. José Ramón Torregrosa, "Juventud, paro y el proceso de socialización"

Durante los años sesenta, y parte de los setenta, los temas que surgían en torno a la juventud eran las protestas estudiantiles (simbolizadas por los movimientos de Berkeley y el Mayo francés, etc.), los enfrentamientos y la ruptura generacionales, el surgimiento de culturas, subculturas o contraculturas juveniles. Actualmente persiste en gran medida el interés y la realidad por esta problemática. No obstante, la situación de recesión y de crisis por la que atraviesa la economía de muchos países capitalistas desde hace ya varios años, ha puesto en un primer plano una de sus consecuencias más graves: el paro.

Esto es especialmente cierto en este país, España, en que la tasa de paro es casi el doble que la media de los países de la OCDE (cerca del 12%, aunque hay desacuerdo en los datos). Del millón y medio de parados reconocidos oficialmente casi el 60% tienen 24 años o menos; es decir, una gran proporción de estos parados son jóvenes que buscan su primer empleo.

El fenómeno del paro, como cualquier fenómeno social complejo, admite ser enfocado desde muchas perspectivas, como es obvio. La que yo me propongo adoptar en las reflexiones que siguen es una perspectiva psicosociológica, es decir, una perspectiva que pueda establecer conexiones plausibles entre la experiencia individual y los aspectos básicos de la estructura social, entre la persona y la totalidad social. En este sentido he considerado que podía ser interesante contemplar el paro, y específicamente el paro juvenil, desde la perspectiva de los procesos de socialización. Cualquier aspecto relacionado con la problemática juvenil puede ser enfocado de hecho desde esta perspectiva. La misma definición social de juventud hace referencia a este estatuto todavía incompleto y dependiente, en transición, de los jóvenes, a través de cuyas experiencias va a cristalizar una determinada identidad social.

En resumen: la hipótesis de trabajo básica es la de que una tasa de desempleo juvenil elevada constituye una ruptura importante en la continuidad de los procesos de socialización, cuyas consecuencias psicológicas, sociales y políticas pueden ser de gran alcance. El fracaso de la socialización ocupacional, o profesional, revela la incompetencia del propio sistema socioeconómico en realizar los valores en que quiere legitimarse.

Por otro lado, la emergencia, reforzamiento o fabricación de culturas o subculturas juveniles, excepto aquéllos casos en que han sido movilizadas para una acción política coherente, ha significado la conversión al plano de lo privado — la psicologización en definitiva — de unas tensiones y conflictos cuyo origen y resolución se sitúan en el plano estructural, es decir, político-económico. Sólo si la experiencia colectiva del paro es reconducida hacia ese nivel políticamente consciente es posible esperar que se deriven cambios sociales progresivos de cierta significación. Sin embargo, es posible también que, sin esa conciencia política, conduzca a una extensión de las subculturas "desviadas" y "delincuentes," a una extensión de actitudes conservadoras, orientadas hacia la vida privada, "pasotas" o narcisistas.

Discussion

(1) Les débats relatifs à la session 4 se sont centrés en grande partie autour de la problématique du rôle de la femme dans la société. Le problème de la connaissance de la femme ou plutôt le constat de non-connaissance de la et de ses rapports avec son corps, avec le travail et avec la mort est mentionné. On met en relief les dangers de réduire le rôle de la femme à celui de mère.

Les relations entre la femme et la famille sont analysées. Dans le monde occidental ou dans le tiers monde, on observe un éclatement du noyau familial. Considéré dans sa perspective historique, l'éclatement en Occident reflète certains éléments de progrès ; par exemple le principe général de confier la garde des enfants d'un certain âge à l'un

ou l'autre parent est mis en question, et les autorités judiciaires tendent à décider à partir des caractéristiques de chaque cas soumis à leur attention.

Où retient dans ce même ordre d'idées les cas de familles mono- ou multi-parentales. Il est dit que si de telles transformations peuvent produire des formes d'anomalie, elles sont aussi de nature à susciter l'éclosion d'un nouvel esprit communautaire.

