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
Socio - Cultural

Development Alternatives

in a Changing World

Project Meeting Report

Tokyo, Japan, June 1977



THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY

From the CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY

ARTICLE I

Purposes and structure

1. The United Nations University shall be an international community of scholars, engaged in research, post-graduate training and dissemination of knowledge in furtherance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In achieving its stated objectives, it shall function under the joint sponsorship of the United Nations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (hereinafter referred to as UNESCO), through a central programming and co-ordinating body and a network of research and post-graduate training centres and programmes located in the developed and developing countries.

2. The University shall devote its work to research into the pressing global problems of human survival, development and welfare that are the concern of the United Nations and its agencies, with due attention to the social sciences and the humanities as well as natural sciences, pure and applied.

3. The research programmes of the institutions of the University shall include, among other subjects, coexistence between peoples having different cultures, languages and social systems; peaceful relations between States and the maintenance of peace and security; human rights; economic and social change and development; the environment and the proper use of resources; basic scientific research and the application of the results of science and technology in the interests of development; and universal human value related to the improvement of the quality of life.

4. The University shall disseminate the knowledge gained in its activities to the United Nations and its agencies, to scholars and to the public, in order to increase dynamic interaction in the world-wide community of learning and research.

5. The University and all those who work in it shall

act in accordance with the spirit of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitution of UNESCO and with the fundamental principles of contemporary international law.

6. The University shall have as a central objective of its research and training centres and programmes the continuing growth of vigorous academic and scientific communities everywhere and particularly in the developing countries, devoted to their vital needs in the fields of learning and research within the framework of the aims assigned to those centres and programmes in the present Charter. It shall endeavour to alleviate the intellectual isolation of persons in such communities in the developing countries which might otherwise become a reason for their moving to developed countries.

7. In its post-graduate training the University shall assist scholars, especially young scholars, to participate in research in order to increase their capability to contribute to the extension, application and diffusion of knowledge. The University may also undertake the training of persons who will serve in international or national technical assistance programmes, particularly in regard to an interdisciplinary approach to the problems with which they will be called upon to deal.

ARTICLE II

Academic freedom and autonomy

1. The University shall enjoy autonomy within the framework of the United Nations. It shall also enjoy the academic freedom required for the achievement of its objectives, with particular reference to the choice of subjects and methods of research and training, the selection of persons and institutions to share in its tasks, and freedom of expression. The University shall decide freely on the use of the financial resources allocated for the execution of its functions. . . .

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**SOCIO-CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES
IN A CHANGING WORLD**

**PROJECT MEETING REPORT
TOKYO, JAPAN, JUNE 1977**

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I. ORGANIZATION OF THE MEETING

1. The Task Force Meeting on Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World was held in Tokyo at the United Nations University Headquarters, 6–10 June 1977.
2. The objective of the meeting was to formulate recommendations concerning the preparation and implementation of a project on socio-cultural development alternatives in a changing world as part of the University's Human and Social Development Programme.
3. The meeting was attended by ten experts from nine countries, attending in their private capacities. Invited participants from Mexico, the USSR, Poland, Upper Volta, Tunisia, China, and India were unable to attend. The list of participants is given in Appendix I. In addition, the following members of the University participated: Dr. James M. Hester, Rector; Dr. Kinhide Mushakoji, Programme Vice-Rector for Human and Social Development; and Dr. Pedro Henriquez, Programme Officer.
4. The meeting elected Dr. Mushakoji chairman, Dr. Firouz Tofigh general rapporteur, and Dr. Henriquez secretary.
5. The meeting was conducted on the basis of the project proposal on the Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World prepared by Dr. Anouar Abdel-Malek, Consultant to the United Nations University, which provides the background and outlines the purpose of the project.
6. In addition, some participants presented papers on present problems concerning socio-cultural studies in different regions. These papers are Appendix II of this report.
7. The opening address was given by Dr. Hester, who gave a résumé of the University's objectives and structure.

8. Dr. Mushakoji explained the nature and objectives of the Human and Social Development Programme and the background and purpose of the Task Force Meeting.

9. The report of the Task Force Meeting was adopted at the plenary session on 10 June 1977.

II. PROGRAMME RATIONALE

Definition of the Problem

10. At the outset of the meeting, Dr. Mushakoji explained the rationale for the Task Force Meeting and suggested that the term "development" should be stressed in order to encompass concepts such as satisfaction of human needs, self-reliance, endogenous development, participation, etc. He added that to meet the needs of different communities, there are different paths — the Western pattern being but one of them. The combined study of *goals, processes, and indicators* is to be related to other topics such as:

- (a) "human rights and development", i.e., how human needs, material and non-material, emerge as rights related to development, and
- (b) "life-styles and industrialization".

11. The study of goal-process relationship should also be located within the historical context of particular units, not necessarily countries, but perhaps broader cultural-geographical entities. The *specificity* of each culture and tradition should be stressed. The problem becomes a question of how a *universal* approach can be combined with this *specificity*.

12. In the discussion which followed, it was concluded that in this research project questions related to negativity (e.g., corruption, loss of values and of moral sense, etc.) should be considered, but only as long as this could be a constructive consideration and not merely polemical.

Purpose of the Project and Its Relevance for Policy

13. The purpose of the project was defined as to locate the problem and to apprehend its relevance for policy. The Task Force reviewed several papers and notes submitted by individual participants.

14. It was argued that the subject of socio-cultural development alternatives could be approached from different angles: the deadlocks of the Development Decade, the dissatisfaction of both scientists and administrators with the whole *problématique* of development, the feeling of crisis in social sciences dealing with development problems all over the world, etc. But the key perspective, taking into consideration the previous work of the United Nations University, should be — if the Programme is to address itself in a meaningful manner to the pressing problems of humanity at a global level — the conception of humanity as comprised of many units. The world has been formed by societies and groups of societies with different patterns of historical evolution which, very briefly, can be subsumed under three different categories: the nation-states; cultural-regional groupings; and civilizations. If this is so, the problem arises: How can thinking about development (models and assumptions) be related to these categories?

15. This is made all the more important because, in developed nations (which happen to belong predominantly to Europe and North America), and in developing nations (mostly in Asia and Africa, with the addition of Latin America), there is a feeling that we are living in a period of global transformation, e.g., the resurgence of Africa, and Latin America, the break-up of the hitherto unified pattern of the market economy, and the scientific and technological revolution.

16. The *problématique* and methodology provided so far have not been sufficiently successful, not because they were not well designed but because they were not applicable. There is an inadequacy of theoretical and methodological tools to apprehend certain processes of social and human development. The models were built from the apex of the pyramid, showing the way people should develop. It was assumed that people would conform to these models but they did not. This approach has been criticized in several forums, both within and outside the UN, and it was felt that a more positive approach would be to relate different social units — be these units nations, cultures, or civilizations, units which exist in the real world as a result of historical evolution — to the manifold objective processes of development.

17. It was agreed that unless social scientists place the problems of social development within the framework of differently constituted socio-cultural units, efforts to solve the problems will go from failure to failure. This is the pragmatic aspect of the work and its relevance for policy-making: fitting research and findings of the social and human sciences to the needs of different societies, cultures, and civilizations in the world today.

III. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Methodology and Focus of Research

18. The meeting considered different conceptual and methodological alternatives as the framework to be assigned to regional groupings.

19. The first concept was that of *specificity*, which was defined as the four axes for the maintenance of any social groupings, e.g.:

- (a) production to satisfy material needs (food, shelter, etc.);
- (b) reproduction of life (family, sexuality, etc.);
- (c) social order (power and state); and
- (d) relations of the members of a group to the time dimension (religion, philosophy, ideology, culture, etc.).

Various historical combinations of these four elements in each society lead to very different results due to the fact that each society (i) occupies a locale that has distinctive spatial relationships (geopolitics), and (ii) has its own natural and human endogenous geographical aspects. For example, because of the natural ecology in arid zones, hydraulic societies have little in common with societies in temperate areas of Europe and North America. According to this conceptualization, *specificity* is not a "return to the sources" or an "ideal type" as seen by, say, Max Weber. It was stressed that the introduction of the concept of *specificity* should not mean the inclusion in the study of nonessential, exotic elements of culture. The variables to be taken into account should be significant and relevant to the problem of development. Only key factors should be retained.

20. At a concrete research level, the aforementioned implies that there is not any one way to approach the problem of human and social development, but that there are different ways of doing so. Each regional grouping should raise its own genuine problems and try to answer them. Some conceive of development as primarily a problem of "modernization"; others as primarily a problem of "renaissance"; still

others as primarily a problem of "increase in the GNP", or "decrease in consumption", or as "military and political power", or as "national and social liberation", etc.; or as a combination of several sets of priorities.

21. It was argued that the problem of development should be tackled by using a conceptual system which contains such elements of reference as political processes, nature of the state, ideology, modes of production, social relations, and the inter-relations of these elements. Ideology will be the single most important factor.

22. During the discussion, the following points were also mentioned.

- (a) The project's referential paradigms may not be exhaustive, and concepts such as "élites", "habitat", "natural endowment", "accessibility", and "leisure" may not be accounted for by them.
- (b) Furthermore, there are many ways in which social development can not be seen: for example, as a balance of energy, the concept of energy being taken in its full meaning, including mainly human-energy input and its counterpart, human atrophy. There is "development" wherever the input of energy is greater than atrophy. The problem could then be formulated as follows: What are the factors which cause the atrophy of human energy and what are the factors which enhance man's creativity?

23. It was decided to benefit from the wide array of conceptual perceptions exhibited by different regional groups and to define the project's methodology in the same broad terms. It was agreed that the recommendations to the regional groupings would be as follows. The research programmes should be designed:

- (a) in order to combine the requirement and approach of specificity with the requirement and approach of universality; and
- (b) within the context of "a changing world".