On note un déplacement des fonctions de transmission de la culture locale par les mères, vers d'autre institutions. Au sein même de la famille, la plus grande participation du père dans la vie publique et son niveau d'instruction généralement plus élevé, amènent parfois à un certain effacement de la mère et à l'identification des enfants au père, au détriment de la continuité et de la reproduction des cultures nationales.

Une mise en garde est proposée quant au rôle de la famille traditionnelle et particulièrement de la famille étendue dans la préservation de l'identité culturelle, que l'on tend généralement à exagérer. Dans de nombreuses occasions, les mécanismes traditionnels permettent au fond une reproduction des formes d'exploitation capitaliste.

Il est rappelé qu'au sein de la famille se transmettent les relations de pouvoir (et la perception de ces relations) et la division du travail des sociétés particulières. On insiste de même au cours des débats sur l'urgence de considérer les droits des enfants et l'on retient que certains dangers peuvent découler de la revalorisation de la femme et menace les droits des enfants.

Plusieurs difficultés ont retardé le progrès des discussions et semblent se devoir aux déplacements constants des réflexions sur la femme en tant qu'unité significative d'analyse sociale ou unité significative d'action sociale. De ce dernier point de vue, l'on fait remarquer, tant en acceptant les idées présentées antérieurement, que la problématique de la femme dans une stratégie de changement social est secondaire dans les pays sous-développés comme l'Iran par exemple.

Certaines interventions soulignent le rôle historique joué par les femmes dans des mouvements pré-nationaux chez les populations tribales de l'Inde, et les comportements differentiés des femmes des milieux rural et urbain. L'on remarque aussi le rôle actif des chinoises au cours des processus révolutionnaires, rôle qui cependant ne débouche pas sur une plus grande libération des femmes. On remarque que dans le monde japonais les relations entre la mère et les enfants priment sur celles qui définissent l'épouse. Les japonais sont avant tout membres d'une famille.

On relève que plusieurs mouvements révolutionnaires ont fait montre d'un remarquable conservatisme quant aux problèmes de la femme.

Finalement on prend note que vu l'éclatement de la famille comme unité de décisions, de consommation et de revenus, le pouvoir s'effrite au sein de la structure familiale, ce qui a des répercussions sur la socialisation de l'enfant. Cette socialisation se donne de plus en plus dans un cadre anonyme de crèches et jardins d'enfants.

(2) Les discussions relatives aux problèmes de la jeunesse et se référant plus immédiatement aux exposés occupent une second place par rapport à celles qui traitent de la problématique de la femme et de la famille.

Dans le cadre d'une réorganisation économique et sociale et des répercussions prévues sur la jeunesse espagnole, le tout situé dans un contexte plus ample de la crise économique mondiale, on a lieu de s'interroger sur les relations entre le chômage massif et le processus de démocratization que traverse l'Espagne. D'une façon plus générale, on exprime un certaine préoccupation face aux inconsistences que doivent résoudre les jeunes, qui sont appelés à se battre pour leur patrie, mais dont la participation dans les prises de décisions d'ordre politique ne correspond pas à ces responsabilités d'un autre ordre.

L'on retient de même que les jeunes sont en quête d'homogénéité, les différences sexuelles par exemple tendent à s'estomper, en même temps qu'ils établissent de nouvelles formes de différentiations qui deviennent évidentes dans le comportement de ce que l'on a appelé la "brigade du blue-jean".

On explique l'importance aux Indes du concept du pouvoir de la jeunesse (youth power) comme politique officielle des divers partis au cours des années '70. Le pays connaît un effort systématique de canaliser les sentiments de frustration et d'anomalie des jeunes, et passer des problèmes au pouvoir de la jeunesse. S'il est vrai qu'il y a lieu de prendre note d'un plus grand sens de responsabilité parmi les jeunes leaders il faut quand même tenir compte des possibilités de manipulations de la jeunesse. Dans ce contexte il est proposé que les problèmes des jeunes sont bien souvent des problèmes des adultes, lesquels n'auraient pas su, par exemple, assurer que la grande vision de Bandung se transmette à la génération suivante. La coupure entre jeunes et adultes peut se considérer comme une carence du principe d'intégration, trop négligé par les adultes.

L'on souligne que le problème de la jeunesse fait parti des relations qui se donnent dans le système économique, et que celui-ci ne connaît que des individus, travailleurs ou consommateurs. Le chômage des jeunes s'inscrit dans ce contexte où le noyau familial se désintègre. Il convient donc de se demander si les catégories de jeunes, adultes et vieux sont opératoires pour expliquer les problèmes de la société. De plus, il est suggéré de prêter attention aux caractéristiques des cultures nationales et aux différences entre couches sociales.

Intervention

M'hamed Boukhobza

Le problème de la jeunesse est difficile à comprendre sans le lier au contexte social dans lequel le problème a vu le jour.

Ce qu'il ne faut pas perdre de vue c'est que dans le système de développement occidental, seul existe l'individu. Il est à la fois force de travail dans la sphère de la production et unité de consommation dans celle de la consommation. De ce fait les structures sociales dans lesquelles vit et évolue un individu sont complètement évacuées par le système.

Par ailleurs la prolétarisation systématique a ôté à l'enfant sa fonction d'hériter, et une longue période de stabilité de l'emploi et d'accroissement de vie lui a ôté sa fonction de soutien — de refuge pour les parents vieillis. Compte tenu de toutes les institutions créées pour prendre en charge l'individu, le retrécissement de la place de l'enfant dans la société post-industrielle ne peut que s'accentuer.

Le travail des femmes, l'éclatement de l'unité de décision, de l'unité de consommation et de l'unité économique ont peu à peu détruit le faisceau de relations de la vie familiale. Refusé par le couple, l'enfant quand il arrive au monde est directement pris en charge des "structures d'éducation industrielle" rationalisées — économiquement — : crèche — jardin d'enfant — école maternel — école . . . A l'âge actif il devient ce qu'a fait de lui le système : un producteur et un consommateur, d'où ce qu'appelle l'auteur l'inexistence d'une mémoire collective ; plus de solidarité autre que celle directement liée aux aspects matériels — bref, l'inexistence de normes et de valeurs cristallisées dans le système d'attitude de l'enfant.

De ce fait le problème de la jeunesse c'est de concevoir non pas comme objet d'interrogation en soi, mais comme symptôme de la destruction des capacités et des conditions de reproduction des valeurs sociales à travers la socialisation de l'enfant par le biais de la famille. C'est la destructuration de celle-ci en tant que cellule de reproduction sociale qui est la *principale* source du problème des jeunes.

Sur un autre plan, il y a lieu de se méfier de la catégorie âge comme catégorie signifiante au plan socio-économique.

Enfin les perturbations sociales créées par le chômage peuvent s'expliquer dans une large mesure par l'apathie des structures familiales des sociétés industrielles: c'est le règne de chacun pour soi.

V. GENERAL REPORT ON THE SEMINAR

• **J.A. Maraj**

There are many approaches which can be adopted in the preparation and presentation of the general report of a seminar. It may therefore be useful for me to explain why I have chosen this particular approach. I believe that, with possibly one exception, we have had comprehensive section reports. In these my colleagues have summarized the main aspects of the presentations and the discussions under the four headings with which we have been concerned. That was the intention - and to a large extent, it has been achieved: the scientific content, the knowledge, the postulations, the insights, the theoretical and philosophical explorations and elaborations pertinent to those four themes, as they are reflected in the impressive array of papers and the no less distinguished presentations and interventions, have already been recorded for us by my fellow reporters. Their diligence, indeed their skilfulness in encapsulating the high quality which characterized our discussions, deserves our commendation and our gratitude, I will not therefore attempt a further distillation or refinement that would be much too presumptuous and wholly unnecessary. In addition, I am conscious of the fact that we were asked to try and produce a report *on* the conference and not one *of* the meeting.