The approach should also be:

- (c) both synchronic and diachronic, oriented towards prospective problem solving and the devising of social policies;
- (d) comparative;
- (e) contextual, i.e., seen within the historical context of each nation;
- (f) critical and analytical, going beyond simple description of the facts to assessing the potentialities of societal phenomena;
- (g) based essentially on the extensive use of local and endogenous data or existing and ongoing research;
- (h) multidisciplinary; and
- (i) oriented in a non-antagonistic manner to contradictions leading to complementarity, i.e., independence within inter-dependence.

24. It was agreed that the focus of the project should be such that it (a) relates to the pressing global problems of the world, and (b) produces a maximum range of diversity among various reports.

25. Four possible themes were submitted to the meeting for consideration.
- (a) Cultural identity and national socio-political change — understood as cultural identity linked to the transformation of the world.
 - (b) Endogenous intellectual creativity — understood as contributions from countries or cultures to human civilization; the study of how to give creativity precedence over transfer; and also the socio-economic framework in which creativity deploys. The absence of regional intellectual creativity should also be considered.
 - (c) New and emerging perceptions of prospects for human civilization — as distinct from futuristic studies.
 - (d) Specificity and universality — a relatively theoretical theme. It is proposed to study alternative methodologies and theoretical conceptual approaches to the study of human and social development in a comparative manner.

26. On the basis of the discussion, it was decided, for the first phase during the coming two years, to focus research on (a) and (b) above, with (b) having first priority. During the second phase, (c) and (d) will be taken up.

27. In the course of the deliberations, it was stressed that by creativity one should understand:

- (a) problem-solving creativeness;
- (b) intellectual creativity taken in the widest sense of participation and not confined only to the creativity of professional intellectuals;
- (c) innovation, adjustment, participation, response to exogenous values;
- (d) new ideas in science, technology, philosophy, and social policy; and
- (e) the effort to make and to project the future.

Some further dimensions of the theme of creativity were also suggested, such as the collectively perceived sources of intellectual creativity, the absence of intellectual creativity in particular areas, and the causes and conditions inhibiting intellectual creativity.

28. For theme (a) above, the meeting concurred that in using the concept of cultural identity, one should have in mind:

- (a) a specific configuration of relevant factors in a historical context and not abstract concepts;
- (b) cultural identity does not exclude external elements; such elements are accepted and assimilated by the people and have become part of the "cultural identity" of nations, the problem being how this identity can be used to promote development;
- (c) the psychological attempt at identifying individuals with a given culture should be excluded and the analysis should concentrate on the macro-level; and
- (d) the regional study groups should themselves overcome some of the shortcomings of the general concept and make adjustments wherever necessary; as an example, in some places the national and cultural identities have different geographical boundaries — in Latin America, cultural boundaries are much

larger than national boundaries; while very different situations might be found in various areas of the world, such as the USSR, Africa, etc.

29. Sub-themes under each of the general headings were suggested by some of the participants. It was decided to include these as an appendix to this report without necessarily implying endorsement by the meeting as a whole (see Appendix IV).

Regions and Structures of Regional Groups

30. Initially, systematic, i.e., purely geographic (insular versus land-locked countries, etc.) or cultural (e.g., linguistic), subdivisions were considered. However, in view of the practical difficulties involved in such an endeavour, the meeting agreed to start with the regional subdivisions accepted by UNESCO. The following ten regions were therefore identified in a very preliminary and tentative manner.

- Europe
- North America
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Tropical Africa
- the Arab region
- West Asia
- East Asia
- South Asia
- Southeast Asia
- the Pacific

31. Each regional grouping will be sponsored by one or more institutions actively involved in research and social sciences and humanities. A preliminary list of such institutions is attached as Appendix III.

32. Each regional grouping shall engage in the following work.

- (a) Scientific, thematic research work, to include:
 - (i) interim papers and reports submitted by participants to the regional meeting, including review, evaluation, and listing of endogenous publications and research papers pertaining to the subject;
 - (ii) acts of the symposium; and
 - (iii) reports of the regional meetings.
- (b) Comparative evaluation of ongoing research in the Human and Social Development Programme, to include:
 - (i) review of papers, interim reports, and findings of projects in the three major areas from a comparative socio-cultural viewpoint; and
 - (ii) particular attention to be paid to the interrelationship between the research projects of the Human and Social Development Programme and the programmes on the use and management of natural resources and world hunger.

33. Translation of these publications into major international languages will be undertaken by the United Nations University.

34. The project will cover a period of five years, subject to extension and development. Ideally, the best way to carry out the project would be to address all subjects to all ten regional groupings simultaneously, and then for the board of the project, composed of co-ordinators of regional groupings, to publish and distribute the research results.

35. In view of the financial constraints, however, it seems that each year a minimum of two regional meetings will be feasible. Thus, in the course of the project period (five years), all regions will be covered.

36. It was suggested that for practical reasons, during the years 1978 and 1979, two regional meetings be convened — one for West Asia (in Teheran, Iran) and one for Europe (in Paris, France).

Dissemination Strategy

37. The members of the Task Force concluded that prompt and wide dissemination of the results of the project was of prime importance. The output should not only be published and publicized in the form of volumes for academia and professional practitioners but also as small pamphlets, TV scenarios, and films. Arrangements with commercial publishers were also mentioned as means of reducing the financial burden of dissemination on the University.

Adoption of the Project

38. The Task Force at its last session endorsed the project as formulated and described in this report and recommended it to the Rector of the United Nations University for approval and implementation, taking into account the suggestions and contributions presented in this report.

APPENDIX I: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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APPENDIX II: PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE MEETING

1. Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World

by Anouar Abdel-Malek, Consultant to the United Nations University

1. Philosophy of the Project

1.1 The central character of our times, of the real world in our times, resides in the *transformation* — not evolution, or transition (all historical periods are periods of transition) — of all dimensions of the life of human societies. To be sure, this transformation, acknowledged by all quarters and groups all over the world, is neither unilinear nor synchronic. At the first level, we are witnesses to major differences in the quality, quantity, and more so, in the tempo and impact, of processes of transformation in different sectors of social life and activity — economic production; patterns of power; societal cohesiveness; cultural identity; civilizational projects; political ideologies; philosophies; ideologies; myths, etc. — in short, all sectors of what is usually termed the infrastructure and superstructure of society. At a second, more visible and forceful level, we do acknowledge distinctions between different types of societies, e.g., in the different types of socio-economic formations and the accompanying political ideologies (basically capitalism, liberal capitalism and monopoly capitalism; and socialism, national progressive socialism and communism). And even more so, in the hitherto neglected dimension of civilizational, cultural, and national specificity, we encounter major, more resilient and protracted, sets of differences.

1.2 This transformation of the world can be recognized in the following three sets of factors, which lend themselves to being reordered according to different conceptions of priorities.

(a) The resurgence of the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to contemporaneity, both in the socio-political and civilizational-cultural fields. The historical processes of national liberation and independence, coupled with national and social revolutions, have gathered momentum since their inception in modern times, during the early part of the nineteenth century, until they became the dominant factor of contemporary history from the years following 1917 and especially in the period 1945–73. This vast transformation has been seen by Western specialists as a socio-political process, within the traditional conception of the world's history (as consisting of one centre — Europe, later Europe and North America: i.e., the Western world — and its periphery, the Orient, i.e., Asia, Africa, the Arab world, later joined by Latin America). The three continents were emerging but what was/is

emerging is seen in socio-political terms. On the other side of the river, especially in the Orient — Asia, Africa, and the Arab world — this process of emergence was seen essentially as a process of renaissance of either culture or civilization, as in the Arab and Islamic “*Nadah*” and in Meiji Japan, in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the upsurge of Africanism; while Latin America’s quest for identity has brought to light the hitherto hidden Indian and Indian-African elements of the culture.

(b) A parallel, major set of formative factors in this transformation appears to have developed between 1848 and 1973, and especially from October 1917, the date of the first socialist revolution in history. The hitherto equanimous front of the bourgeoisies in power was suddenly faced with the eruption of the labouring people into power, coupled with a populist *Weltanschauung* geared towards a persistently more humane life for the have-nots. Sixty years later, nearly half of mankind lives under socialism, while two of the three main centres of influence in our times follow that path.

(c) More recently, a third set of factors has become more visible, centring upon the immense progress accomplished in the fields of science and technology. Here again, while certain advanced Western countries opted for such denominations of description as the “scientific and technological revolution”, or “post-industrial society”, on the other side of the river the vision remained paradoxically nearer to more realistic approaches, using the more traditional concepts of “revolution”, “development”, “social transformation”, within the implacable parameters of geopolitics. Yet, none would deny the message and ever-growing influence of the application of modern technologies in our world, in the very fabric of our individual life through the complexity of societal processes. The transformation of the world: how can it be related to the social and human sciences, political and social theories, to the philosophical quest? And, proceeding from there, how can this lead the path of the study of human and social development?

1.3 The study of human and social development is bound to start from the mould of the conglomerate of intellectual, cultural, and scientific assumptions we see at work in the whole range of human and social sciences: what is good for the “centre” is good for the “periphery”; and the centre is, and shall remain, the major workshop for the future of mankind. The very concept of “development” itself, in lieu and place of “evolution”, “change”, “transformation”, “historical development”, stems from the assumption that the way of the West — i.e., the rise of capitalism from the ashes of feudalism in Europe and North America — is and remains the way of, and for preindustrial societies or societies belonging to a backward colonial type of capitalism, predominantly agrarian and commercial, for which the Socialist revolution in the West ought to be regarded as the model for parallel developments in the Orient. In short, while Louis Aragon proclaims, “The future has not already been lived”, the future for the epigones of reductionism in human and social sciences has been lived, and must be duplicated: the projection of the Western societies’ past onto

the future of Oriental societies, in place of the historical praxis of intellectual, socio-political, scientific, and technological creativity.

Yet, the need for comparatism, for a comparative evaluation of the unfolding evolution of human societies, remains central to our intellectual quest. Till now, the instrument of this formal comparatism was quantification: variables selected from the postulated goals of the hegemonic world; the measurement of frequency and range attempted from random surveys. Thus, we had, for example, comparisons of Turkey and Japan; linguistic frequency in Peru, India, and Canada and its relation to types of nations; economic development in Bolivia and Egypt; religions, or religious ideologies, in Catholic France and Buddhist Vietnam, etc. Any societal ensemble, and any nation, seemed fit to be compared to any other similar unit and labelled in any manner one chose from prepatterned goals, sometimes out of sheer curiosity and paraculture. However, comparatism became fashionable, respectable, and sought after mainly because of this wave. The political aim was obvious; the scientific aim is to process "other" contemporary societies and nations into the pattern(s) of the Western hegemonic centres.

Reductionism, in a word, disguised as "comparatism-toward-universalism" was, and still is, being attempted from quantitative techniques via formalism and formalization, and baptized "methodology". Yet, simultaneously, and very strongly in the more recent period (1948–73), a current of deep dissatisfaction has emerged. For comparative studies of this type compare very little and are not conducive to a better explanation, interpretation, or comprehension of our changing world. Yet, more than ever before, in our world now finally brought together — through science, technology, and notably the mass media; through geopolitics and ideology — the need is keenly felt for a means of unifying different societies, dialectically combining the one and the multiple. How can we, if at all, meet this challenge?

2. Conceptual Framework

2.1 In many ways, three major, interlinked circles can be said to constitute the more general frame of comparatism.

- (a) Civilizations. This is the outer, more general circle, to be defined following Joseph Needham's approach.
- (b) Cultural areas. These fall within the mediating circle, often identified with the civilization circle, as in Arnold Toynbee's work. Broadly, the following cultural areas can be circumscribed:
 - (i) in the Indo-European civilization circle: the ancient Egyptian, Persian, Mesopotamian cultures; Greco-Roman antiquity; the European cultural area; the North American cultural area; major parts of the Indo-European cultural area in Latin America; the sub-Saharan African cultural area; the Islamic cultural area (partially — i.e., the Arab-Islamic and Persian-Islamic

- cultural areas, linked with the Chinese-Asian civilization circle); and
- (ii) in the Chinese-Asian civilization circle: China proper; Japan; Mongolia-Central Asia; Vietnam and South-east Asia; the Indian sub-continent; Oceania (with the exception of Australia and New Zealand); the Asian-Islamic cultural belt area (from Persia to the Philippines).

This second circle of cultural areas has directly inspired the cultural-regional divisions adopted, *inter alia*, by UNESCO (see section 4 below).

- (c) Nations (or "national formations"). These are the basic units for the very existence, continuity, unfolding, and evolution of macro-societal processes. It is suggested that a typology in five categories can render some assistance.
 - (i) The fundamental, continuous nations, whose modern phase is often described as that of renaissance
 - (ii) The European, Occidental type of nation-states
 - (iii) The new nation-states heading towards unification: the new nation-states strictly speaking as well as the national formations within the framework of multinational ensembles
 - (iv) The dualistic, Indian nation-states
 - (v) The new states with a national vocation

The key distinctions among the three circles cannot be dealt with here except in broad outlines.

Civilizational areas would be defined by the general conception of the interrelation between cultures, nations, societal formations on the one hand, and the time dimension on the other hand. More than a strict vision of the world, it is this philosophic relation to "time, the field of human development", and its consequences that can be said to distinguish East from West. Cultural areas can then be seen as societal ensembles sharing a common *Weltanschauung* more in terms of their historical-geographical determinism through history (both ecological and geopolitical) than in terms of philosophy proper — a conception of the world often expressed in a limited set of main languages, sometimes in one single language (English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Persian, Japanese, Spanish, Portuguese, etc.).

The combination of the first two outer circles — civilizational moulds and cultural areas — provides the more generally accepted form of definition of "East" and "West", of "Orient" and "Occident".

The Orient can be seen as composed of:

- the circle of Asian-Chinese civilization, and its cultural areas;
- the circle (civilizational-cultural) of Islam, which is the one major link between the circle of Indo-European civilization and the circle of Asian-Chinese civilization, and consequently an area both of mediation and of maximum tensions; and
- the sub-Saharan African cultural area, thus making Africa, as a whole, a major constitutive element of the Orient.

The Occident is seen as made up of the major sections of Indo-European civilization, broadly: Europe, North America, Australasia, and an important part of Central and South America.

These remarks are intended to help clarify the frame for meaningful comparatism, while, at an operational level, the key units are to be defined as the cultural-regional divisions of UNESCO.

In positing these three major, interlinked circles as the frame for comparatism, we have but posited what is really a topographical description (anatomy) of the field of comparatism. We now have to relate dialectically the different units within each of the three circles to the surrounding, wider and narrower, two circles. This, precisely, is the purpose of introducing the concept of specificity.

2.2 The analysis of the *concept of specificity* can be attempted at three levels/ moments as follows.

(a) The level/moment of general definition. In order to grasp the specificity of a given society, one should seek the pattern of societal maintenance obtaining in a given socio-economic national formation through a critical study of its historical development. This particular pattern of the societal maintenance is nothing else but the pattern of structuration and interaction of/between the four key factors which constitute every societal maintenance:

- (i) the production of material life in the geographic and ecologic framework (the mode of production in the strict sense);
- (ii) the reproduction of life (sexuality);
- (iii) social order (power and the state); and
- (iv) the relations with the time dimension (the limitedness of human life, i.e., religions and philosophies).

In this ensemble, the production of material life occupies a decisive place in the structure of the whole mode of maintenance. By applying this model to different societies, we would be in a better position to clarify the general picture, to qualify and to give colour — through the introduction of dominant touches — to the first analysis undertaken from socio-economic criteria.

(b) The level/moment of the emergence of the spatio-temporal factor to conscious awareness. The study of specificity is not undertaken in the rarefied world of pure epistemology, but within the framework of the concrete evolution of given societies. This evolution puts the time factor in the forefront; wherefore the central importance of the notion of “depth of the historical field”. There is no question of seeking specificity in the case of an occasional society such as a jamboree, a student movement, or a state artificially put together for show (e.g., Biafra). To talk of societal maintenance is to address oneself, not to contingencies, but to the long duration of history which moulds. By this we mean that one could validly speak of specificity in the old

social-national formations (the ideal terrain for specificity), or in those formations which have not yet reached the national level of evolution in the strict sense, or in the "new nations", to use Thomas Jefferson's phrase in respect of the United States of America. One can thus see how vast the field is, for it does cover the immense majority of nations and peoples in our time. The social sciences will feel less at ease with the "space" factor because of the falling out of favour of one form of geopolitics. However, the historical evolution of societies does not take place in the abstract space of the dialectics of the mind; neither does it unfold itself in the secluded field of epistemology. Societies, but only within the framework of their geographical conditions, can be considered under two aspects.

- (i) The aspect of localization, which leads to the appreciation of the place assigned by this localization to each society and its state as compared to others (geopolitics).
- (ii) The aspect of internal conditioning, i.e., ecology, which indicates and quantifies resources and potentials, taking into consideration the demographic factor.

(c) The moment/dimension of the dialectical interactions of the factor of maintenance with the factor of transformation, which ultimately decides the mode of production and, at extreme limits, the progress of techniques of production. We have to disentangle that which is maintained from that which maintains (an altogether different thing from "invariables", of a *posteriori* origin); that which is maintained from that which maintains according to a certain pattern; that which was not and becomes from that which is and shall be no more: to distinguish the link factors, whatever be their relative weight at any particular stage of historical evolution.

2.3 As we proceed towards a genuine understanding of the processes, alternative goals, and scientific and socio-political requisites of the alternative paths and modes of social dialectics — "development", or societal evolution — in our times, with a view to providing a comparative evaluation that can be of relevance to the future of mankind, we ought to be aware of the dialectics of the time dimension. This is because of the very fact that the philosophic-conceptual approach suggested here is fundamentally a historical-critical, or historical-dialectical, vision of the evolution of human societies: it thus is firmly grounded in the very depth of the historical field, as it unfolds in the real world — and fundamentally at variance with, and in opposition to, the passing vogue(s) of epistemological agility, dogmatic exegesis, structuralism, and functionalism, the many-faced mirrors of neo-positivism in our times.

Time, therefore, the field of human development, is also the unending, refreshing river. Legacies of time, to be sure. But also, time as a many-splendoured array of potentialities. Time, as the iron frame of our given destinies, here and now; but also, time as hope and future, the unfolding visions of our human race. This is indicated in the tonality of our endeavours, directly oriented towards the unfolding problems of human and social development.

3. Scientific Research Field of the Project on the Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World (SCA Project)

3.1 Definition of the Scientific Research Field of the Project.

The central problem in the comparative-critical evaluation of development alternatives lies at the very outset of our thinking, i.e., at the level of the position of the problem itself (as indicated in 1.1 and 1.2).

The following appears to be of importance in our forthcoming work.

The notion of the position of the problem is to be understood and formulated as the notion of the *positions* of the problem. For a comparative-critical evaluation cannot reach a level of meaningful comparatism if it limits itself to comments and criticisms of the existing, hegemonic position of the problem (of "development", "evolution", the "good society", etc.). Yet, this is precisely the maximum that intellectual paternalism can offer in lieu and place of the general line: a proliferation of panels, advisory bodies, dialogues (a key word) — always, perforce, stemming from, and revolving around, the positions of the centre.

The approach advocated here would stress the differences in unity; the national-cultural specificities within the frame of the more general civilizational moulds of the world.