Each of us will take from this experience and from our interactions his or her own conclusions: clarification of some issues, an awareness of new questions, perhaps even a reinforcement of our own prejudices. But I am sure that we shall all be the richer for having participated. Nonetheless, I can hardly discharge my responsibility as your General Rapporteur without at least adding a few of my own reflections on some of the paths we have traversed together. And if my personal views differ markedly from your own, let me attribute that difference to the dizziness which some of us experience when we attempt to scale unaccustomed heights. I have no doubt that the heights that have been scaled in this seminar are very different from the heights that have been attempted in some of the earlier seminars in this project sponsored by the United Nations University and I am particularly prone to such dizziness. I am not unaware of the absolute necessity for the human spirit to soar and to give free rein to imagination, for there can be no creativity without it. I am equally aware that it is a real world in which we live, and the pressing global problems we seek to address are grounded in a reality that will not be obfuscated by taking refuge in a new lexicon. The world we seek to transform is a real world, with inequalities, injustices,

exploitation, poverty, hunger, unemployment, and so on. And I suggest, with respect, that while analysis is important — indeed it is imperative, and as scholars this is perhaps our most useful contribution — it is not enough. We must point to paths of action, though not necessarily advancing these as panaceas or prescriptions. Only the foolhardy or the arrogant will attempt such in the highly complex and extremely uncertain matters with which we have been concerned.

To illustrate what I mean, let me liken it to a group exploring in a jungle and finding that they are lost. Scouts are dispatched in various directions in search of an exit. Those who return with the information that the direction in which they went did not offer a way out make no less a useful contribution than those who happen to stumble on an exit trail. Our discourse in this project, considerably deepened during this particular seminar, at least enables us to indicate which ways do not constitute a way out. I believe that we are now much clearer on where to look more carefully, with a greater hope of finding alternatives for socio-cultural development in the process of transformation. Perhaps the UN University could begin to give consideration to strategies through which the blind alleys and the dead ends could be drawn to the attention of a wider audience.

I have referred to the high intellectual quality of the papers and the presentations, and my fellow rapporteur colleagues have dealt with some of these. I should like, however, in the General Report, to make particular mention of Professor Furtado's keynote address, to which we returned so often during our deliberations. Indeed, the very fact that we did so is testimony of the "keynoteness" of his remarks and of their fundamental importance and relevance to the matters which engaged our attention. It will be recalled that he emphasized the extreme complexity of the issues involved in trying to maintain a global vision. He noted that it was important in any serious consideration of world transformation to recognize such factors as the political confrontation taking place at the highest levels, triggering off the arms race, the technological developments which were largely a spin-off from the production of armaments, the processes of closer integration of the markets of the advanced industrial capitalist countries, and the emergence of the third world as a political actor in international affairs. Professor Furtado drew particular attention to the pressures on the ecological frontiers, and he felt that there was an increasing lack of co-ordination of economic activities which was tending to become more "internationalized." He also observed that many of the capitalist countries were resorting to selective protectionism and were having to abandon some of their political and social postures. These views, which were elaborated upon by Professor Furtado and others in the course of our deliberations, provided, it seems to me, useful markers of the boundaries within which our search for alternatives and our strategies for transformation extended, at least at this stage and at this time of our history.

The next major area to which I should like to draw attention is in Professor Abdel-Malek's paper, which by being linked with a particular section of the seminar perhaps

prevented us from exploring its wider implications. We recalled through that paper the factors relating to the break-up of some of the traditional patterns of hegemony, and he noted the primacy of the political dimension in the assault on imperialism and fascism. As we moved towards liberation and development, it was the political that was emphasized. And indeed, in terms of liberation movement or decolonization or independence, it was the political motive force that was predominant. This was strongly tinged with a search for national identity. But I think he will agree that the fashion that overtook us before long led to the economic gaining ascendancy. We witnessed a reinforcement of models of centre and periphery, sometimes the economic centre being little other than what was the imperial centre in a political sense. This brought technology as a new shrine at which we had to worship. It also led to the establishment of a new barometer marked in "stages of development."