Hence, it follows that the whole range of the problem of human and social development will have to be evaluated, as will the different and differing positions of the problem themselves. Central attention will have to be devoted to delimiting the differing positions of common problems, using the concept of specificity objectively grounded in the process of historical evolution. This is where such notions and concepts as "development", "evolution", "success", "achievement", "growth", "human happiness", "the good life", "free society", "progress", "sociability", "liberty", "justice", *inter alia*, will have to be dealt with at the start, not as outputs of quantified formal analysis, but by appropriate methods. Greatest care must be attached to the scrutiny of the relevance of the findings, i.e., of their socio-cultural — not "official" — representation; that is, the degree to which they are recognized by sizeable sectors of the autochthonous societies as expressing their condition and visions. Field work can be different, while secondary analysis can sometimes be in deep harmony with specific objectives, social conditions, and processes.

To clarify matters further, the choice was between one of the following two attitudes.

- (a) One position of the problem: to be followed by well-balanced, comparative-critical evaluations in different regional, civilizational, and national-cultural areas.
- (b) A range of differing positions of the problem evaluated by representative region-

al — civilizational and national-cultural — intellectual centres and experts. In that option — which we advocate in the SCA project — we would be able to benefit from the *maximal range* of combinations:

- comparison between these different, theoretically specific, positions of the problem itself, in different regions;
- comparison of each of these different positions with parallel positions obtained from other regions.

So it seems this approach will enable us to range wider, in both the regional and thematic areas, towards greater richness and efficacy.

3.2 Nature of the Scientific Research Field: the Theoretical Workshop

3.2.1 A more challenging problem will be met as we proceed to select the themes to be studied by the Socio-Cultural Alternatives project, side by side with its task of providing a progressive comparative-critical evaluation of development alternatives provided by all research units of the two major streams of the Human and Social Development Programme.

Our guiding principle has been the following: to concentrate on the scientific areas which provide for an optimal combination of comparative evaluation, areas considered both as seminal theoretical areas and as posing crucial sets of tasks for policy-makers in the whole range of socio-cultural and political policies in a world now entering an era of global transformation, on the threshold of the 21st century. The choice of themes to be proposed, as indeed any other choice(s), is bound to be open to criticism. Yet, by defining our method — firmly set within the framework of the terms of reference of the UN University Charter and its definition of the Programme on Human and Social Development — we have sought to minimize arbitrariness and optimize objectivity, creativity, and efficacy. We must bear permanently in mind the fact that we are to evaluate and to prospect a whole range of problems from all regions of the world, albeit in vastly different, and often divergent, manifestations.

3.2.2 The major themes for our comparative-critical research and evaluation are the following.

(a) Cultural identity and socio-political change

This area will benefit from the concept of specificity, usefully getting away from abstract, essentialist typologies. And it will thus naturally lead to a refining of the different, and differing, positions of the problem of development itself, through the complex processes at work in the fields of social dialectics, of the perpetuation and novation, transformation, rise and decline, renaissance and crisis of human societies.

(b) Endogenous intellectual creativity

Starting from the position that human and social development is, fundamentally, a process of self-reliance — at the macro-level, by whole societies; at the micro-

level, by human groups and individuals — it will immediately appear that the key lies in endogenous (self-reliant) creativity as against the prevailing fashion of the “transfer” of knowledge, itself to be remodelled according to, precisely, alternative goals of development. And this creativity, contrary to exoticism and orientalism, lies at the very heart of the thought process itself, i.e., is essentially intellectual creativity, encompassing science, technology, philosophy, and social policy — jointly with culture and the arts.

- (c) New and emerging perceptions of prospects for human civilization
This is the field of the transformation of the world in our times, of the new international order (which is not only “economic”). The different perceptions of this global transformation will have to be assessed — at geopolitical, political, economic, strategic levels certainly; but also at the levels of ideas and theories, of modes of societal maintenance and evolution — as conceived of, and felt by, major civilizational and national-cultural areas of our world, encompassing the various political and social philosophies, religions, ideologies. A key area appears to be the notion of the civilizational project, often conceived of as a societal project (*le projet de société*), and its interrelation with the mainstream of socio-political systems and their accompanying ideologies.
- (d) Specificity and universality
At work through all scientific problem areas of our project is the problem, and concept, of specificity. It would, therefore, be proper to develop a universally valid theory of specificity, from, and bearing upon, major civilizational and national-cultural areas of the world. A second, culminating, step would then be to explore and consolidate the bridges between such specificities and our goal of universality, in the forthcoming epoch of human history.

Throughout, this whole project will be approached in a spirit of non-antagonistic dialectical contradictions, leading to complementarity.

4. Organization

4.1 The Regional Approach

It seems useful to make use of the regional divisions adopted, *inter alia*, by UNESCO.

- (a) Europe and North America, to be demultiplied into:
 - Europe
 - North America
- (b) Latin America and the Caribbean
- (c) Africa
- (d) the Arab region
- (e) Asia and Oceania, to be demultiplied into:
 - East Asia and Oceania
 - South Asia
 - Central and West Asia

In each of these regional groupings, one or more major regional and/or national institutions will act as the regional centre for the project. It would also be useful to establish consortia in each region, to ensure maximum representation and efficiency. A preliminary list will have to be established at this founding Task Force Meeting for adoption by the Human and Social Development Programme of the UN University.

4.2 Linkages between Regional and Thematic Groupings

It is proposed that the optimal form of linkage between the two types of units will be achieved by the following procedures.

4.2.1 Specific comparative critical scientific contribution of the project

- (a) One major scientific theme will be selected every year by the Board of the Socio-Cultural Alternatives project among the four suggested above.
- (b) This theme will be studied by different regional groups:
 - either by all of them in, say, a two- to three-year period, should we be limited to only two regional groups meetings per year;
 - or by all of them, in a shorter period, should we be able to arrange all or most of the regional meetings every year;
 - or again, by two selected regional groups per year, a second theme being devolved to two other regional groups the year after, etc.Obviously this will depend on the financial and organizational capabilities of the host institutions in different regions.
- (c) The proceedings of regional studies will then undergo a second stage of elaboration, both at theoretical and policy-making levels. This will be the task of the four Working Groups, which will be selected from the officers of the various Regional Groups according to their specialization. The thematic Working Groups would then be in the near-ideal position of combining the widest possible array of findings and positions of the problems, with a high level of comparative-critical capability.

4.2.2 Mediating the comparative-critical evaluation contribution of the project

- (a) As the work of different networks and units of the two major streams of the Human and Social Development Programme unfold, they will be sent to the SCA project for evaluation.
- (b) This evaluation will be undertaken at two levels:
 - the level of Regional Groups and thematic Working Groups, separate or combined, in fashions to be gradually defined; and
 - the level of the Board of the project, whose main scientific task will be to combine this comparative-critical evaluation of work in process with its own specific contribution (described under 4.3).

4.3 The Board

- (a) The over-all direction of the Socio-Cultural Alternatives project would be vested in the Board. The Board would be composed of Co-ordinators of Regional Groups, and Co-ordinators of the thematic Working Groups. It would be chaired by the Director of the Project, who would be able to benefit from the advice of the Programme Vice-Rector and the Programme Officer for Human and Social Development.
- (b) The Board would be represented by its Director on the Board of Directors of the Human and Social Development Programme..
- (c) Several members of the Board would take part in different meetings of the Human and Social Development Programme (panels, programme committee, etc.), to be defined by the Vice-Rector for Programme.
- (d) The Board of the project would meet once a year, in Tokyo preferably, to evaluate the project and decide its future course of implementation.
- (e) The representative panels of both the Regional Groups and the thematic Working Groups would be composed of a selected number of experts, and would meet in different regional centres. It is hoped that it will be feasible to organize one of the two types of meetings (regional and thematic) at the same time and location, to reduce costs and also for reasons of higher efficacy. The host institutions would organize lectures, workshops, and seminars in the host country, so as to benefit from the human resources available at the time of the meeting.

5. Publications

It is suggested the following two major types of publications be undertaken:

- (a) interim papers: state of the art; description of work in process; provisional results; and
- (b) formal books: presenting the proceedings and findings of the comparative-critical evaluation of major Human and Social Development Programme projects on the one hand, and, on the other hand, specific scientific research contributions of the project itself.

It is expected that the evolution of the project will be presented in official publications of the UN University, while contributions by members of the project will find their way to the scientific journals of the UN University.

2. Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World: Comments on the Project

by S. H. Alatas, University of Singapore

1. What I am suggesting here is intended to complement, at the level of the analytic research operation, the conceptual framework proposed by Dr. Anouar Abdel-Malek. The entire development effort centres upon satisfying human needs: the biogenic, the psychogenic and sociogenic, the realization of certain values, the achievement of a definite quality of life, and the attainment of justice.
2. In development research, it is necessary to keep in mind certain categories of the development process. These are the categories of quality and quantity, the sense of equilibrium, of right and wrong, of order and disorder, of the dialectic process, and of change and conservation. There are more such categories, but our aim here is only to bring them to attention.
3. In the development effort these categories influence the course of events. It is important to know what is believed to be correct by those involved in development. Since "right and wrong" is a category of action, the concepts of right and wrong development should also be considered as legitimate concepts, provided they can be established, and they can overcome the problem of development. Those who are developing expect the right development. Hence, we must be interested in the concept of right development. It is not correct to say that this is a matter for policy-makers. It is a matter for all concerned, including the social scientists involved in development.

3. Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World

by M. S. Abulezz, Arab League Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization

1. Perhaps the point of departure for the evaluation of development alternatives in their socio-cultural context is to define from the outset the characteristics of applied patterns of development which accompany political ideologies (the West European, the American, the Chinese, etc., or the basic types mentioned in Dr. Abdel-Malek's paper, namely: capitalism, liberal capitalism and monopoly capitalism, socialism, communism).

2. This should be followed by outlining the major socio-cultural lineaments of the contemporary world. The criteria for delimiting such cultural areas are varied (e.g., linguistic, ethnic, anthropo-geographic, political, economic, etc.). It might be important to assign eminent geographers to review the criteria for defining the major cultural regions of the world.

3. The prevailing demographic, economic, socio-political, and cultural characteristics of each cultural area or region should be accurately summarized and expounded in the light of the region's environmental background. Demographic characteristics, for instance, may include such items as: rate of population increase, literacy rate, public health and hygiene, population movements, densities, and traits (rural, urban, nomadic etc.; population structure in terms of occupations, sexual composition, age, etc.). The wider economic characteristics might be tackled along similar lines. These are, in a very broad delineation, represented in the Arab world by the following: engagement of the majority of the population in agriculture (subsistence and commercial), the move toward industrialization, marked supply of natural resources, etc. As the need for economic development becomes more and more emphasized, conflicts between the traditional and modern values have acquired great significance. The rapid advance of science and technology, and the compulsive need of the West to maintain its own growth, has had a serious impact on the Arab region, aroused scepticism about imported values, and made the integration of old traditions and modern attitudes very highly complex.

4. Current transformations in any given cultural region should next be analyzed from the cultural, social, economic, and political points of view. Special stress, in the Arab region, should be laid on the changes in dominant values and beliefs, and the liberation from traditional relationships and emotional bondage.

5. It is then important to proceed to defining the optimum conditions for an overall development which will meet pressing human needs, both material and intangible. In other words, what are the optimal objectives of development, and to what extent are the present-day political, economic, socio-cultural, and environmental policies in

any given region directed toward the achievement of over-all development? In this connexion, the objectives of the intellectuals should not be overlooked, particularly in developing countries where the intellectual segment of the population is striving for tolerance of beliefs, values, criticisms, socio-political participation, civil and human rights, and liberation from dominance by the northern hemisphere (in political, economic, and cultural matters).

4. Development Alternatives in a Changing World

by Stuart Holland, University of Sussex

1. When the United Nations and its various international institutions were established, they were very much under the dominance of the United States. Although the USSR remained a member of key significance in the Security Council, her effective membership was limited by the Cold War period. China, until relatively recently, was excluded.
2. The result was both politically and ideologically asymmetric on a global scale. In practice, the political ideology of Western liberal capitalism dominated both key UN programmes and key international development institutions. It was implicitly assumed that developing countries could repeat the development pattern of the already developed capitalist countries. The Rostow "stages of growth" theory was but a latter-day statement of this conventional wisdom.
3. The prevailing ideology has major implications for both the intra-national and inter-national mode of development attempted by developing countries subjected to scrutiny of their development programmes by the main international aid agencies.
4. Intra-nationally, major emphasis was placed on the quantitative scale of industrial investment, with a major bias towards urbanization. Implicitly, the programmes assumed that the free working of the market mechanism would result in a harmonious adjustment of the economic structure and its social and spatial distribution.
5. Inter-nationally, it was assumed that specialization of the principles of comparative advantage would enable developing countries to compensate their lower levels of technology through lower wages and more labour-intensive techniques of production. This equal exchange, plus a complementarity between trade from developing countries in commodities and raw materials, and from more developed countries in modern rather than traditional manufactures, was assumed to offer an equal inter-national partnership to developed and developing countries alike.
6. The implicit value system in such global perspectives was development through growth. A further implicit assumption was autonomy and independence for the State. The assumption of autonomy implied that the political and governmental institutions of the State would be independent from dominance by a particular social group or class. The international dimension of this independence was assumed to be the capacity of the State to exert its own sovereignty in international affairs.
7. In practice, it has come to be admitted that postwar international trade and

payments were highly unequal. It also has increasingly come to be admitted that most of the developing countries have been obliged to operate within a particular sphere of influence, and on largely dependent terms. The franc-zone countries remained largely tied to France and the sterling-zone ex-colonies orientated toward the United Kingdom for most of the postwar period. United States direct intervention in Southeast Asia followed major indirect intervention in Latin America.

8. With the high increase in the prices of basic commodities and raw materials in the early 1970s, followed by the OPEC oil price rise, some of the key features of the hitherto unequal terms of trade between more developed and developing countries have been reversed. Also, the global focus of hitherto key colonial countries such as France and the United Kingdom has shifted to Europe. United States withdrawal from Vietnam has been followed by the Carter administration's important declaration that the United States in the future will not support governments and regimes simply because they are anti-Communist.

9. Both economically and politically, these are important changes in the mid-1970s relative to the thirty years of postwar history. But they have been accompanied by other changes which have received less attention yet are as important for world development perspectives into the 21st century.

10. For one thing, the developed capitalist countries have lost their confidence that Keynesian demand-management policies, supplemented by indicative planning and indirect intervention, can assure full employment and a high level of public expenditure and social welfare. The combination of rising inflation with rising unemployment and stagnant investment has challenged not only the basic assumptions of the Keynesian welfare state, and its capacity to finance increasing public expenditure, but also the superiority of the liberal capitalist mode of development over more socialized alternatives.

11. In some cases, the political leadership in the nominally developed capitalist countries has tried to maintain that all was for the best in the best of all possible economic worlds until the OPEC oil price rises. Still others maintain that the joint cause of the current crisis has been excessive wage demands. Yet few are prepared to admit that the main factors in the pattern of postwar growth and development have been highly specific and probably unsustainable over the long term, whether or not commodity and oil price inflation had hit the capitalist world economy in the 1970s.

12. One factor was the dependence of high rates of capital accumulation in economies such as Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and to a lesser extent France, on reserves of labour drawn from agriculture. In 1945, these countries had from 1 in 4 to 1 in 5 of their workforce in farming. Today, the ratios are near or less than 1 in 10. In other words, the main part of the reserve labour force in these countries has been absorbed into the active labour force in industry or services. For

this reason, the full employment ceiling of these economies is now more static than it was in the thirty years following the war, and the potential for super-normal accumulation by drawing on labour reserves has largely come to an end.

13. Another factor was the particular demand structure of the postwar expansion in these economies. This was based essentially on construction projects (in many cases reconstruction after the war) and on the automobile and consumer-durables industries. But initial consumer demand for these products has given way to relative consumer saturation. Most consumers welcome their first home, first automobile, first refrigerator, first washing machine, first television. But they do not as clearly need three or four of each. Export demand in developing countries cannot cope with absorption of the surplus capacity in the supplying industries concerned, especially when the oil and commodity price increases have pre-empted a higher share of import capacity.

14. In some of the key "fast accumulators" of capital in the immediate postwar period, this has led to a fall in the rate of capital accumulation. For instance, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the rate of gross fixed domestic capital formation fell from 9 per cent per year in 1950–54 to 6 per cent in 1960–64 and less than one per cent in 1970–74 – i.e., investment accumulation had slumped before the oil price increases.

15. In addition, even if output growth in the main developed countries had been maintained through the 1970s, it would have been associated with a fall in industrial employment in most countries. For industrialized Western Europe as a whole, the rate of growth of product in the metal- and chemical-based industries increased in the 1960s relative to the 1950s, but the rate of growth of employment fell dramatically in these industries and was approaching zero. In other words, classic postwar industrialization could not have assured full employment without absorption of labour displaced from industry through technical progress and higher capital-intensity.

16. In most of the Western European economies, such labour was substantially absorbed by an increase in public-sector employment in social services and administration. But at the same time the fiscal basis of these states was being increasingly undermined through a failure to tax the most productive sectors of the economy effectively, and in particular manufacturing and export-oriented enterprises. The nominal tax from enterprises in these sectors was increasingly offset by a range of investment and export subsidies which meant that effective taxation was reduced substantially. By the mid-1970s, in some countries, for example the United Kingdom, the corporate industrial sector was paying virtually no effective tax. Under such circumstances, quite apart from the profitability crises caused for firms during the mid-1970s depression, governments could not continue to finance indefinitely the rising public expenditure on the absorption of labour displaced from industry, or on welfare-state type programmes.

17. The result has been a major ideological crisis for the welfare state economies. The assumption that full employment could be indefinitely assured through Keynesian economic policies of demand-management was profoundly undermined. The further assumption that indicative planning at the industry level, along French indicative-planning lines, could avoid the necessity for extensive state intervention in the structure of supply has also been challenged. The concept of the "mixed economy" as a half-way house between central government planning and the anarchy of the market has been under profound attack. Possibly the only developed economy which has been immune from these changed ground rules for public policy has been Japan.

18. In effect, the dominant ideology of Keynesian "managed capitalism" has given way to a dominant pre-Keynesian ideology of monetarism, associated in practice with Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economists. Friedman recommends cutting personal taxation, cutting public expenditure, and privatizing the public enterprise sector of the economy by selling off nationalized industries.

19. If there is no effective counter-challenge to the Friedmanite philosophy, the result will probably be catastrophic for both the developed and developing countries alike. As already argued, the fiscal crisis of the developed capitalist economies is not a matter of rising public expenditure as such, but of failure to tax the productive corporate sector of the economy in such a way as to cover such expenditure with effective tax revenue. Personal income tax may well be too high in some countries, but corporate income tax in key cases is low to nonexistent. Keynes' principles concerning public expenditure and demand management remain essentially correct in the sense that reducing public expenditure will reduce demand and thereby contract import demand and world trade.

20. In other words, on the demand side, the Friedmanite formula represents beggar-my-neighbour deflation by leading world economies. The world trade and payments system cannot recover through each of the economies concerned trying to gain an export surplus by reducing its import demand. Developing countries in particular will be hit by such deflationary policies, whether or not they become extensively supplemented by import controls on some products in some countries. The result in practice could be a slump of indefinite duration, setting the world trade and payments system, and the prospects for development, back nearly half a century.

21. By contrast, it is correct enough to maintain that the application of Keynes' demand and trade-management principles has been undermined in practice during the forty years since he published his *General Theory*. But the reason lies essentially in the transformation of the dominant mode of international production and trade which has occurred since Keynes, and the perverse relationship which has emerged between it and the previously dominant Keynesian ideology.