That barometer appeared to be calibrated in degrees of industrialization. Progress seems to have been defined as synonymous with development, and development itself seemed to be checked against Western models of industrialization. Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the rest of the third world, at that stage, appeared simply to be waiting to westernize, to modernize. The new patterns of domination which arose led to a flourishing of cultural imperialism. Indeed, in some ways we were probably even on the brink of a final emasculation - but somehow, that was avoided. The new philosophies, the ideologies, the notions of self-help and self-reliance and endogenous creativity were reawakening. There was a note of stridency in the question "Why?" rather than "How?" This was perhaps sometimes born of an acute nationalism, but nonetheless it was clear that we were becoming resistant to continued subjugation in any form. Here and there, there were glimpses of hope, and of different "ways." Some of these "ways" were often constrained if not snuffed out by pressures exerted by and through those who wielded power and influence until of course the Japanese "miracle" was wrought without sacrificing those characteristics endogenous to the people. It was lettered in Japan's own philosophies, drawn from Japan's own inner well-springs, revitalized, indeed regenerated, modernized from within, not westernized from without. Let me add that if the Japanese well-springs, as we were told, were Confucian in orientation, there are other well-springs inspired by other philosophies and other ideologies, in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America and the Arab World, and so on. Perhaps it would not be unfair to note that if we were to drink somewhat more deeply from those well-springs we, too, might work miracles or near miracles!

Three themes of a broad kind recurred throughout the discussions. I would like to highlight these. The first dealt with "power and control." Transformation calls for a consideration of the problems as one of power structure and control. We came back to this several times. The continuing questions seem to be: Where are the effective loci of power? Who will control and by what means? And, depending on the answers we get, at various levels, what scenarios can be devised that will lead to what has been called "positive sum games"? The second theme that recurred concerns "the division of labour." At all levels, national, regional, international, and across the various divides

that we examined, whether they were North/South, urban/rural, men/women, centre/periphery, working classes/bourgeoisie, what we kept coming back to in these various divisions was in fact related squarely to the division of labour. A third broad theme which recurred has to do with concepts of "progress" and "development." In the shadow of the failure of the great vision, I think we agreed that progress is not simply outmoded; it has to be rethought in the multiplicity of new ideas based on the enormous cultural heritage of mankind. And these concepts of progress must start at the level of the internal social structure before spreading on the international scale. I believe there was agreement that the proposed formulation of alternatives needs a minimum consensus on basics and on the framework. I think that was what the meeting had been seeking in the attempts at transformation - a synthesis of mankind's cultural heritage without necessarily losing the future specific. I think we have agreed on what some of those basics might be.

There are two other points that I want to make. I do so in the spirit of reflection of the meeting. The first of these concerns the feeling of enrichment that one gets from the participation of people drawn from all parts of the globe. I will not seek to particularize the insights that we gained from the contributions made by colleagues from Ghana or Iran, Spain or Quebec, Japan or Algeria, except to say that one got the feeling that we were in a situation akin to witnessing similar patterns of development being portrayed on different surfaces. And on these different surfaces, because of their contours, their configurations, different images were reflected, perhaps in some cases "distorting" the shape of some elements, in others reducing them in size and so on. But I have no doubt whatever that it was the specific contribution of our colleagues who reflected on their own cultural backgrounds and development which enabled us to see a bit more clearly the basic patterns of development which are evolving.

In this connection, I wish to record our gratitude for the enormous education which we have had by virtue of the participation of our Spanish colleagues. I believe this is the first time we have had such a large number of Spanish participants in one of our meetings. This meeting has been immensely enriched by their presence. We are grateful not only for the examples of their technical expertise but even more for being exposed to the spirit of humility and humaneness which infuses their work.