22. Basically, Keynes was writing at a stage of capitalist development when most

capital was based in one rather than several nation states, and when firms were essentially price competitive and price responsive. Further, at the lower levels of technological complexity of his time, the planning undertaken by most firms was mainly budgetary planning and relatively short-term.

23. In short, the micro-economic enterprises of the Keynesian model made sense at the time in real world terms. Firms and nation states were mainly small and responsive to changes in domestic demand or national exchange rates. Devaluation could work more or less effectively as a policy of international trade because of the competitive process, with firms reducing export prices in line with devaluation or vice versa.

24. However, the dominant enterprises in world trade and payments now are large, multinational enterprises producing in many different countries. If such firms followed through a devaluation with lower export prices to a country where they already were producers, they would be undercutting themselves rather than the "foreign competition" in such markets. Besides, the increasing concentration and centralization of capital has resulted in a situation where two or three firms typically dominate markets in any individual country. Even by Adam Smith's terms, rather than those of Karl Marx, such concentration tends to monopoly pricing and a situation of producer sovereignty rather than consumer sovereignty.

25. This erosion of the price-competitive edge of the Keynesian exchange-rate policy has been accompanied by an extension of the standard corporate planning period of enterprises in the big league sector, and its inclusion of the broad range of technical and economic factors rather than simple budget planning. As a result, the common corporate plan of big business is now in terms of five years or more, while the common planning horizon of governments — with the possible exception of Japan — is less than five years, with budget changes introduced annually or even more frequently. Thus, there is an increasing gap between the supply-planning cycle of big business and the demand-planning cycle of governments. Put simply, big business cannot afford to be seriously influenced in its corporate planning by the Keynesian "fine tuning" of demand. There is a basic new disharmony between government and big business.

26. Analytically, the new monopolistic and multinational companies demand a framework for analysis which transcends the conventional macro-micro distinction. Unlike the micro-economic enterprises of the competitive model, which were assumed to be too small to influence macro-economic aggregates, there now is a new meso-economic sector between the micro-sector of small firms and the macro-level of national or international aggregates and policy.

27. The new meso-economic sector can be illustrated in the United Kingdom's case by the fact that whereas the top 100 manufacturing companies in the United King-

dom accounted for only 20 per cent of the value of output in 1950, they now account for some half of manufacturing output and employment, and more than half of industrial assets and export trade. In fact, 75 firms account for half of the United Kingdom's visible exports, and 31 firms for 40 per cent of such exports. This is against some 60,000 regularly exporting companies and some two-thirds of a million companies in the economy.

28. Put differently, a minor fraction of one per cent of the enterprises in the United Kingdom now accounts for half of the main macro-economic aggregates of investment, output, employment, and export trade. Implicitly also, these firms command half of the price determination in the economy — and more than half if one takes their oligopolistic price leadership into account. It is in this sense that their structure and influence is different from the remaining 99 per cent of micro-economic enterprises. Also, all the top 100 firms are effectively multinational in operation.

29. Similar dominance by big business is reflected in key Western European economies such as the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Italy, where less than 2 per cent of enterprises represents half of the main economic aggregates. The multinational nature of their dominance is reflected in the fact that some 330 companies now account for half of the industrial sales in the European community. This level of concentration appears marginally higher than in the United States, though lower than in Japan.

30. In other words, the developed capitalist economies show themselves to be well-launched on the path to global domination as indicated by the prediction of Hymer that in the foreseeable future between 300 and 400 companies could dominate two-thirds of world industrial output; or the prediction by Barber that by around 1980 some 300 companies could control three-quarters of world manufacturing assets.

31. If governments wish to ensure either an independent or a joint capacity to manage the main outcome of development perspectives on a global scale throughout the rest of this century, they will have to take account of the broad range of these transformations in the nature of growth and the structure of economic power since the Second World War.

32. To summarize the transformations:

- (a) the high rates of accumulation of capital and increase of employment of the 1950s have given way to falling accumulation and employment in the 1960s, with prospects of a shrinking industrial base in developed countries in the future, even if output levels are recovered;
- (b) national incentives to capital have reduced the fiscal basis of developed capitalist economies through rebated taxation or non-taxation, reducing the nation's capacity to finance increased public expenditure, and thereby reducing actual and potential demand in both the national and international economy;

- (c) the trend to monopoly and multinational capital has imbalanced the previously more or less equal relationship between big business and the state in most developed countries and has resulted in a new meso-economic sector between the micro-economic enterprise of national economies and national or international aggregates and policies; and
- (d) the model of private consumption growth in the future has been threatened by its relative success in the past, reducing further the potential for expansion on the basis of private expenditure, private criteria for the allocation of resources, and private enterprise control of the commanding heights of the global capitalist system.

33. Essentially, if governments in developed economies are to be able to assure relative stability and expansion in world trade and payments, they will have to change their own model of development relative to the previous postwar period. Such changes will be a precondition for effective markets in developed economies for exports from developing countries, including exports of commodities and raw materials.

34. It is arguable that the major challenge to such changed development perspectives is ideological. Liberal capitalism was "legitimized" by the Keynesian revolution in economic ideology. By arguing that if the state intervened to manage the level of demand it would not need to intervene directly in the structure or ownership of supply, Keynes appeared to have circumvented the necessity for public ownership and social control of capital within the mature capitalist economies. Although he was in favour of progressive taxation and a redistribution of income, he distinguished this case for social justice from economic demand-management as such. Basically, Keynesian demand-management policy meant raising or lowering the prevailing levels of effective demand within the system, rather than socializing either demand or supply structures.

35. Also, according to the Keynesian paradigm as applied by his postwar disciples, unemployment was unlikely to be combined with inflation, since it would reduce the bargaining power of trade unions to increase wages, while firms would compete during a recession for a larger share of declining markets through lowering prices.

36. It could be claimed that the simplest short-term resolution of the combination of high unemployment and inflation in developed countries would be a combination of reflation with price controls. During the current recession the meso-economic price leaders in the system faced new fixed costs relative to the inter-war period, which have reduced the downward price flexibility hitherto associated with recession. For one thing — reflecting a major social gain in the postwar period — trade unions are largely able to prevent an actual reduction of wages, rather than an increase in unemployment. Further, the switch from stock market finance — which need not be repaid or repaid in full during a recession — to bank and bond borrowing, has represented a new fixed cost for enterprises which they have to meet by maintaining or

increasing prices during a recession of demand.

37. Both these factors could be offset — jointly with the fixed costs of under-utilized capacity — through a reflation of demand via public expenditure. This would reduce the unit costs of enterprises, since their fixed costs would be covered by higher units of output.

38. But to achieve such a reflation of demand — in the first instance through a reversal of the present scheduled expenditure cuts in various countries — it would be important to ensure that big business in the meso-economic sector restrains price increases (to avoid dissuading consumers from further personal expenditure rather than saving their new income).

39. The obstacles to such reflation lie substantially in the extent to which it would involve major public intervention in the cost, profit, and pricing structures of big business in the meso-economic sector — in other words, a new dimension to the relationship between big business and the state, transcending the Keynesian framework of indirect intervention and challenging the dominant Friedmanite ideology of reduced rather than increased state intervention in the economy.

40. In itself, this represents a challenge which the EEC Commission so far has rejected. For instance, the above arguments were embodied in a report on inflation prepared by an international working group and chaired by Robert Maldague, head of the Belgian Plan and chairman of the Medium-Term Economic Policy Committee of the European Community. The Commission effectively tried to suppress the report, which it had itself sponsored, refusing to release copies to journalists or the European Assembly.

41. Similarly, the British Labour Government since 1974 has refused to implement such a strategy for reflation, with increased public intervention and social control in the meso-economic sector, despite the fact that such policies have been embodied in its economic programmes since 1973, and in the corresponding programmes of the British Trades Union Congress.

42. Moreover, this rejection is doubly significant, granted that reflation on such lines will not in itself cope with the longer term structural changes in the pattern of private consumption development of the main capitalist economies since the war.

43. In practice, it is arguable that the more developed economies will need to consider major new dimensions along the following lines if they are to be able to transform their postwar economic growth into sustainable development, and to offer prospects of increased demand for the exports of developing countries:

- (a) equalized employment hours for the populations of working age, rather than 40 hours a week plus overtime for some of the population and permanent struc-

tural unemployment for others;

- (b) equalized personal incomes as an incentive to sustained output of basic consumer goods, the demand for which is relatively saturated at prevailing levels of unequal income distribution;
- (c) increased social income, in the sense of extending public services in the economy which are not paid for directly by consumers, thereby offsetting the inflationary spiral of higher wage demands chasing higher public service charges;
- (d) increased social services, extending the area of those services which are not directly paid for in the above sense, including services for basic needs such as housing, health, education, social welfare, leisure, and transport;
- (e) extended social or public enterprises in the meso-economic sector of the economy, as direct instruments for fulfilling investment and productivity targets for the industrial sector of the system; and
- (f) extended social control over meso-economic enterprises, including greater accountability to, and scrutiny by, both parliaments and trade unions.

44. In such a framework, the equalization of employment hours — possibly to a 35-hour week — could be accompanied by a more genuine socialization of both demand and supply than was anticipated forty years ago by Keynes. Extended public leverage and social control in the meso-economic sector could ensure that major increases in productivity through rationalization did not lead to the unequal social costs now imposed on particular groups of workers in society.

45. Public countervailing of private economic power in the meso-economic sector could be internationalized, at a minimum, on the basis of new social and economic accounting by the multinational enterprises which now dominate international trade and payments.

46. Meso-economic accounting could take the form of international agreements to publish the upper half of the main economic aggregates of investment, output, employment, and trade represented by individual enterprises. If agreed internationally on a UN basis, this would give governments internationally the information on which to base their individual planning for a new mode of development based on the new social criteria already outlined.

47. New criteria for the social use of economic resources would become operable in such a framework: in other words, social criteria not only concerning the environment and non-pollution, but also relating to respect for trade unions and human rights on the basis of UN criteria which are already established yet at present widely unenforced.