We must also remember the fundamental point that the project is not a third-world project. Throughout our deliberations, in attempting to have a global vision and address global concerns, we should avoid focusing on those concerns as seen only from third-world perspectives. This is not to say that we should not ask whether the third world must continually readjust its own posture and continually rewrite its own lines depending on what is going on on the stage occupied by others. It is to take cognizance of the fact that, even while we are meeting here, shifts are taking place in geopolitical terms of which we cannot be unaware. Even if we do not respond immediately, we must at least take into account such geopolitical shifts in developing our own strategies

towards transformation. I think, too, that we were wise to record that any strategies for the transformation which emphasize basic needs do not mean that basic needs should be limited to a mere subsistence level.

Finally, I wish to introduce a note which is completely personal. So much of what we have talked about concerns the changing patterns of the world economy. In that context we looked at the OPEC experience and the related strategy and agreed that it was likely that its success might well lead others to adopt it. That might well be so, but the world economies may also be influenced, sooner than we can think, by another set of factors involving an often forgotten part of the third world. We talk a lot about Latin America, Asia, and Africa, but my humble submission to you is that in the same way as when oil loomed as a major factor this led to new groupings and new perceptions, it is conceivable that the islands of the world may find themselves in the very near future in a similar position, if only they can hold together. They could well exert considerable influence on economic strategies and economic development because of the resources of the sea-bed. My own view is that, in trying to create a togetherness within the third world, new groupings may arise which, while initially using strategies not unlike those of OPEC, may evolve other strategies which not only take advantage of the existing order but attempt to change it in a fundamental way. This is the thought that I felt I should share with you as we come to the close of this symposium.

Let me say finally that, if Professor Furtado's keynote address took us from "progress" to "development," perhaps we have reached the stage in the development of this project, in its unfolding, where we can clearly recognize some progress in our attempt to advance the transformation of the world. That progress must not be halted, for, as in rowing upstream, if we do not move forward we must performe slip backwards. It is just not possible to stand still.

APPENDIX. PAPERS PRESENTED

Celso Furtado. "De la ideología del progreso a la ideología del desarrollo."
Anouar Abdel-Malek. "From Developmentalism to the Civilizational Quest: A Mission
for the United Nations University."

Session 1. Changing Patterns in World Economy

Immanuel Wallerstein. "Patterns and Prospectives of the Capitalist World Economy."
Tamás Szentes. "Changing Patterns of World Economy."
José Luis García Delgado. "Crecimiento y cambio industrial en España, 1960-1980:
viejos y nuevos problemas."
Issam El-Zaim. "Changing Patterns in World Economy and the Transition to a New
International Economic Order, with Special Reference to the Arab World."

Session 2. The Scientific and Technological Revolution: Its Impact on Urban and Rural Societies

Yves Barel. "Peut-on encore penser la modernité?"
Janusz Gofębiowski. "Social Values and the Development of Technology."
Jean Casimir. "L'Encadrement du développement scientifique et technologique
dans la Caraïbe."
Osama A. El-Kholy. "Investigation of Scientific and Technological Potentialities
in Tradition and Culture of Communities for the Satisfaction of Basic Needs
(Egyptian Case)."
M'hamed Boukhobza. "Impacts de la révolution scientifique et technique sur les
ressources et besoins dans la société agricole."

Session 3. Social Power: The State, the Working People, and Hegemonic Classes

Kazuko Tsurumi. "Endogenous Intellectual Creativity and the Emerging New
International Order, with Special Reference to East Asia."

Anne Legaré. "Eléments pour l'analyse du Québec: aujourd'hui et demain."

Kwesi Botchwey. "Transforming the Periphery: A Study of the Struggle of the Social Forces for Democracy and National Sovereignty in Contemporary Ghana."

María Angeles Durán. "Crisis económica y conflicto social en España."

Barun De. "The State, Hegemonic Classes, and Working-Class Power: An Overview."

Session 4. Youth, Sex, Family: The Quest for New Life Units

Zinat Tofiq. "Youth and New Ways of Life in Iran."

Bruno Ribes. "Système économique et crise des générations."

José Ramón Torregrosa. "Juventud, paro y el progreso de socialización."

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