48. It is clear enough that such a framework for public accountability and social control of the resources of dominant enterprises, in a reflationary context, is diametrically opposed to the Friedmanite ideology of recovery through a thousand cuts in

public expenditure. It also is clear that such a framework would only make possible new terms of reference for development strategy, not in itself resolve the problems of global development.

49. Nonetheless, the suggested framework points up that the issues of development have changed during the postwar period, and that they crucially concern the so-called developed world economies, as well as developing countries. A protracted world slump will benefit neither dominant private enterprises in the world economy, nor national economies.

50. To the extent that the ideological challenge of a new mode of social development is focused on public intervention and social control of the meso-economic sector which now dominates global production, distribution, and exchange, it also offers an intermediate mode of development between total state control of all aspects of economic activity and the lack of effective controls in the mature capitalist economies.

51. In other words, if effective control by the public authorities is exercised over the meso-economic sector of national economies, this can permit greater liberalization in the micro-economic sector of the economy than is now allowed in some countries, without giving up either public accountability or social criteria for development. This clearly is relevant to the mode of development of countries such as the USSR.

52. Conversely, the extension of public accountability and social control over meso-economic enterprises in the mature capitalist economies could enable them to exert a strategic control over the use of resources in society without diminishing the personal and political freedom of individuals in society.

53. If this dimension to the feasibility of a "convergence thesis" between the communist and capitalist worlds is seriously considered in the developed economies, it also is highly relevant to the developing countries. Global accounting by big business is not a simple technicality, but a necessary premise for the exercise of social control, on a world scale, of dominant enterprises. Extensive trade concessions by the developed to the developing economies become more feasible in a world economy where the developed countries are in command of their own economic destiny.

54. Within such a framework of social control, socialized expenditure, and public accountability, there is no reason why a uniform development path should be imposed on particular developing countries. The particular mix of the public and private sectors in individual countries themselves could and should be left to the political determination of those countries themselves. The important premise for such individual autonomy for developing countries is the greater security over their own economic outcome which could be achieved by the more developed countries, in a framework of social development, through adoption of policy options on the previously elaborated lines.

5. Remarks Concerning the Project Entitled "Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World"

by Lê Thành Khoi, University of Paris

1. The notion of "alternatives for development" does repudiate the "ethnocentrism" of those theories which are based on one or two models of development considered as the only possible ones.
2. The problem is, however, to agree on the meaning of "development". Certainly, development is no longer identified with economic growth. But it seems that not all the implications of the concept are indeed accepted.
3. I think development means, from the point of view of *ends*, that the whole population benefits and not a minority, whichever minority it may be; in this view, development must involve the creation of more social justice as well as the liberation of the exploited and oppressed classes.
4. Secondly, development is multidimensional. The raising of the standard of living is necessary but not sufficient. Development for the people means their spiritual emancipation; it must assure them the dignity of being free and responsible, the consciousness of being the subjects of history.
5. If we accept these criteria, we have to criticize the "alternatives of development" which don't fulfil them partly or wholly.
6. From the point of view of *means*, this conception implies that the concerned populations take part in the determination of the goals as well as in the realization of the different projects. Thus, the process must be, first, independent, that is to say, it is up to the community to choose its own model; and secondly, authentic — that is, the choice has to find its source in its own culture.
7. An educational effort, in the widest sense, is necessary so that the population becomes conscious of what is at stake; otherwise it may be alienated either by ignorance and domination or by seduction by foreign models. "Authenticity" itself, as a concept is not free of mystery. We have to distinguish between the positive and negative factors existing in any culture, traditional or modern, and this cannot happen by disregarding the interests of the people, that is to say, by disregarding the criterion of democracy.
8. Among the possible orientations of the research, I would propose the following guideline topics.
 - (a) The notion of "cultural identity" in relation to that of "authenticity" as well

as to that of “return to the roots”. In what way and since when has it appeared? How is it understood in different countries and how is it used by international organizations? Has it been translated into a development policy? Comparison of goals and results.

- (b) The study of the internal socio-cultural factors which promote or brake development in several countries or regions. Among those factors, let’s mention morals, religion, philosophy, family, and so on, without forgetting the military tradition. It is also important to distinguish in each of these factors the positive and negative aspects with regard to development (in the sense we have already defined it).
- (c) The cultural aggression by science and technology. Development implies the application of science and technology. But they are being monopolized by industrial countries. To what extent have this monopoly and the use of modern communication and educational media become instruments of domination? To what extent do they favour or discourage development? How could we diminish the negative effects and increase the positive ones, mainly with regard to the cultural identity and the creativity of the people?

6. Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World: A Few Reflections

by Saburo Ichii, Seikei University

1. Basically I support the project plan (including its philosophy) proposed by Dr. Abdel-Malek, and I fully sympathize with almost all points made in Dr. Lê Thành Khoi's paper. I think, however, that the presentation of my views on two problems — namely that of the goal of development and that of creativity — may not be out of place.
2. Dr. Lê Thành Khoi writes that his "conception implies that the concerned populations take part in the determination of the goals as well as in the realization of the different projects. Thus, the process must be first independent, that is to say, it is up to the community to choose its own model" In principle, I agree. My contention, however, is that goals chosen independently by a community at a particular historical time may be interpreted as short-range specifications of a long-range, universalistic goal.
3. To say it straightforwardly, what I have in mind as such a goal is the decrease in the various pains inflicted upon people by those things over which they have no control. I call this, in short, the principle of decreasing absurd pains. Clarification must be made.
4. For instance, the fact that a person is born as a Vietnamese (or of a particular colour, or as a member of a particular family) is a thing over which the person himself has no control. Still, the fact makes enormous differences to his fate. Many Vietnamese had to endure the pain of being killed in order to resist foreign invasions. Many Africans had to die of hunger or endemics merely because they were born there.
5. So the goals of liberating themselves from foreign invasions, or from hunger or endemics, could be interpreted as specific forms of a wider goal, namely the goal of decreasing absurd pains. Hence, the specific may partake of the universalistic.
6. Now a few remarks on endogenous creativity. Historically, we can recognize that creativity or innovation often came from the effort to return to the original spirit of a now decayed tradition. For instance, the Reformation in Christendom was brought about by a European effort to go back to the true spirit of the tradition of Christianity. Any tradition tends to deteriorate, but any initiative which later becomes a real tradition contains moments of lively innovation or creativity. So the nostalgic endeavour, so to speak, to go back to the original spirit often becomes the source of new innovation or creativity.

7. Whether a thing is really a tradition of a human community does not depend on its origin. Ancient Greek philosophy (or pre-science) could become a tradition in northern Europe after the Renaissance. Ancient Chinese doctrine (Confucianism) has been a tradition of Japanese thought since around the 13th century (in both cases, accompanied by certain modifications or novelties). Traditionalization took place when foreign ideas took secure root in new soil. In other words, the question is whether independent minds can assimilate foreign ideas while using independent judgement.

8. This somewhat sweeping generalization of mine — that innovation or creativity is only possible when it is based on preceding tradition of some kind — applies to cases of scientific or cultural innovations. I will not dwell upon this any further. But lastly a few words: No creativity without tradition.

7. Socio-Cultural Development Alternatives in a Changing World: A Response

by Everett Kleinjans, President, East-West Center

1. Inherent in the concept of development is the idea of improving the quality of life. For those working in the field of development, both planners and implementers, development can be considered as a process increasing a society's capability to enhance the quality of life of its people. Development therefore means change, and the drive for development is one of the major sources of the rapid change that is taking place in the world.

2. The socio-cultural elements of a group of people — nation or society — are dynamic, changing with time. Therefore, evaluation is not a static concept and comparison must be made longitudinally across time as well as horizontally across cultures and nations. The scientific approach (the empirical method, the attitude of "show me") for example, has challenged many, if not most, of the traditional beliefs and values of the West. And the battle still goes on. It started in the physical sciences with the challenge of Copernicus and Galileo to the traditional view of the place of the earth in the universe. It continued through the biological sciences when Darwin challenged people's beliefs about their origins, and Freud gave a different psychological explanation for the motivation of our behaviour. Present-day historians challenge the historicity of the traditional presentation and interpretation of past events, and textual criticism has raised doubts about how religious books came to be written. The sociology of knowledge shows that what people believe tends to depend upon the social support they get. When all of these factors are added to the growth of the big city where there is more than one world view, where mass media define what is news, timely, and relevant, where movies and books not only determine style but knock traditional piety, then one can begin to perceive the causes and result of change, and the devastatingly stimulating or stimulatingly devastating impact which it has upon people. Certainly, the beliefs and values of present-day Westerners, certainly of present-day Americans, are different from those of their forefathers. Thus, a socio-cultural evaluation of the quality of life in the United States will be seen in a perspective by Americans of 1976 which is quite different from that of our forefathers in 1776. In fact, the battle goes on between those holding to what they perceive as traditional beliefs and values and those who profess to be "modern". Evaluation, therefore, is dynamic and changing, rather than normative.

3. Human and social development can be looked at from many perspectives with different dimensions. I would like to mention two.

(a) Within human society there is a need for human sustenance, human settlements, and human services (three s's for mnemonic purposes). The three overlap, but in

general "sustenance" refers to food, shelter, clothing, work, health, and other necessities to sustain human life; "settlements" refers to the places where people live, work, play, and how these spaces are arranged or organized for social life; and "services" refers to provisions by governments (increasingly) of education, recreation (play), protection (law, penal system), health care (medicine), social work (care of the young, aged, deviants, etc.), and communication and public transportation. Of course, it is immediately apparent that all three are intertwined, as, for example, when a person works to sustain himself within a factory located in a settlement and the government deducts a certain portion of his salary for social security. It is also clear that wealthy people have the capability of buying sustenance, space in good settlements, and quality services, whereas provision of these necessities to the poor is the concern of the development planner.

(b) A second perspective on development considers quality of life to be the criterion of progress. Quality of life has at least two dimensions: standard of living, and meaning of existence. "Standard of living" has generally to do with the provision of the basic physical necessities mentioned above — food, clothing, shelter, health — without which life can not be maintained. In other words, there is a basic floor-level of human existence and when humans fall below that level they tend to become inhuman. But "meaning of existence" does not come merely from piling up necessities. In fact, judging by the experience of affluent countries, it can be said that there also seems to be a ceiling-level of existence and that conspicuous consumption above it seems immoral and demoralizing. But given the floor and the ceiling (assuming that they can not only be defined, but also that everyone is between them) human beings still need some kind of meaning in their existence, something beyond the provision of these physical needs. Again, there is no clear line between standard of living and the meaning of existence, but thought must be given to that second element.

4. Most discussions of the meaning of existence begin with religion and/or philosophy. Since we are dealing with a plurality of religions and philosophies, let me try to outline a few indicators that seem to have their origin in human nature itself. Peter Berger outlines some of these in a different context in his little book *A Rumor of Angels* (Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., Garden City, New York, 1969).

5. There is probably no greater drive in human beings than the propensity for *order*, the craving for *orientation*. Evidences of the craving for orientation can be seen in the recent popularity of the book *Roots* and its TV presentation. The scientific researcher tries to make order out of his data; in fact, science can be defined as a determined attempt to "make sense" out of complex reality. Within the Hebraic-Christian tradition, God is said to have made the world by creating order out of chaos. Berger, who is deeply concerned with people in everyday life, tells of the way in which a mother reassures her anxious child.

"A child wakes up in the night, perhaps from a bad dream, and finds himself surrounded by darkness, alone, beset by nameless threats. At such a moment the con-

tours of trusted reality are blurred or invisible, and in the terror of incipient chaos the child cries out for his mother. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that, at this moment, the mother is being invoked as a high priestess of protective order. It is she (and, in many cases, she alone) who has the power to banish the chaos and to restore the benign shape of the world. And, of course, any good mother will do just that. She will take the child and cradle him in the timeless gesture of the Magna Mater who became our Madonna. She will turn on a lamp, perhaps, which will encircle the scene with a warm glow of reassuring light. She will speak or sing to the child, and the content of this communication will invariably be the same — ‘Don’t be afraid — everything is in order, everything is all right.’ If all goes well, the child will be reassured, his trust in reality recovered, and in this trust he will return to sleep.” (pp. 54–55)

6. A second drive in man is for *play* and *humour*. Every society displays both — and both are needed to add zest to life. When people play, they are on a different schedule. They lose all sense of time. “Why are you late for dinner, Johnny?” “I’m sorry, Mommy, but I was playing (baseball, basketball, chess, or whatever) and completely forgot about the time.” Although formal play is constrained by time, especially when broadcast on TV and radio, informal play does not go by the clock, but by the structure of the game — the second inning, the third quarter, your move. Much of art is like play. Painting a picture, producing drama (a play!), playing (n.b.) a musical instrument, or creative writing, are activities in which people often lose their sense of time. In a sense, play lifts people out of the mundane world, providing a taste of the eternal.

7. Humour deals with the incongruities and discrepancies in the ordered world. The mighty politician stumbles and falls on his face as he gets off his airplane. The great philosopher is seen picking his nose. It is possible that one of the reasons for the great number of jokes about sex is that the act of procreation is absolutely essential to the survival of the human race and therefore of utmost seriousness but, at the same time, is not one of the most graceful human acts. On the one hand, humour shows man his finiteness, but on the other hand, it therefore gives him clearer perceptions of reality. Laughter is the physiological release of the constraints of finiteness, order, and tragedy. People laugh while at play and, of course, laugh at humour. The point is that both play and humour, besides providing relief from heaviness, an interlude of lightness, also provide human beings with an added dimension to life, an insight, some significance and meaning.

8. A third human drive is for *creativity* and *hope*. Human beings do not want to feel helpless. They want to realize their dreams, embody their hopes, improve their lot. An artist finishes his work despite bad health. Pride of craftsmanship lends significance to his life. A person sacrifices for others despite risks. There is a deep desire in people to be able to do something new that will make the future better than the present, to be the actor rather than the victim. History is then neither a blind

plunge into the pit nor an automatic escalator to progress and the good life. It consists of people struggling to create, to make a better future. Hope only comes wrapped in human flesh.

9. Upon the basis of this simplified view of human life, let's look at the task before us. First, it should be said that the setting of goals must precede everything else. Goals determine the answers to the questions of what kind of technology and which indicators. Technology for what? Technology is, must be, a means, not an end. Indicators of what? What are the priorities? Is technology to be used for food production, human settlement, clothing, communication, mobility, the creation of jobs, the elimination of human drudgery, or the production of musical instruments for a symphony orchestra? Once our goals and priorities are set, a search can be made for the proper, appropriate technology. Existing implements and tools could possibly be transferred or transformed, or new ones developed. The decision about goals will have to be made by each socio-cultural group within the context of its own values.

10. Finally, if some of the above is true, it will bear upon indicators of the quality of life and provide insight into the success, or unsuccess, of the human and social development we are discussing in this seminar. The following list is merely suggestive of the kind of indicators which might be used.

- (a) Human sustenance
 - (i) Is each person getting the 2,000 to 2,500 calories needed to sustain life each day?
 - (ii) What is the number of jobs? The rate of unemployment? How satisfying are the jobs?
 - (iii) How is income distributed?
- (b) Human settlements
 - (i) How much space does each person have? At home, at work, for play and recreation? How much space does each person really need?
 - (ii) What is the condition of the space?
- (c) Human services
 - (i) What is the level of education? How many people go through how many grades of school? What is the literacy rate? How many books and libraries are available? How well are public libraries used?
 - (ii) What is the level of public health? What is the rate of infant mortality and life expectancy? How many children are immunized?
 - (iii) What is the level of security in a country? How much violence is there? How prevalent is fear?
 - (iv) What is the amount of space set aside for recreation and play? How many parks, athletic fields, swimming pools, walking or cycling paths? How much music, drama, and art? How many professionals? How involved are the ordinary people, the non-professionals?
 - (v) What is the status of communication? Number of telephones? Radios?

Newspapers? Magazines?

- (vi) What is the status of mobility? Is there a public transportation system?
- (vii) How many people are able to repair their own homes, furniture, and machines? What is the prevalence of hand tools for that purpose?

11. It will be noticed that I have hardly referred to gross national product and other economic variables that most development models deal with. This was the case, first of all, because I am not an economist and therefore cannot speak in economic terms; and secondly, I have attempted in this short paper to respond to the general theme of socio-cultural comparative evaluation of development alternatives in a changing world, the theme of this seminar.

APPENDIX III: PRELIMINARY LIST OF SUGGESTED INSTITUTIONS

REGION	INSTITUTION	
EUROPE	— Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique	Paris
	— Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Soviet Sociological Association)	Moscow
NORTH AMERICA	— Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations State University of New York	Binghamton, New York
	— The National Humanities Center	North Carolina
PACIFIC	— East-West Center, Hawaii	Honolulu
ARAB REGION	— Institute of Arab Research and Studies (ALECSO) League of Arab States	Cairo
	— Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Economiques et Sociales	Tunis
SOUTHEAST ASIA	— Commission Nationale des Sciences Sociales	Hanoi
	— University of Singapore	Singapore
SOUTH ASIA	— Institute of Economic Growth	Delhi
	— Indian Council of Social Science Research	Delhi
EAST ASIA	— Academia Sinica	Peking
	— University of Kyoto, Institute of Humanities	Kyoto
	— Institute of Developing Economies	Tokyo
WEST ASIA	— Institute for Research on Planning of Science and Education	Teheran
LATIN AMERICA	— Centro de Investigaciones Sociales University of Mexico (UNAM)	Mexico City
	— Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO)	Buenos Aires
	— CEBRAP	São Paulo
TROPICAL AFRICA	— Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA)	Dakar

APPENDIX IV: SUB-THEMES RECOMMENDED BY PARTICIPANTS

- (a) Cultural identity and national socio-political change
 - (i) Effects of modernization on dominant values and beliefs.
 - (ii) Shift from the eternal to the temporal aspects of life.
 - (iii) Exogenous influences on societal elements: values, distribution of power, wealth, opportunity, etc.
 - (iv) Restructuring and rearrangement of social stratification.
 - (v) Transformation of family structure.
 - (vi) Effects of the superimposition of Western political systems.
 - (vii) Cultural homogenization (i.e., urban culture is in the main similar).
 - (viii) Reawakening pride in the past and the pursuit of national and regional identity.
 - (ix) National liberation and national development.
 - (x) Language, cultural identity, and education.
 - (xi) National and international (world) identity in relation to national and international (world) change.
 - (xii) National cultural identity and the new international (economic) order.
- (b) Endogenous and intellectual creativity
 - (i) International creativity as stimulant and/or obstacle to national creativity.
 - (ii) Cinema in intellectual creativity.
 - (iii) Socio-cultural, political, and economic prerequisites of cultural creativity.
 - (iv) Creativity and the integration of traditions and modern attitudes.
 - (v) Leisure and intellectual creativity.
 - (vi) Objectives of the intellectuals in developing countries.
 - (vii) Authenticity and creativity.
 - (viii) Ecological implications of intellectual creativity.
 - (ix) Creativity and the revitalization of traditional cultural modes.
 - (x) Creativity and national self-reliance.
 - (xi) Maximization of intellectual creativity.
 - (xii) Development of intellectual creativity.
 - (xiii) Negative effects of educational systems on creativity (awakening to the opportunity for higher incomes, not to the knowledge the education has bestowed).
 - (xiv) Youth and creativity.
 - (xv) Materialistic societies and their influence on non-creativity in arts and upon aesthetic values.